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Prologue
I first visited Koh Sralao village in June 1998. The area sur-rounding the village had recently (1996) obtained Ramsar site 
status because of the health and abundance of mangrove trees 
in this part of the Gulf of Thailand. Being Canadian and new 
to mangrove ecology, I was awestruck as we boated through the 
extensive stands of mangroves. Birds flew through the trees, 
monkeys swung between branches, and I saw expanses of white 
sand in places. The landscape was truly magnificent. I could 
see why people were migrating from other parts of Cambodia 
to live in this resource-rich area.
Six weeks later, however, much of the lush mangrove canopy 
surrounding the village was gone, particularly at the estuary 
edges where only trunks of trees remained. Villagers had an 
opportunity to earn decent money from the sale of mangrove 
logs in the final days prior to the 1998 national election. This 
episode of small-scale logging was a product of a particular 
point in time: officials turning a blind eye toward resource 
extraction during a chaotic pre-election campaigning period. 
I was witnessing what I took to be a classic tragedy of the com-
mons scenario, where multiple individual actions were resulting 
in serious deforestation.
In the years that followed, I continued to visit this village on 
a near annual basis. With time, villagers halted the mangrove 
decline and initiated an active mangrove replanting campaign 
(500 ha), an environmental education campaign, and monitor-
ing and patrolling activities. These local-level experiences fed 
into national resource governance reforms. Against great odds, 
villagers had persisted and found a way to maintain their live-
lihood while also perusing a resource management mandate.
My second shock came in 2010, twelve years after first arriv-
ing to this area. On our boat ride towards Koh Sralao village 
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we passed a dozen or so large barges filled with either sand 
or a serious amount of sand extraction equipment. Then, as 
we arrived at the village, I saw a dozen or so abandoned stilt-
framed houses dotting the shoreline. By way of explanation, 
I was told that around a sixth of the households had left the 
village in the past year. People were leaving because of serious 
declines in the swimming crab population and high debt levels 
thought to be linked to the sand mining operations that had been 
taking place near local fishing grounds since 2008. Needless to 
say, this situation angered and saddened me immensely.
—M. Marschke, field research reflections, June 2010
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Source: Ministry of Environment, Cambodia, August 2010.
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I have always found a way to earn money, and as my children got 
older I have been able to help my village, too. I fished with my father, 
went into the army, became a dynamite fisher and charcoal kiln 
owner, returned to dive fishing, started selling goods from home, 
began work with the village resource management committee and 
recently was elected onto the commune council.
In general, everything is going well. But I am not sure if the village 
is such a good place for my children. There are fewer fish, every-
thing is expensive since goods are brought in by boat, and it is hard 
to protect and manage our natural resources as more people become 
interested in them. Some people are starting to leave the village, 
which makes us all think about our future.
—Excerpts from an interview with  
Wayne Som Sak, Cambodia, 2010
Wayne Som Sak’s reflection upon his livelihood speaks vol-umes about the changes taking place in the Cambodian 
countryside. Wayne lives in a mangrove-estuary village sur-
rounded by trees, water and fish. For many years Wayne has 
been able to make his living from the natural resources found 
in this area, through selling fish—caught in various ways—and 
by producing charcoal, among other things. At a certain point,
inTroduCTion
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perhaps a decade ago, Wayne became involved in resource 
management and other village work and diversified into non-
fishing activities. Wayne’s comment about it being “hard” to 
protect natural resources hints at the tension between balancing 
resource extraction with resource protection, and the challen-
ges of enforcing rules when outsiders (other fishers, or those 
interested in coastal resources) come into the area. Meanwhile, 
fisheries continue to decline. For these reasons, Wayne is hesi-
tant about the future of life in this village, being unsure if his 
children will be able to sustain themselves or, given the distance 
from other services, if they will even want to.
This book is about people, livelihoods and resource govern-
ance strategies in coastal Cambodia. I am curious as to how 
people who are dependent upon the natural resources in and 
around their village handle the schism between livelihood 
opportunities that involve some degree of resource extraction 
and resource governance, particularly in areas where multiple 
interests compete for the same resources. Cambodia, as a 
society weighed down by violence and poverty, provides for 
a particularly illuminating case. Governance reforms due to 
donor programs and the creation of new policies have set out 
to improve the condition of the population (Li 2007) through 
an active democratization process, including emphasizing local 
resource governance. Although these processes have created 
formal rules, Cambodia remains a place where formal rules can 
easily be replaced by the personal and the informal, particularly 
by those with power (Hughes 2009). This begs the question of 
how resource governance intersects with rural livelihoods in 
the Cambodian context.
My focus in this book is on resource governance rather than 
resource management.1 I do this because resource manage-
1 Another reason that I focus on resource governance is that classic notions of resource 
management are associated with, among other things, a separation of humans from the 
environment, the commodification of nature, a division between resource users and 
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ment focuses on the operational decisions necessary to achieve 
a specific resource outcome, whereas resource governance 
incorporates politics, the broader processes and institutions 
through which a policy agenda is set, along with specific 
rights and responsibilities (Kooiman et al. 2005; Jentoft and 
Chuenpagdee 2009). Scholars are interested in how relationships 
between actors can facilitate or hinder how a society transforms 
the way natural resources are governed (Crona and Hubacek 
2010). Therefore, an emphasis on resource governance enables 
me to consider how decision-making occurs between state 
and nonstate actors, and how power is exercised over natural 
resources more generally (Béné 2005; Sneddon and Fox 2007). 
In doing so, I can pay careful attention to who profits and loses 
from such processes (Béné and Neiland 2006), the system of 
rules that are put into place, and what guides these processes 
(Rosenau 2003). Since resource governance is broader in scope 
than resource management, I generally use this term except 
when writing about specific resource or fisheries management 
activities.
I define resources broadly, to acknowledge the utilitarian 
and the ecosystem functions provided by natural resources. 
Traditionally, natural resources have been viewed as assets for 
human satisfaction or utility, being only of value to the extent 
that they can also be used to create goods and services (Berkes 
2010c). Land, forests and fish were seen as commodities for the 
market, and industrial, colonial and post-colonial development
 managers, and the rise of a managerial class (cf. Berkes 2010a for a careful review). 
Resource management has implications of the “domination of nature, efficiency, social 
and ecological simplification, and expert-knows-best, command-and-control approaches” 
(Berkes 2010a: 33). Moreover, to my mind, management and governance are not synonym-
ous. Whereas management involves operational decisions to achieve specific resource 
outcomes, governance refers to the broader processes and institutions through which 
societies make decisions that affect the environment. For these reasons, resource and 
environmental management continues to be reframed, repositioned and connected with 
governance (Armitage 2010 pers. communication).
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has been predicated to a certain extent on the exploitation of 
such natural resources (Bernstein 2010). Natural resources, 
however, encompass far more than this. Natural resources may 
provide economic opportunities, health benefits and aesthetic 
pleasures or add to welfare (Béné et al. 2010) and well-being, 
and contribute toward regulating and sustaining ecosystems 
(Biermann and Boas 2010). As such, natural resources are more 
than a commodity for human use, although this component is 
important, since they also maintain diversity and contribute 
toward social-ecological sustainability (Berkes 2010c).
I ground my analysis of resource governance by focusing 
on livelihood trajectories in one resource-dependent village.2 
Livelihoods are dynamic, complex and often unpredictable, 
since “goals, preferences, resources and means are constantly 
reassessed in view of new unstable conditions” (De Haan 
and Zoomers 2003: 357). A livelihood is more than “hav-
ing to make a living to get by” (Bebbington 1999: 33), rather 
encompassing a complex web of activities and interactions.3 
Accessing livelihood opportunities, which are governed by 
social  relations, institutions and organizations, with power 
being an important explanatory variable, remains a challenge 
(De Haan and Zoomers 2005). Livelihood activities are not 
neutral: they engender processes of inclusion and exclusion. 
As such, the classic agrarian questions à la Bernstein (2010) of
2 There is no specific word for “livelihood” in Khmer (like many words used in develop-
ment discourse such as “sustainable development” or “decentralization”), although this 
concept is often translated as tweeka, to work. This is a narrow interpretation, only 
focusing on money-making activities. A more useful expression is ka chenh chem chiavit 
(life activities and living).
3 Livelihood studies date back to the French concept of genre de vie, although the most 
widely used livelihood framework points to a series of capitals—natural, social, physical, 
financial, among others—interacting via institutions to produce specific livelihood out-
comes (De Haan and Zoomers 2005). This framework has since been adopted by many 
development practitioners, although it has lost traction in recent years because of the 
complexity of implementing this framework (Scoones 2009).
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who owns what, who does what, who gets what and what do 
they do with it are of central importance to a livelihood analy-
sis. For these reasons, livelihood perspectives offer an important 
lens for looking at complex governance questions (cf. De Haan 
and Zoomers 2005 and Scoones 2009 for a succinct overview 
of livelihood studies and its contributions).
My research is framed by an interest in three things: (a) how 
livelihoods shift, evolve and adapt in villages where numer-
ous actors are vying for access to the same natural resources; 
(b) the role of decentralized resource governance in situations 
with high levels of poverty, resource-dependence and social-
ecological change; and (c) the potential for other forms of 
resource governance in such situations. To develop my analysis 
I pay careful attention to coastal livelihoods and resource-
related challenges over a twelve-year period, including how 
people actually try to achieve specific outcomes. Several texts 
have been helpful in enabling me to advance my arguments. 
Key to my thinking has been the work of Brent Flyvbjerg, 
Making Social Science Matter, who points to the need for deeply 
grounded, context-specific research. In the area of decentral-
ized resource governance, research by Christopher Béné, Fikret 
Berkes, Elinor Ostrom and Krister Andersson have been par-
ticularly insightful and informative.
First, in terms of paying attention to how livelihoods shift, 
evolve and adapt, the case material is thick both in descrip-
tion and in attention to the nuances found within the social- 
ecological system of southwestern Cambodia. I aim to identify 
the basic connections and general patterns that are characteristic 
of the context I am researching. As Nietzsche notes, “one should 
not wish to divest existence of its rich ambiguity” (emphasis 
in original, as cited in Flyvbjerg 2001: 84). I explore the ever-
changing details of everyday life in one resource-dependent 
coastal village and the fishing grounds that this village, along 
with a handful of other villages, use. This enables me to 
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examine struggles over access to natural resources (Scoones 
2009). I then reflect upon how local resource governance pro-
cesses have been formed in light of the multiple influences 
and agendas of internal and external actors found within the 
Cambodian context. Flyvbjerg (2001) notes that a thick and 
hard-to- summarize narrative may be a sign that the study has 
uncovered a rich problematic; such thinking has helped me to 
persevere in exploring and analyzing this rather complicated, 
dynamic story.
Second, since I am interested in local resource governance, 
I pay attention to decentralization reforms and processes. 
Decentralization, as a policy project, implies the changing of 
power structures and relations (Raik et al. 2008), and may be 
more ideologically driven than is practical in some contexts 
(Gellman 2010). Decentralized resource governance projects 
are “simultaneously political-economic projects” and vice 
versa, and the interaction between politics and ecology requires 
careful attention (Harvey 1993: 25). Without an in-depth 
understanding of power relations, in terms of which actors hold 
power, to whom actors are accountable, etc., it is difficult to 
understand what resource governance may actually mean at the 
village level (Agrawal and Ribot 1999). This is why it is import-
ant to pay explicit attention to relationships and, where possible, 
power dynamics between the state and sub national units, civil 
society and the private sector. Moreover, it is important to 
investigate the relations that have been, or are being, established 
within the natural resources sector and those institutional actors 
who emerge in newly created local resource governance institu-
tions (Béné et al. 2009). In particular, how is policy supporting 
decentralized resource governance created, enacted (or not) and 
then, sometimes, manipulated in practice? The creative use of 
policies may be rather telling in terms of understanding how 
policies are understood and/or privileged by various actors.
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Third, I consider what else might compliment local resource 
governance to mitigate against ecological disturbance, vulner-
ability and unsustainable path dependencies. Sustainability will 
not be realized unless current resource management regimes 
undergo a transition toward more adaptive and integrated 
resource governance (Pahl-Wostl 2009). For these reasons, 
governance scholars are exploring the need for multi-level 
institutions and partnerships among state and nonstate actors 
(Kooiman et al. 2005). While this includes an emphasis on 
local governance, scholars call attention to governance at 
multiple levels (Ostrom and Anderson 2008). This concept 
has two basic characteristics: interdependence across govern-
ance levels and showing the interaction among different actors 
(Berkes 2010c). However, there are numerous challenges with 
multi-level arrangements including accountability concerns, 
coordination issues, and being relevant in an ever-changing 
world (Cash et al. 2006; Biermann and Boas 2010). For these 
reasons, I am interested to explore the potential for such 
arrangements in a place where decentralization processes are 
only just emerging and power has typically remained at the 
centre.
THE CAMBODIAN CONTEXT
I situate my study in Cambodia, a country that is character-
ized by struggle and change. Cambodia has been subject to 
six different ideological regimes, including several forms of 
 socialism, since independence from France in 1953 (Slocomb 
2006). Violence has plagued Cambodia, in  particular  during the 
Cold War era, and governance was shaky for decades (Slocomb 
2002). The genocidal Khmer Rouge regime (1975–1979) resulted 
in a drastically reduced civil service (Slocomb 2002) and a 
population reeling from an intense trauma: the Khmer Rouge 
resistance army only defected to the government in 1999 after 
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Pol Pot’s death. Nonetheless, with the lifting of international 
embargos on credit and trade for Cambodia and Vietnam, 
liberal economic reforms were introduced in the late 1980s. 
This period also marked the beginning of political reforms: 
Cambodia signed the Paris Peace Agreement in 1991 and a 
multi-party political system was introduced in 1993. These 
extensive economic and political reforms are in line with neo-
liberal prescriptions tied to a world view and theories about the 
economy, state or education that are Western-centric (Slocomb 
2006; Gellman 2010).
Nonetheless, the “means of governing” Cambodia has con-
sistently included elements of nepotism, corruption and sup-
pressing opposition (Thion 1986; Slocomb 2006). This is an 
example of a state where formal rules can be replaced by 
informal rules. Hun Sen has been Cambodia’s prime minister 
since 1984, and remains popular with the business elite and 
senior bureaucrats, along with people in the countryside. In a 
sense, citizens see Hun Sen as a fait accompli rather than an 
elected and responsive leader (Chandler 2010). Such acceptance 
speaks to aspects of Khmer culture, which include elements 
of deference, obedience to authority and patronage networks 
(Ebihara 1968; Marston 1997; Legerwood and Vijhen 2002).4 
The elite do have far greater material resources than most; 
at the same time, they require popular consent to legitimize 
their rule that awards a kind of residual power to the poor 
(Hughes and Ojendal 2006). Gift-giving, as seen in the distri-
bution of rice, fish sauce, t-shirts and scarves (kramas) during 
election campaigns, speaks to this. At the same time, Khmer 
culture is evolving and adapting in part linked to a large 
demographic born post-1979 and the infusion of development 
aid since the early 1990s. Thus, patronage structures overlap 
4 For a nuanced reflection on how Khmer culture is evolving, see the special 2006 issue 
of The Journal of Southeast Asian Studies.
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with evolving political and institutional development in a 
context of social, economic and political change that is spon-
sored by powerful internal and external actors (Hughes and 
Ojendal 2006).
There is no doubt that Cambodia is a complex place. On the 
one hand, there is corruption, nepotism, authoritarian one-party 
rule, a culture of impunity, ecological degradation, poor social 
services and a widening gap between the rich and the poor 
(Chandler 2010). Political consolidation has been strengthened 
by governance reforms emphasizing decentralization, with 
the ruling party having a firm grasp on rural politics (Hughes 
2008). The prime minister is portrayed as an authoritarian 
strongman, strengthening his support through strategic inter-
family networks (Slocomb 2006), and Cambodia’s political 
elite has generated much of its wealth through seizing pub-
lic assets, particularly forest and land resources (Un and So 
2009). On the other hand, infrastructure has greatly improved, 
a large number of primary and junior high schools have been 
built, political stability has been conducive to development and 
investment and tourist dollars continue to flow. Multi-party 
elections have been held both nationally and locally, and the 
introduction of local-level democratic elections is seen as a 
major gain for democratization in Cambodia (Turner 2006). 
Finally, Cambodia is a full member of the United Nations, 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the World 
Trade Organization. These changes have brought benefits, and 
Cambodia is now a safer, more secure place than it has been for 
decades.
THE FIELD CONTEXT
The area where my field research takes place (see Figure 1 in 
the Prologue)—southwestern, coastal Cambodia—was, until 
recently, referred to as Cambodia’s “wild west.” The area served 
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as a  frontier for much of the 1980s and 1990s. Resource rights 
were ill defined and state regulations were weak, an attractive 
combination for those who had lost their land during the Khmer 
Rouge era or wanted to try their luck in another part of the coun-
try. This area was isolated from other parts of Cambodia and 
remained a Khmer Rouge stronghold until well into the 1990s, 
two factors that contributed toward the variety of resource-
related livelihood activities (logging, charcoal production, 
working on shrimp farms) available to those migrating into the 
area. The 1998 election period was particularly concentrated 
in terms of logging activities, which led to a dramatic decline 
of mangrove trees in the mangrove-estuary villages on which 
this research focuses. Intense deforestation over a short period 
of time, coupled with an increase in charcoal production, was 
wreaking visible havoc on the ecosystem.
By 2000 the state was slowly permeating this frontier-like 
area; in doing so, most illegal resource extraction activities 
became too risky, particularly for villagers, and shrimp farm-
ing collapsed due to poor site selection (Mastaller 1999). Some 
households left the area; those that stayed were forced to rely 
mainly on the crab fishery or to diversify into non-resource-
based livelihoods. At this point in time (2000), southwestern 
Cambodia was seen as holding significant potential in terms of 
local resource governance (for fisheries, forestry and protected 
areas), and this is when I first learned of the resource govern-
ance experiment that I carefully examine in this book.
Fast-forward a decade later (2010), forms of village-run 
resource governance do exist, in addition to many national poli-
cies supporting this governance approach. At the same time, this 
area has continued to serve as a frontier for business interests, 
particularly for well-connected entrepreneurs. My conclusions 
are drawn from the particularities of this case.
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THE WRITING APPROACH
My writing moves back and forth between examining the emer-
gence of local resource governance in Cambodia and explor-
ing how local resource governance processes intersect with 
other forces in a specific place. I have been a frequent visitor 
to various government ministries in Phnom Penh, and privy 
to a series of donor meetings and policy reform workshops. 
I have also been a frequent visitor to several remote mangrove-
estuary fishing villages since the late 1990s. This study became 
longitudinal, in part because every time I returned to the 
area something had shifted. Although these were often minor 
events—the chance to sell mushrooms growing on mangrove 
trees to a Korean buyer or the appointment of a new village 
chief—these shifts impact and help to shape rural livelihoods 
and the choices made around levels of resource extraction. 
I realized that only through consistent conversations with a 
handful of households over a period of time would I begin to 
understand the complexities of daily life and the potential for 
resource governance in this context. Thus, multiple discussions 
over the years, combined with further reflections and readings, 
have enabled me to begin to untangle some of the intricacies of 
rural life in southwestern Cambodia.5
I begin in Chapter 1 with an exploration into why decentraliz-
ation became privileged as the way to govern natural resources 
in and around villages, and then explore how this idea is playing 
out in Cambodia. In Chapter 2, I focus on fisheries resources,
5 The main sources for this research investigation were interviews, workshops, surveys, 
participant observation and talking with key informants over the past twelve years. My 
field research has generally taken place with a research assistant, often a university stu-
dent or young graduate, or with members of the Participatory Management of Coastal 
Resources (PMCR) team, the Canadian-funded, intergovernmental research team led by 
the Ministry of Environment (cf. PMCR 2008 for more details on their work). For more 
details on the research methods, see Marschke 1999; Marschke 2005; Marschke and 
Sincliar 2009; Marschke, forthcoming.
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reflecting on Cambodia’s current fisheries governance chal-
lenges and past fisheries governance practices. In Chapter 3, 
I describe life in one coastal village, tracking the stresses that 
people endure in relation to livelihood extraction opportunities 
and emerging resource governance policies over a twelve-year 
period (1998–2010). Chapter 4 is where I begin my analysis of 
resource governance implementation, again spanning twelve 
years, and reflect upon the local-level strategies that villagers 
engage to deal with various resource challenges. I also explore 
the issues that villagers are not able to address. In Chapter 5, 
I move across administrative units to examine resource gov-
ernance challenges within local fishing grounds. Here I pay 
attention to when policy is implemented, creatively adapted or 
ignored. In Chapter 6, I interrogate failures in resource govern-
ance that occur in and around the village, within local fishing 
grounds and at the national level. I conclude by reflecting on 
the broader resource governance issues that are brought up from 
this extensive field investigation and consider the desirability 
of this particular situation.
Twenty years of war excluded Cambodia’s natural resour-ces—forests, coastal and inland fisheries, waterways and 
minerals—from the acute resource depletion associated with 
agricultural expansion and economic growth throughout 
much of Southeast Asia in the 1970s and 1980s (Le Billon 
2000). Cambodia was subject to major bombing during the 
Vietnam War (1959–1975), experienced the genocidal Khmer 
Rouge regime (1975–1979) that left an estimated one million 
Cambodians dead, followed by the Vietnamese liberation from 
the Khmer Rouge in 1979 and a subsequent trade embargo 
enforced by the West (1980s). These events helped to ensure that 
Cambodia’s natural resources remained relatively unexploited 
during the 1970s and 1980s (Tyner 2008). Had Cambodia’s geo-
political history been different, deforestation and overfishing 
would likely have begun at an earlier point. As it was, as soon 
as it was viable to do so, resource entrepreneurs targeted the 
forestry sector (Le Billon 2000) and increased trade in aquatic 
species (Degan et al. 2000).
Deforestation practices began in heavily forested areas, those 
that remained as Khmer Rouge army strongholds and those 
that were secured by the military. The Cambodian government 
I
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permitted the military to access forest areas during the late 
1980s and into the 1990s in exchange for its allegiance and 
as a way to diminish the strength of the Khmer Rouge oppos-
ition forces (Le Billon 2002). “With this permission, the army, 
working through networks of businesspeople, forestry officials, 
and provincial authorities sold timber for personal gain and to 
raise funds for the civil war” (Un and So 2009: 128). Within 
certain regions of Cambodia, particularly in areas that were 
further from state penetration, there have been serious money-
making opportunities from natural resources both for business 
entrepreneurs and, in some cases, local villagers. High levels of 
resource extraction began with deforestation and overfishing but 
have since moved to include other natural resources including 
land-claiming, oil and gas exploration and mineral extraction 
activities (Le Billon 2000; Un and So 2009; Cock 2010).
As resource extraction (or perhaps exploitation is a better 
term) practices have continued, Cambodia’s natural resource 
base has declined. Over the past fifteen years, nearly 45 percent 
of Cambodia’s land has been purchased by private interests 
(Global Witness 2009) and Cambodia now faces one of the 
highest deforestation rates in the world. The last global forest 
cover survey by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
found that Cambodia had lost 29 percent of its primary tropical 
forest between 2000 and 2005 (FAO 2008); other estimates 
suggest that Cambodia’s primary forest cover has gone from 
70 percent in 1970 to 3.1 percent in 2005 (Global Witness 2007). 
Even if these numbers are too high, all indicators suggest that 
significant deforestation has taken place in Cambodia in recent 
years. There is even less precise information for Cambodia’s 
fisheries although overfishing (Salayo et al. 2008), declining 
shrimp stocks (FAO 2009) and smaller catch sizes are reported 
throughout the Tonle Sap and the coast (Bush 2008; PMCR 
2008). This trend is in line with the general depletion of coastal 
stocks found throughout the Gulf of Thailand, where resources 
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have been fished down to between 5 and 30 percent of their 
unexploited levels (Salayo et al. 2008).
Cambodia’s population remains predominately rural—around 
80 percent of Cambodians live in rural areas—and resource-
dependent (World Bank 2009; NIS 2008). In spite of shifting 
migration patterns, rural people rely on agriculture, small home 
businesses and/or a mix of natural resource activities to sus-
tain their livelihoods (Diepart 2010). In the short term, many 
people will continue to stay in the countryside since there are 
not enough jobs to absorb migrant labour even with Cambodia’s 
five-hundred-plus factories employing some 300,000 workers 
(in 2009) (Chandler 2010). Resource extraction activities do 
offer employment opportunities (i.e., for rural residents and 
business entrepreneurs) and can generate substantial economic 
growth. Households, therefore, engage in a range of resource-
based livelihood activities, including small-scale fishing or 
charcoal production and more technical business enterprises 
(i.e., operating machinery for sand dredging, electronic equip-
ment for larger fishing boats), and may also engage in other 
forms of wage labour (Marschke, forthcoming).
Cambodia has experienced economic growth averaging 
7 percent per annum since the mid-1990s (Un and So 2009), 
with agriculture (i.e., rice, timber, fish and rubber), trade and 
manufacturing playing a major role in this growth. Poverty rates 
have also decreased, from 34.8 percent in 2004 to 30.1 per-
cent in 2007, although this period of falling poverty has also 
been associated with rising levels of inequality (World Bank 
2009). While some households benefit from resource extrac-
tion opportunities, it is likely that poorer households do not 
(cf. Resurreccion 2006; Sneddon 2007). Recognizing this 
situation, the Cambodian state has taken steps toward creating 
a policy environment that encourages local forms of natural 
resource protection and management (Van Acker 2010). A wide 
range of policies have been drafted and passed since the late 
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1990s. These policies and programs are seen to be timely and 
potentially important for securing and sustaining rural live-
lihoods given the overall situation of resource dependence 
coupled with persistent resource declines (Van Acker 2010).
This being said, there are no studies that trace how rural 
people have been involved in resource extraction in the past 
fifteen years and how these types of opportunities have shifted. 
Moreover, it is not clear if newly developed policies actually 
help to ensure resource access or sustain rural livelihoods. This 
is a gap that this book seeks to fill.
To do so, this chapter provides an overview of decentraliza-
tion processes and specific policy reforms designed to give local 
people a voice in key decisions related to natural resources in 
and around villages. I begin with a discussion about the pros 
and cons of involving local people in resource governance. This 
discussion offers insights into the prevalence, in both the schol-
arly and donor communities, of justifying and promoting the 
involvement of local people in forms of community-based man-
agement. From here I look at the forces shaping local resource 
governance in Cambodia, including the interests of the donor 
community, the Cambodian government including the Fisheries 
Administration, and, to a certain extent, local villages.
DECENTRALIZATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES
Most public policy is delivered in some sort of hierarchy. 
Decentralization processes, therefore, are about “reversing the 
concentration of administration at a single centre” and delegat-
ing power to subnational territories (Smith 1985: 1). There are 
now a significant number of books and articles that discuss 
the positive effects of such local governance. A strand within 
the public administration literature, for example, suggests 
that life should be better under decentralized, democratic rule 
(Ayres 2001; Blunt and Turner 2005; Turner 2006). The idea 
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is that empowered and resourced local governments are better 
positioned to respond effectively to the specific needs of a sub-
national territory’s population. In theory, local governments can 
address the particular needs of their jurisdiction and be more 
efficient in service delivery, in the belief that closeness with 
local residents will ensure greater accountability (Rondinelli 
1981; Smith 1985).
This is in line with the development thinking of donors 
and multilateral lending agencies that now fund a plethora of 
programs and projects that include decentralization as part of 
their goals (Andersson and Ostrom 2008). The arguments for 
decentralization reforms go beyond those based on economic 
and administrative efficiency, although such arguments remain 
pervasive (and persuasive); decentralization is also associated 
with the idea of progress in public accountability, environ-
mental sustainability and empowerment of poor and vulner-
able groups (Béné et al. 2009). Villagers are encouraged to be 
involved in planning for, and in parallel, carrying out their own 
development. As an example of how pervasive this thinking has 
become, one need only examine prominent development policies 
like the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers or the Millennium 
Development Goals: both emphasize including local people 
within national planning processes and ensuring local needs 
are met vis-à-vis national plans (Chambers 2004). In Southeast 
Asia, decentralized governance models have been widely pro-
moted over the past decade (Turner 2006).
Specific arguments for decentralized resource govern-
ance include helping decision-makers to notice significant 
environmental changes, and that such involvement can 
mobilize affected local interests to address environmental 
change. Because local conditions and ecosystems vary widely, 
 decentralization is also argued to provide a way to implement 
policy more flexibly to ensure effectiveness and to foster adap-
tation to such change (Tyler 2009). Users who live within a 
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resource system will often develop relatively accurate mental 
models of how their biophysical system operates, since their 
harvesting efforts depend on these mental models (Andersson 
and Ostrom 2008). Feedback is also an advantage for local 
governance regimes since direct, rapid feedback about how 
the resource system responds to harvesting or climate varia-
tion is easily provided. Fishers, for example, are often able to 
identify changes in the size of species caught and in species 
distribution over a significant period of time (Marschke and 
Berkes 2006). Finally, “because local users have to bear the 
cost of monitoring in a decentralized system, they are apt to 
craft rules and make infractions highly obvious so monitoring 
costs are lower” (Andersson and Ostrom 2008: 75). Resource 
governance intersects the literature on public administration 
(good governance and democracy), as well political econ-
omy, development and resource management (Larson and 
Soto 2008).
In many respects, the emphasis on natural resource decen-
tralization is a reaction to earlier efforts to centralize the gov-
ernance of natural resources. In the 1970s and 1980s a widely 
shared presumption was that the most effective way to manage 
natural resources was at a national level, since it was then 
believed that only a strong central government was capable of 
constraining citizens’ demand for resources (Andersson and 
Ostrom 2008). There was a serious attempt to “control nature 
in order to harvest its products, reduce its threats and estab-
lish highly predictable outcomes for the short-term benefit of 
humanity” (Holling and Meffe 1996: 329). This was known as 
the era of top-down, “command and control” resource manage-
ment. This approach to resource management often resulted in 
unforeseen consequences such as collapsing resources, social 
and economic conflict, and the loss of biodiversity (Holling 
and Meffe 1996). Managers did not incorporate politics or 
relationships into their thinking. The collapse of the Canadian 
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cod fishery, where scientists privileged their maximum sustain-
able yield calculations over local observations of the pending 
decline, serves as an example of the potential ineffectiveness of 
this approach (Berkes 2010c). Moreover, this centralized man-
agement often privileged the interests of the resource industry 
(Berkes 2010b).
Arguments for processes or tools that promote decentralized 
resource governance drew on commons scholarship, following 
from the extensive research done by Elinor Ostrom (cf. Ostrom 
1990) and others (cf. McCay and Acheson 1987; Slager and 
Ostrom 1992; Cox 2008) to illustrate the potential of collective 
rights. There are numerous cases of commons governance, with 
research demonstrating how community forestry or fisheries 
can work both for natural resource conservation and, in certain 
cases, to produce local economic benefits (cf. Barsimantov 
et al. 2011 for a review). The emphasis on rules of access, 
exclusion and subtractability, and the identification of design 
principles or enabling conditions for the management of com-
mon pool resources are major contributions in terms of how 
to enact and support commons governance (Ostrom 1990). 
Commons research has shown how community groups are 
capable of managing resources given appropriate incentives, 
although most examples of common pool governance tend to 
be small-scale and single-case. Such management may hap-
pen without government support, in cases of high capacity or 
relative isolation, although it is recognized more and more that 
government involvement is an essential component of commons 
management (Khumsri et al. 2009). Theories for commons 
governance have continued to evolve (cf. Armitage et al. 2009), 
including in the area of co-management (e.g., Pinkerton 1989; 
Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2007; Clement 2010).
Co-management involves some configuration of the state, 
resource users and civil society (Pinkerton 1989). Common 
across definitions of co-management are the notions of 
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shared responsibility and authority for decision-making in 
the management of natural resources (Armitage et al. 2009). 
Co-management arrangements vary across settings including 
the subject of management, the existing institutional arrange-
ments and the way in which co-management is implemented or 
introduced (e.g., Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2007). For example, 
within fisheries co-management arrangements could include a 
single resource, such as a catfish stock or sea grass, or multiple 
resources, such as those found within a marine protected area. 
Co-management offers a governance approach that can be 
potentially viable under a variety of conditions, and enables a 
more flexible, reflexive approach toward resource governance 
than did past, top-down, “command and control” approaches 
(Arthur et al. 2011).
From a policy and practice perspective, this type of approach 
for resource governance has gained popularity over the past dec-
ade, referred to by different names including co-management, 
community-based management, adaptive co-management or 
community fisheries/forestry/watershed management and, 
more recently, adaptive governance, multi-stakeholder govern-
ance or transformative governance (cf. Armitage et al. 2009; 
Ostrom 2009; Berkes 2010a; Gelcich et al. 2010). While each 
of these approaches emphasizes different aspects of resource 
governance partnerships, each acknowledges the importance 
of local involvement. Besides, numerous scholars have dem-
onstrated how the users of many resources can develop effect-
ive governance mechanisms that increase the likelihood of 
sustainability (Ostrom et al. 2002; Berkes and Folke 1998; 
Berkes 2009), and the privileging of this type of approach 
within academia and the donor community speaks to its 
potential.
What is happening within the resource sector is seen within 
social policy more generally, linked to a global decentraliza-
tion agenda. Although decentralization processes initially took 
Desiring Local Resource Governance  21
place in Western countries, such as Denmark and Canada, these 
ideas spread rapidly to the global South (Béné et al. 2009), 
likely influenced by the donor agenda and the growing need 
for accountability in the donor home countries. Most countries 
in the global South have some type of policy that includes the 
participation of end-users in many of their social policies for 
health, education and the environment (Béné et al. 2009), which 
involve some form of multi-stakeholder collaboration.
Even so, local resource governance is not always successful 
and can lead to a tragedy of the commons situation (Hardin 
1968). Self-organizing can result in a loss of short-term eco-
nomic gains (Ostrom 2009) or may be too costly for local users 
to implement (Meinzen-Dick 2007), and local groups may not 
be able to reduce their dependency on a resource. Selecting 
appropriate rules for resource management is not easy: some 
groups will select rules that do not work well together and 
will consequently generate failure (Berkes 2007). In other 
cases there may be a lack of leadership that is necessary to 
create a change in existing practices (Marschke and Sinclair 
2009). Other scholars still argue that “the track record of 
 co-management is weak in poverty reduction and empowerment 
of the marginalized” (Berkes 2009: 169), and that decentralized 
governance systems may be dominated by local elites who cre-
ate rules for their own advancement (Platteau 2004). Finally, 
conflicts among user groups may happen in decentralized 
systems, with conflicts being difficult to manage when there 
is limited external buy-in or support for conflict-resolution 
mechanisms (Alston et al. 1999).
Resource governance processes may also stagnate. For 
instance, where local ecological systems are characterized 
by considerable variance and complexity, experimentation 
can produce unexpected results leading users (or government 
managers) to adhere to systems that have worked well in the 
past. The issue here is that resource systems do not remain 
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static, and users need to innovate continuously to ensure the 
best rules are in place to lead to better outcomes (Andersson 
and Ostrom 2008). The policy community cannot always 
handle such flexibility, since rules may need to be continuously 
revisited and updated (Arthur et al. 2011). Complexity may be 
difficult for users to handle, especially where there is limited 
access to scientific information. Even when stakeholders work 
well together, it is a challenge to ensure that local knowledge 
and scientific knowledge are understood by all actors. Yet 
scientific information serves as a complement to place-based 
information, and this can be particularly pertinent when it 
comes to assessing the health and viability of a given resource 
(Ostrom 2009).
As such, one can appreciate the advantages and disadvan-
tages of decentralized resource governance arrangements. 
Decentralization is a political and economic process that 
implies, fundamentally, a redistribution of power and resources. 
Not everything should necessarily be decentralized, however, 
and a balance needs to be struck within every context. The 
academic community is starting to move toward theorizing 
and promoting multi-governance solutions, since there is never 
a unitary state or a homogeneous community (Berkes 2009; 
Ostrom 2009). What this means for resource governance in 
practice is less clear. No doubt the pendulum has swung from 
a strongly centralist perspective toward governing resources 
in the 1970s and 1980s to a strongly decentralist perspective 
in the 1990s and 2000s, and is possibly recalibrating toward 
some middle ground perspective as I write. Ultimately there are 
inherent imperfections in all human governance arrangements 
for dealing with complex resource problems (Andersson and 
Ostrom 2008). This is worth keeping in mind as we consider the 
forces that have shaped the shift toward decentralized resource 
governance in Cambodia.
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CAMBODIA’S EXPERIENCE WITH LOCAL 
RESOURCE GOVERNANCE
Not only have various literatures over the past twenty years 
placed a strong emphasis on promoting local involvement in 
the governance of diverse social-ecological systems (cf. public 
administration, resource management), governance arrange-
ments have also been on the agenda of multilateral and bilat-
eral donors during this time. There has been a convergence 
of various bodies of thinking that emphasize the need to 
include local people (Andersson and Ostrom 2008). This push 
toward  decentralization is also seen within the Cambodian 
context: decentralization has been prioritized as a mechanism 
by which to facilitate good governance (Godfrey et al. 2000; 
Hubbard 2005; Slocomb 2006). In the World Bank’s publica-
tion Cambodia at the Crossroads: Strengthening Accountability 
to Reduce Poverty, decentralization is promoted as “shorten-
ing the route of accountability bringing government closer to 
the people” (2004: 17). Donor agencies have spent time and 
money on pilot projects that illustrate the potential of decentral-
ization in terms of good governance and local empowerment. 
From exposure to and involvement in such pilot testing, the 
Cambodian government has passed several pieces of legisla-
tion with a strong decentralization mandate, particularly at the 
municipal level (Turner 2006). This is where donors now focus 
a significant amount of effort and funding (Knowles Morrison 
2010).
Proponents suggest that these new modes of governance are 
nothing short of radical, transforming Khmer society from 
adhering to highly centralized, hierarchical forms of governance 
to supporting local governance and the rule of law (EIC 2005). 
Decentralization is a major governance reform, in the sense 
that this is a mechanism that is designed to bring citizens, local 
groups and organizations into the policy and decision-making 
24  Life, Fish and Mangroves
process (Berkes et al. 2010a). The introduction of local-level 
democratic elections in Cambodia is a real accomplishment. 
Critics, meanwhile, suggest that the Cambodian government 
has adopted a public transcript of state transformation, largely 
dictated by donor experts (Le Billon 2000) or that nepotism, 
corruption and top-down rule remain central features of the 
current regime (Slocomb 2006; Hughes 2008). As such, some 
scholars question the extent to which democratic decentraliza-
tion is really occurring (cf. Hughes 2008; Chandler 2010).
All the same, a significant amount of policy has been passed. 
Table I illustrates a variety of policies that now (2010) support 
decentralized resource governance in Cambodia.
As Table I illustrates, there are a suite of policies that sup-
port decentralized resource governance. The Law on Commune 
Administration, passed in 2001, sent a strong signal for the need 
to support local governance through creating municipal elec-
tions and a platform through which local citizens are meant to 
be able to express their demands and dissatisfaction. Specific 
policies followed in the resource governance arena, enabling 
citizens to enter into co-management arrangements with tech-
nical departments such as the Forestry Administration, the 
Fisheries Administration and the Ministry of Environment. 
Hence, forms of “community” or “co” management processes 
were established in the 2000s. Many such linkages are between 
state departments that enter into a contract with a specific 
village or group of villages to govern their natural resources, 
with much of the day-to-day management activity being left in 
the hands of villagers. National Poverty Reduction Plans and 
Strategic Development plans also emphasize local governance 
of natural resources; these are the documents that donors rely 
on to guide them in their choices relating to aid programming 
and delivery in Cambodia. From a policy perspective, there is 
a serious amount of policy and legislation that supports local 
democratization and participation.
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Table i: Cambodia’s Policy Framework for Resource Governance
Resource Area Specific Policy to Support Resource Governance
Protected Areas 
Policy
Royal Decree on the Creation and Designation of 
Protected Areas: 1993
Environmental Protection and Natural Resources Law: 
1996
National Environmental Action Plan: 1998–2002
Protected Areas Law: 2008
Guidelines on Community Protected Areas Management: 
In Progress
Land Policy Land Law September: 2001
Sub-decree on Procedure for Commune Land Use 
Planning: 2008
Draft Declaration on Land Policy: In Progress
Sub-decree Procedures of Registration of Land of 
Indigenous Communities: 2009
Fisheries Policy Fisheries Policy Reforms: 2000–2001
National Fisheries Policy Statement: 2005
Fisheries Law: 2006
Sub-decree on Community Fisheries Management:  
2005; 2007
Guidelines for Community Fisheries: 2007
The Strategic Planning Framework for Fisheries: 
2010–2019
Forestry Policy National Forest Policy: 2002
Forest Law: 2002
Community Forestry Sub-decree: 2003
Guidelines for Community Forestry: 2006
National Forestry Program: 2010
National Community Forestry Plan: In Progress
Local Governance 
Policies
Law on Commune Administration: 2001
Organic Law on Sub-national Administration: 2008
Other Supportive 
policies
National Poverty Reduction Strategy: 2003–2005
National Strategic Development Plan: 2006–2010
National Strategic Development Plan: 2009–2013
Adapted from: CBNRM LI 2009.
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In Cambodia, as is likely true elsewhere, there are nuances 
in terms of what decentralization really means. Some policy 
devolves power to local branches of the same ministry of the 
central state; commune (or municipal) councils reporting to 
the national Ministry of Interior are an example of this. This 
is referred to as administrative decentralization (Larson and 
Soto 2008). The Ministry of Interior has mandated the com-
mune council to be responsible for many things at a municipal 
level, including resource planning, management and land alloca-
tion. However, decentralization of natural resource governance 
can also take other forms. For instance, the central government 
can formally cede power to institutions and actors at lower 
levels (non-government actors), which is often referred to as 
democratic decentralization (Berkes 2010a). The Fisheries and 
Forestry Administration and the Ministry of Environment 
each have policies that support forms of democratic decen-
tralization: some power is ceded to locally elected resource 
management committees, although each central state ministry 
retains the ultimate decision-making power. This is not exactly 
what scholars are arguing for when it comes to democratic 
decentralization. Regardless of the exact nuances involved in 
Cambodia’s decentralization processes, such policies appear 
to be the only way that local people can have a say in the con-
trol and management of natural resources in and around their 
villages.
In the Cambodian context, with its hierarchical, authoritarian 
roots, this effort is definitely encouraging a process different 
from what has taken place over the years. On the one hand, 
Cambodian society continues to rely on patron-client rela-
tions (Legerwood and Vijghen 2002), while, on the other, also 
being heavily influenced by donor agendas of good governance 
(Slocomb 2006). This begs the question why different actors 
have bought into this agenda of promoting good governance 
and local governance, particularly given how different it is from 
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the strongly centralized governance regimes that the state has 
generally promoted and followed (Slocomb 2006). The follow-
ing section examines the interest in decentralization from three 
often intertwined perspectives: (a) national interests, gener-
ally; (b) fisheries interests, specifically; and (c) other actors 
promoting the need for local voice in the governance of natural 
resources in and around villages. This analysis illustrates some 
of the reasons why government actors, and others, have created 
decentralized policies and, at the same time, why the uptake of 
certain policies will remain a challenge for some time to come.
National Interests Promoting Decentralization
Turner (2006: 260) comments that Cambodia’s “impetus for 
decentralization came from relative stability rather than crisis.” 
This is different than in other democratizing Southeast Asian 
countries. For example, the Philippines (1986), Thailand (1992) 
and Indonesia (1998) saw authoritarian states challenged by 
new parties, comprising elite alliances with newly empow-
ered economic classes and/or social movements. By contrast, 
Cambodia’s resistance parties entered into a multi-party govern-
ance arena, disempowered by the dissolution of their admin-
istrative structures and the closure of border refugee camps 
(Hughes 2003). This hints at the “uniqueness of the exogenously 
promoted Cambodian democratization project” (Hughes 2001: 
301).
Hun Sen’s ruling Cambodia People Party (CPP) has identified 
decentralization as a priority for its government, and there is an 
active donor effort to support this (funds from the World Bank, 
United Nations Development Program [UNDP], the Danish 
International Development Agency [DANIDA], among others). 
The first phase of Cambodia’s decentralization program was 
the institution of elections for commune chiefs and councils, 
held in 2002 and then again in 2007. The ruling CPP party, 
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for example, now holds power in all but thirty of Cambodia’s 
1,621 commune-level authorities (Hughes 2009). Moreover, it 
was these CPP-dominated commune councils that “appointed 
or reappointed Cambodia’s 13,000 village chiefs in a new sys-
tem that cements the party’s dominance to the lowest levels of 
administration” in 2006 (Hughes 2009: 207). One result of the 
decentralization project appears to be political consolidation. 
More bluntly put, decentralization strategies have likely served 
to strengthen the main parties’ monopoly of the administrative 
apparatus (Hughes 2009).
The next phase of the decentralization project may reproduce 
this control at district and provincial levels (Hughes 2009). The 
Organic Law was passed in 2008, and this piece of legisla-
tion is expected to involve a significant devolution of power 
from the centre to the provincial and district levels further 
to improve subnational democratic development, the delivery 
of basic services (health, education, roads, water, sanitation, 
etc.) and the state’s regulatory functions (land, forestry and 
fisheries). Moreover, this policy may exacerbate existing chal-
lenges between ministries with different mandates. Already 
decentralization policies are widely promoted both within the 
Ministry of Interior and across other ministries, and there may 
be multiple committees working on resource-related issues 
within a village or a commune, since the elected commune 
councils have a mandated role in resource management activ-
ities, as do the specific committees elected at a village level to 
address fisheries, forestry or protected areas issues. This causes 
tension, duplication and confusion (Marschke and Berkes 2005). 
This is also an issue between technical departments that see 
resource management issues as the domain of centralized state 
agencies (i.e., fisheries, forestry and land management) and the 
Ministry of Interior, which argues that it is tasked to deal with 
all local governance issues. Greater collaboration is necessary 
if decentralization is to work in practice.
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While the introduction of democratic elections at the com-
mune level may represent a major gain for democratization in 
Cambodia, and there has been large voter turnout for these 
commune elections (Turner 2006), questions do remain. An 
Asia Foundation survey (2003) found that most Cambodians 
vote to fulfill their civic duty rather than to make inputs to 
policy. This may change. Voter turnout, over time, appears to be 
down (Hughes 2009). Another study suggests that citizens may 
embrace democracy while also supporting the military and rule 
by strong leaders (Carlson and Turner 2008). Perhaps the bigger 
issue is that the process focuses on a highly restricted range 
of political parties among which the dominant political party 
has control in terms of resources (Hughes 2006; Turner 2006). 
It is possible that the Cambodian government has taken on 
decentralization for pragmatic reasons rather than the largely 
ideologically driven interests of donors in the establishment of 
strong forms of popular participation and political pluralism 
(Blunt and Turner 2005). What is likely happening is that some 
government bureaucrats see decentralization as a way to extend 
control to the grassroots level, others see decentralization as 
a threat to their central control, and others still buy into the 
decentralization agenda that is promoted by donors believing 
that people need to have greater say and control of their lives.
Decentralization within the Fisheries Sector
Much of Cambodia’s approach to fisheries management has 
been rather hands-off, other than to ensure a consistent source 
of revenue for the state (cf. Bush 2008; Arthur et al. 2011). 
For specific aquatic species, the management approach was 
based on policy and legislation that placed restrictions on gear 
through licences and prohibitions, combined with establishing 
blanket closed seasons that broadly correspond with breeding 
and spawning seasons (Arthur et al. 2011). Enforcement of such 
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policies has been highly variable, and in most cases ineffective, 
causing tensions between state agents and local fishers. Within 
this system there appears to be significant space for political 
inf luence to determine access and control over resources 
(Sneddon 2007). Thus, in the past ten to fifteen years there has 
been a growing recognition that state-led approaches, repre-
sented in their simplest form as a combination of conservation 
objectives with policing approaches, have failed in either pro-
tecting fishery resources or in generating a shared interest in 
fisheries management among fishers and the state (Naasuchon 
and Charles 2010; Arthur et al. 2011).
The late 1990s was not the worst time to reconsider how to 
administer this resource. Significant fieldwork in the area of 
community forestry had been promoted since the mid-1990s, 
and there were early signs of success (Un and So 2009). The 
timing was also right in terms of promoting local involvement 
in the management of a resource within another resource sector, 
namely fisheries, particularly since fishers were beginning to 
mention stock declines and conflicts over access to the fishery 
were flaring up (Evans 2002). Thus, forms of local-government 
partnership (i.e., fisheries co-management) became attractive 
to a number of actors.
Prime Minister Hun Sen initiated a reform of Cambodia’s 
fisheries sector in 2000, when the central government scaled 
back the extent of individual fishing lots by releasing 56 per-
cent of Cambodia’s commercially zoned fishing area (around 
5,000 ha) and placed a nationwide call to establish commun-
ity fisheries (Sneddon 2007; Evans 2002). This administrative 
reform led to significant changes, not only in terms of institu-
tional changes such as the creation of a Community Fisheries 
Office or the promotion of community fisheries in Cambodia’s 
Millennium Development Goals but also changes at the vil-
lage level too, enabling local committees to form and work on 
local fisheries governance. A handful of community fisheries 
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 committees existed in the 1990s, whereas by 2010 there were 
468 community fisheries sites (433 inland, 35 coastal) (NSDP 
2010). At this point only 173 sites have been officially registered, 
even though the Community Fisheries Sub-decree was passed in 
2005 (to be recognized, communities need to work with fisheries 
staff to create maps, rules and regulations for a specific area) 
(CBNRM LI 2009; NSDP 2010). Regardless, the idea of village 
involvement in fisheries governance has caught on.
Consider the following quote from Cambodia’s prime minster 
in 2007 with reference to the role of villagers in Cambodia’s 
fisheries.
We must strengthen the established communities to be at a high stan-
dard rather than to increase the quantity and continue to protect the 
conservation area and to constantly prevent illegal fishing by cooper-
ating with relevant stakeholders country wide, especially to eliminate 
the illegal fishing equipments with strict and unforgivingness. . . . this 
will lead our country to that of mein tik, mein trie (having water, hav-
ing fish) again (Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, April 9, 2007).
As the prime minister’s speech suggests, community fisheries 
and aquaculture development are at the core of Cambodia’s 
current fishing policy, summed up in the 2005 Community 
Fisheries Sub-decree, which gives a right to villagers to man-
age their fishery, and the 2006 Fisheries Law, which provides 
an overarching framework for fisheries governance including 
specific fisheries management activities at a local level. Within 
these policies, the Fisheries Administration is meant to take a 
strong role in preventing illegal fishing activities. The prime 
minister is advocating for the strengthening of community-based 
groups for fisheries management. This approach to resource 
governance is a cornerstone of Cambodia’s fisheries policy.
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Even with the number of community fisheries sites (formal 
and informal), the strength of this reform is somewhat tenuous 
in the sense that it is not clear how many actors have really 
bought into it. Although in line with other sectoral reforms that 
emphasize decentralized governance, this reform emerged as a 
directive from Hun Sen, Cambodia’s leader. That is, changes in 
the fisheries sector were not a result of policy dialogues within 
the Fisheries Administration or between state officials and fish-
ers (Sokhem and Sunada 2006). Some Fisheries Administration 
officials do not endorse the community emphasis found within 
this policy shift. On the other hand, once this reform was set 
in motion, significant donor, NGO (non-governmental organ-
ization) and government effort was placed in policy dialogue. 
Between 2001 and 2005, the Community Fisheries Sub-decree 
was subjected to extensive revision, beginning in 2001 and then 
entering another series of consultations in 2003 before final 
approval in 2005 (Marschke 2005). Fishers and local fisheries 
management committees were called upon to attend policy 
dialogues or to host study tours of senior government officials 
learning about what community fisheries might entail (PMCR 
2008). Getting the policy right was seen as a first step to sup-
porting rural fishers, and much of the donor effort went in this 
direction.
Donors Supporting Local Involvement
Foreign aid is justified as an integral component for develop-
ment under incomplete market conditions with limited invest-
ment (Ear 2007). Over half of Cambodia’s national budget is 
funded by foreign sources (Hubbard 2005); between 1993 and 
2003, five billion dollars of overseas development assistance 
accounted for 13 percent of Cambodia’s GDP (Ear 2007). There 
are more than thirty major donors, along with hundreds of 
NGOs, working in Cambodia (Ear 2007). For 2009, the Royal 
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Government of Cambodia mobilized approximately one bil-
lion dollars in Overseas Development Aid (ODA), which was 
the highest in the last ten years (http://www.investincambodia.
com/PM/primeminister.htm). Many donors have placed their 
aid efforts at the national level, working to support the creation 
of policies designed to ensure that mechanisms are in place 
to enhance democratic governance and to alleviate poverty. 
These policies are all organized around similar design prin-
ciples that support local-level governance and ensure state-local 
partnerships.
Donor agencies such as the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP), the Swedish International Development Agency 
(SIDA), the German International Development Agency (GTZ, 
now GIZ) and Canada’s International Development Research 
Centre (IDRC) all began their work on community-based 
resource management in the 1990s (Marschke 2005). Some 
projects focused on fisheries, some on forestry and some on 
both. Initial community-based management approaches were 
experimental: community members, NGOs and/or government 
facilitators worked on understanding what resource management 
could look like on a village-by-village basis. In these areas, 
village-level institutions were created in a policy vacuum, with 
maps and management plans recognized informally through 
appropriate signatures (from village headpersons to the prov-
incial governor) and in some cases by technical departments at 
the provincial or national level (Marschke 2005). Pilot projects 
tended to address a mix of resource issues, from the illegal 
cutting of trees, to stopping the use of explosives in fishing, to 
addressing water supply issues.
Initial community-based management or co-management 
pilots did appear to be successful. Reasons for their success 
included intensive donor support, a long-term commitment 
to an approach (at least five years), working in relatively iso-
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lated regions of the country (sometimes being the only pro-
ject in an area, meaning that the area was not oversaturated 
with “development options”) and perhaps the newness of the 
approach—everyone was keen for it to work (Ear 2007). Local 
institutions and provincial governments were often extensively 
engaged by project teams to gain their support for specific 
activities. Undoubtedly these experiences of the late 1990s and 
early 2000s contributed to the reform of Cambodia’s fisheries 
sector and greatly influenced the design of local institutions 
and programs (Evans 2002; Marschke 2008). A series of actors, 
particularly government staff who worked closely on such pilots, 
became change agents within their own departments, really 
advocating within government for this type of approach and, 
in some cases, continuing to work on rolling out programs to 
ensure that a greater number of municipalities could be involved 
(Knowles Morrison 2010).
Villagers get involved in resource management activities for 
various reasons, too. A newly elected resource management 
committee, for example, may enable actors to find a new patron 
(Legerwood and Vijghen 2002) and serve as a way to alter vil-
lage power relations. This may also serve as a mechanism to 
ensure that those who have been historically excluded from 
natural resources near their villages (vis-à-vis fishing lots, for-
est concessions) can now gain access. A committee may also be 
organized as a way to garner resources to stop encroachment 
from outsiders onto local resources. There may be strong leaders 
who are interested in protecting resources near the village, or 
villagers may feel that it makes sense to work on these issues. It 
may also be that the area has experienced significant declines, 
and an opportunity through a technical department or through 
an NGO pilot project enables the establishment of a community-
based natural resource management site (Marschke and Sinclair 
2009). Or, it may be that community members are interested 
in remaining in rural areas and recognize that part of their 
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livelihood is linked to natural resources. Although Cambodian 
communities are no longer particularly isolated, and household 
members are now moving in and out of the village, rural liveli-
hoods remain linked to healthy ecosystems.
Snapshots of what community involvement in resource man-
agement may entail do exist. A 2009 edited volume of case 
studies, titled Emerging Trends, Challenges and Innovations: 
Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) 
in Cambodia, highlights cases of successful local resource 
management in Cambodia. For example, while initial resource 
management initiatives emphasized resource protection, this 
volume of cases demonstrates how people can move beyond 
conservation to manage and harvest their resources, such as 
honey bees and pole cultivation (CBNRM LI 2009). Cases 
also deconstruct ideas around common property, participation 
and who gains from an involvement in resource management. 
However, none of these cases provides any longitudinal per-
spective to demonstrate how resource governance processes 
may unfold over time. What are the ebbs and flows of this type 
of work? Can it realistically be sustained in a context such as 
Cambodia, particularly when donors pull back and the govern-
ment remains largely responsible for supporting this type of 
effort?
CONCLUSION
Supporting local involvement in resource governance (fisheries 
and other natural resources) is an approach that holds appeal 
within the resource governance, scientific and research com-
munities (Armitage et al. 2009) and arises as a response to the 
complexity and diversity of the systems, uncertainties about 
the effectiveness of current management arrangements, the 
diverse range of stakeholders and the often unexpected out-
comes from previous policies and practices. Policy processes 
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supporting decentralized resource management emerged for 
multiple reasons: donor interests with public participation and 
empowerment, state attention to forms of political consolidation 
and/or grassroots participation, the need for technical depart-
ments to share the responsibility for resource management, and 
a curiosity in resource management from a local perspective (or, 
at the very least, an interest to work with an NGO at the local 
level). Such support is also tied to agendas of natural resource 
conservation, as well as wider goals of poverty alleviation and 
sustainable development and resonates with the regional agenda 
of democracy, decentralization and devolution.
Initial pilot testing was successful enough to serve as a 
model from which government authorities and donors could 
design their decentralization policies. Forms of community-
based natural resource management or “co” management 
promoted within fisheries, forestry and environment agencies 
demonstrate the intersection of decentralization processes 
across multiple sectors, particularly that of public admin-
istration and that of resource governance. This results in a 
policy commitment to community and co-management of 
natural resources (fisheries, forestry, etc.), endorsed and pro-
moted by the state, intergovernmental organizations, local 
NGOs and academic practitioners. Some programs empha-
size a strong governmental presence and others advocate for 
mostly community involvement. In practice, this presents 
some challenges as the less prescriptive nature of the approach 
means that the terms “co-management” and “community-based 
management” can be unclear, and their application vague 
(Arthur et al. 2011).
Moreover, these policy reforms are occurring within an 
authoritarian, hierarchical power structure where social strati-
fication remains an important cultural value (Ebihara 1968; 
Marston 1997; Gellman 2010). In concrete terms, people con-
tinue to pay respect and are loyal to those with a higher  political 
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rank and economic status. At the same time, these societal 
values are interacting with evolving political and institutional 
development: notions of fairness, justice and local empower-
ment are entering into people’s ways of thinking (Ojendal and 
Sedara 2006). This results in a “hybridization,” whereby par-
ticipatory democracy is overlapping with persistent patronage 
structures (Ojendal and Sedara 2006). In the resource sector, 
for instance, many of the Cambodian government’s formal 
and informal policies are about exploiting timber and fish, or 
converting forests for agriculture production and converting 
fishing grounds into exclusive “fishing lots” (Sunderlin 2006; 
Ratner 2006). Meanwhile, as I have illustrated in this chapter, 
there are a series of recently designed policies to encourage 
decision-making and resource governance at a local level. The 
Cambodian context serves as an excellent example of how dif-
ferent world views intersect, at some points blending together 
and at other points clashing. Before turning to an in-depth 
examination of how these resource governance processes unfold 
in the coastal areas of southwestern Cambodia, Chapter 2 
explores fisheries resources and specific fisheries governance 
challenges in greater detail.
 
II
governing a CoveTed 
resourCe
Fisheries resources contribute significantly toward nutri-tion, livelihoods and GDP in Cambodia. At the same time, 
most of the near-shore fisheries are overfished (Pomeroy et 
al. 2007), both in coastal areas within the Gulf of Thailand 
(Salayo et al. 2008) and within freshwater areas such as the 
Tonle Sap lake. These declines have profound implications for 
tens of thousands of Cambodian households, particularly poorer 
households, in terms of livelihood opportunities and poverty 
alleviation. Fisheries governance in this situation is neces-
sary, yet challenging to implement. Policy-makers are aware 
of persistent fisheries declines, although narratives around the 
role of small-scale fisheries in terms of poverty alleviation are 
contested. Some argue that small-scale fisheries are doomed 
(Bush and Hirsch 2005), that “fishing rhymes with poverty” 
(Béné 2003) or merely serves as a coping strategy (Allison 
and Ellis 2001). Others argue that fisheries provide a range of 
livelihood and developmental values that cannot be replaced 
(Arthur and Friend 2010), provide an important source of wild 
food (Greenburg 2010) and serve as a buffer during hard times 
(Béné et al. 2010). Regardless, diversification beyond fishing 
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or into aquaculture (fish farming) is frequently promoted as a 
pathway out of poverty (Arthur and Friend 2010).
Aquaculture, in comparison to capture fisheries, does offer 
the potential of high returns, even at a household-producer level 
(Bush et al. 2010), and other countries in Southeast Asia have 
seen significant rates of aquaculture growth (six percent per 
year) over the past decade (FAO 2009). Vietnam, for example, 
is the third-largest aquaculture producer globally (FAO 2009). 
Aquaculture, however, poses its own set of risks, including 
boom-bust cycles (Hall 2009), environmental contamination and 
complicated feed regimes (Phillips and Subasinghe 2008). Rapid 
aquaculture expansion causes further dilemmas of access, land 
allocation and coastal management. Households need a certain 
amount of start-up capital to begin aquaculture, along with a 
steady stream of buyers wanting their products. Cambodia’s 
commodity chain for fisheries products is complex, involving 
multiple fish buyers or middlepersons (Yim and McKenney 
2003). These are some of the reasons why aquaculture produc-
tion remains low in Cambodia for now (six percent of its food 
fish production stems from aquaculture, mainly in the form of 
grow-out or small-producer aquaculture in the Tonle Sap lake 
and Mekong River). As such, shifting toward small-producer 
aquaculture in many fishing communities may not be a realistic 
option at this point.
This begs the question of how to govern the declining fish-
eries resources that many rural Cambodians continue to depend 
upon (I focus on fisheries resources, since aquaculture produc-
tion remains low in Cambodia). This chapter begins by dem-
onstrating the significance of fisheries within the Cambodian 
context and sketching out several of the key governance challen-
ges for fisheries. I then turn to an exploration of the history of 
fisheries management, from the French colonial administration 
through Cambodian independence to the post-Khmer Rouge 
era. Particular attention is paid to the role of local people in 
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fisheries management, to consider if and how people have been 
involved in managing their fisheries. This is worth examining 
in light of recent reforms encouraging local resource govern-
ance, including fisheries governance, which were discussed in 
Chapter 1.
THE FISHERIES AS A RESOURCE IN DECLINE6
In general, fish and other aquatic species are in decline. For 
example, in the Gulf of Thailand the total biomass in 1995 had 
declined to less than eight percent of the 1965 estimates (Salayo 
et al. 2008). In the last fifteen years, biomass has likely further 
declined, given the amount of activity found in coastal and 
inland areas. Cambodian fishers themselves report a decline 
in catch per unit effort (Long et al. 2008) and note that the size 
and diversity of fish species have significantly decreased in the 
last fifteen years (Nao and Lieng 2008). As catch per unit effort 
across Southeast Asia has been declining, the exploitation ratio 
has increased (Stobutzki et al. 2006). Based on current trends, 
production from capture fisheries in the Asia-Pacific region 
is estimated to continue to decline over the next ten to twenty 
years unless excess capacity is greatly reduced (Sugiyama et al. 
2004); this statistic likely holds true for Cambodia as well.
Fisheries are far easier to exploit than they are to manage for 
many reasons, including limited scientific knowledge about the 
resource, the hidden nature of the resource and the economic 
opportunities that fishing can afford (Berkes et al. 2010b). 
Fisheries ecosystems are highly variable, and include many 
species with different life cycles and seasons, often migrating 
over large distances. From a purely biological perspective, it is 
difficult to understand natural productivity, and there is much
6 This section on fisheries decline is adapted from an article co-written by myself, Robert 
Arthur and Richard Friend. See Arthur et al. 2011 for more details.
42  Life, Fish and Mangroves
to learn about aquatic life (Arthur et al. 2011). Added to the 
variability of natural systems are the diverse ways in which 
people interact with the natural system. People employ differ-
ent kinds of gear targeting a variety of habitats, with different 
levels of intensity at different times of the year (Deap et al. 
2003). Furthermore, households may rely on the fishery as a 
buffer, in the sense of family members moving in and out of the 
fishery, or as a livelihood strategy that enables the accumula-
tion of capital and perhaps modest wealth (Béné et al. 2010). 
As such, fisheries represent “complex” systems of dynamic, 
interlinked social and bio-physical elements across a range of 
scales, characterized by contested values and interests, in which 
policy decisions are based on limited information (cf. Arthur 
et al. 2011).
Yet in spite of this biological complexity and general state of 
decline, the fisheries sector, along with agriculture (rice, timber 
and rubber), trade and manufacturing, plays a major role in con-
tributing to Cambodia’s economic growth. The fisheries sector 
contributes significantly to Cambodia’s GDP, although the num-
bers do vary (anywhere from 7 to 12 percent); the fisheries sec-
tor is Cambodia’s fourth-largest employer, accounting for almost 
5 percent of the workforce (FAO 2009; MRC 2009). Fishers are 
likely fishing down the food web, i.e., shifting landings from 
longer-living bottom fish to shorter-living invertebrates and 
planktivorous pelagic fish (Pauly et al. 1998). In other words, 
fishers increasingly target large quantities of smaller fish. This 
situation is hypothesized to lead to an initial increase in catch, 
before transitioning into a phase that is associated with stagna-
tion and decline (Pauly et al. 1998). This cycle helps to explain 
why money has continued to be made from fisheries resources, 
even though fishers themselves talk about smaller catch sizes. 
In this type of scenario, it is possible for production to grow 
even in the face of oncoming declines.
In 2008, based on consumption data, Cambodia’s total produc-
tion of fish grew to 471,000 tonnes, with increases coming from 
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rice field capture and freshwater aquaculture (NSDP 2010). 
From a regional perspective, the overall production of the 
Mekong capture fisheries—shared between Cambodia, 
Vietnam, Lao PDR and Thailand—is said to constitute 2 per-
cent of total global fish production and 17 percent of total global 
inland fisheries production (Baran et al. 2006; MRC 2009). Fish, 
whether dried, smoked or eaten fresh, provides an estimated 75 
percent of animal protein for rural Cambodians (NSDP 2010). 
Citizens in other Southeast Asian countries, in comparison, 
derive an average of 21 percent of their protein from fish (with 
the exception of Indonesia, where fish is also a main source of 
protein) (FAO 2009).
The Mekong River and Tonle Sap lake are the larger, more 
visible examples of Cambodian water bodies that are (or were, 
depending on one’s perspective) rich in aquatic resources. Tonle 
Sap is Southeast Asia’s largest freshwater, floodplain lake (the 
lake shrinks in the dry season and greatly expands during the 
rainy season) and gained UNESCO Biosphere Reserve status 
in 1997. There is also a great diversity and diffusion of small-
scale fisheries in ponds, streams and rice fields (Gregory and 
Guttman 1996), small-scale yet productive upland fisheries 
(e.g., Degen et al. 2005) and a productive coastal fishery along 
Cambodia’s 435 km coastal zone (Sugiyama et al. 2004). At this 
point statistics are only collected on the fishing effort for tax-
able gear. As such, there are no statistics for either the offshore 
fishery, which is heavily fished by international fleets, or for 
those using small-scale gear. Many households are small-scale 
producers or perhaps may even use what is classified as taxable 
fishing gear, but are not paying any official taxes (Marschke 
2005). Households generally tend to fish in shallow waters 
that are less than twenty metres deep with boats of less than 
33 horsepower.
Competing claims over land and biotic resources have 
increased in recent years, as new, often regional industries 
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have sought access and control for aquaculture production, min-
eral extraction and tourism. At the same time, there has been 
a depletion of aquatic stocks throughout the Gulf of Thailand 
and in freshwater areas, an increase in international fleets in 
Cambodian waters (fishers perceive this, although there are no 
exact numbers to back these claims) and a squeezing of coastal 
fishers into near and inshore water areas. For many rural dwell-
ers relying on aquatic resources for their livelihoods, these new 
patterns of ownership have proven exclusive and inequitable. 
Yet fisheries are of particular importance to Cambodia’s poor 
partly due to their nature as common property resources, acting 
as a component of diversified livelihood strategies and also as 
a safety net and coping strategy (Béné et al. 2010).
THE FISHERIES AS A GOVERNANCE CHALLENGE7
There are a series of challenges that fishers face: overfishing, 
biological complexity, and competing claims over land and 
biotic resources, to name a few. Although fishers can man-
age some of these challenges themselves, particularly with 
appropriate policies, many of these challenges do require state 
or regional intervention. Throughout Southeast Asia fisheries 
governance is poor, particularly in terms of managing excess 
capacity and in terms of solving fisheries-related conflicts. In 
most cases, excess capacity is ignored (large trawlers operating 
in local waters) and conflicts are not easily resolved. Cambodia, 
as one of the poorest countries in the region, is no different. To 
get a better handle on what these two issues mean for small-
scale fishers, I examine excess capacity and fisheries-related 
conflicts each in turn.
7 This section on fisheries governance challenges is adapted from a working paper  co-authored 
by Dr. Simon Bush and myself. For more details, see Academic Acknowledgements.
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Excess Capacity
Excess capacity has two dimensions: (a) the total quantity of 
effort being exerted in the fishery, and (b) the ability or effect-
iveness of fishing vessels and gear to catch fish (Pomeroy et al. 
2007; Salayo et al. 2008). In terms of quantity of effort, people 
migrate and/or live along river areas and coasts relying on fish-
eries resources as a source of daily sustenance and livelihood. 
The fishery also serves as a buffer for hard times, enabling 
people to enter the fishery temporarily (Béné et al. 2010). With 
current stock declines, small-scale fishers are forced to increase 
the number of nets or traps that they set and the number of 
hours they fish. While small-scale fishers do place pressure on 
the fisheries, perhaps a far greater challenge is offshore trawls 
and larger-scale vessels. In both cases, a key challenge is how 
to reduce pressure through the “demodernization” of fishing 
technologies and through regulating access to fishing resources.
Management of excess capacity is difficult, partially because 
of the common pool nature of the fisheries resource in the 
inshore, near-shore and offshore water areas. While the open 
access nature of the fishery does have some benefits, in the 
sense of being a livelihood option that poorer households can 
move in and out of (Béné et al. 2010), unclear ownership also 
aggravates competition among fishers. Moreover, the general 
absence of enforcement of existing fisheries laws and policies 
has created a situation whereby no one is taking responsibility 
to do anything but harvest the resource (Siriaksophon et al. 
2009). Compounding this situation is the neo-Malthusian nar-
rative around resource decline (Henley 2005), which focuses 
on population growth and overfishing. This is an example of 
a “blame the poor” mentality that over-simplifies a complex 
situation influenced by multiple factors.
Although small-scale fisheries remain largely unregulated, 
regional and government authorities are increasingly focused 
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on extending management approaches to the small-scale sector 
(as touched upon in Chapter 1). Not all management measures, 
however, are accepted by small-scale fishers. In a study of 
fishing in Thailand, Cambodia and the Philippines, Salayo 
et al. (2008) showed that area-based protection and banning the 
use of some gear types were generally accepted management 
strategies because they are seen as affecting larger-scale fish-
ers. In comparison, seasonal (temporal) restrictions and effort 
reduction were not accepted largely because they are perceived 
disproportionately to restrict small-scale fisher’ income genera-
tion. Coastal fishers see regulation as being far more pertinent 
for larger fishing vessels, hinting at the poverty dimension 
facing many small-scale fishers (Salayo et al. 2008).
The number of large-scale national and foreign trawls that 
fish in particularly efficient ways is a major issue. For most 
Southeast Asian countries, including Cambodia, capacity 
appears to be increasing (Stobutzki et al. 2006). As with small-
scale fishing, the incentive leading to overcapacity is the open 
access nature of the fishery. National fleets face an open access 
situation not because of inadequate policies, but rather because 
boat licencing is poorly enforced and landings, due to the large 
number of ports, are poorly monitored. A concerted effort at 
the regional level to consider options for fisheries management 
is desperately needed, particularly in light of national plans and 
policies that promote exportation of fisheries products as a way 
to alleviate poverty.
For these reasons, Stobutzki et al. (2006) argue that a two-
tiered system of instituting or strengthening output controls for 
industrial fisheries, such as quota and licencing, and strength-
ening area-based user-group rights for small-scale fisheries 
may well provide the most promising set of fisheries manage-
ment solutions. A two-tiered management approach would not 
absolve small-scale fishers from sustainable use of aquatic 
resources nor reify any claims that local fishers “know better” 
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(Johnson 2006). The success of output-based management will 
depend not only on how poverty and alternative livelihoods 
can be used to reduce fishing capacity but also on the specific 
importance of fisheries to these communities. Without broader 
understanding of the meaning and importance of fisheries to 
fishing communities, policy aimed at steering fisheries to sus-
tainable use will remain ineffective at best and antagonistic at 
worst.
Conflicts
Multiple interests compete for the resources that small produ-
cers depend upon, including extractive industries (oil and gas 
exploration, mining of sand), international and national fishing 
fleets, tourism and dive resorts, and aquaculture development. 
Most of these activities result in territorial claims, leaving 
less and less coastline and aquatic space accessible. Although 
competition for marine resources has existed for decades 
(Chou 1994; Valencia and Marsh 1986), it is the intensity of 
competition for marine and aquatic resources that is at the 
crux of recent tensions. Conflicts may occur within the two-
hundred-mile Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ) over access to 
territorial waters (e.g., between Cambodia and Vietnam) or 
between users of different fishing technologies (Pomeroy et al. 
2007). One reason that competition has intensified is the use of 
industrial fleets that possess a level of power and technology 
that can “‘vacuum’ or monopolize available fishery resources, 
taking all living organisms . . . and leaving nothing behind for 
resident and other smaller-scale fishers” (Pomeroy et al. 2007: 
646). Such efficient gear contributes to a general decline in 
fishing stocks, which in turn exacerbates conflicts for local 
resource users.
Rapid transformations can also exacerbate conf licts: 
Cambodia’s coasts and river bodies are now in the midst of 
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such a rapid transformation. Although conflicts play out at a 
local level, they occur often as a result of broader-level political 
economy policies and practices. In the case of extensive sand 
exploration and extraction found throughout Cambodia’s coasts 
and rivers, much of this is driven by Singapore’s choice to 
 construct buildings reliant on cheap, resource-intensive concrete 
structures rather than using other (more expensive) construction 
techniques involving steel or glass. Market opportunities, rather 
than a lack of government policy (when enforced, Cambodia has 
decent policies that limit sand mining) have influenced where 
sand is dredged (The Economist, 2009). Fishers are affected by 
sand mining since it disrupts local aquatic habitat and affects 
catch levels. Other informal policies, such as rapid tourist 
development in the absence of an environmental impact assess-
ment or other social assessments, can also increase conflicts.
Access is another issue facing local populations. As claims 
are made in and around shorelines (i.e., lagoons, mangrove estu-
aries, rivers, bays, inshore and near-shore areas)—whether from 
large-scale industry (oil and gas, sand mining), through national 
agencies creating protected areas and marine protected areas, or 
by individuals staking claims through the use of particular fixed 
fishing gear—fewer water areas remain accessible to poorer 
households. This creates conflicts, which play out in numer-
ous ways, including through the stealing of fishing gear, anger 
toward those practicing illegal fishing (i.e., electric or blast 
fishing) and friction between those using different gear types. 
Social unrest between fishers is real; this unrest is enhanced 
by general fishing declines, aquatic and coastal exploration 
and exploitation. Adequate conflict-resolution mechanisms do 
not exist, and many conflicts cannot be handled at the village 
level alone (Pomeroy et al. 2007; Nasuchon and Charles 2010). 
It appears that those with the most “might” are often rather 
likely to win (i.e., those well-connected individuals and those 
with bigger boats and more efficient gear).
Governing a Coveted Resource  49
THE FISHERIES AS MANAGED IN THE PAST
What, then, has been the response to these fisheries-related 
challenges at the national level and within fishing villages? As 
was mentioned in Chapter 1, fisheries policies have generally 
focused on policy and legislation that placed restrictions on gear 
through licences and prohibitions, combined with establishing 
blanket closed seasons that broadly correspond with breeding 
and spawning seasons (Arthur et al. 2011). Enforcement of such 
policies has been highly variable and in most cases ineffective, 
often causing tensions between state agents and local fishers. 
This is what helped spark the fisheries reform in 2000, leading 
to the creation of a unit within the Fisheries Administration to 
focus on community-based fisheries management and the pass-
ing of legislation to support such an approach. Interestingly, 
this approach appears to be in marked contrast to past fisheries 
management practices. For this reason, I turn to a historical 
examination of how Cambodia’s fisheries resources were man-
aged as a way better to assess the potential for community 
fisheries processes.
Few scholarly articles examine Cambodian fisheries from 
a historical perspective (cf. Degen et al. 2000; Sneddon 
2007; Bush 2008). Although the French colonial archives for 
Cambodia, which are partially housed in Aix-en-Province, 
France (the other section is housed in Hanoi, Vietnam), do con-
tain archival documents from the colonial period (1863–1953), 
information on fish or fisheries management is limited. In 
comparison to other sectors such as forestry or agriculture, the 
fishery is not often referred to except in terms of establishing 
the parceling and auctioning system found within the Tonle 
Sap. Most post-colonial documentation from the 1950s and 
1960s was destroyed during the Khmer Rouge era (1975–1979) 
and little was written in relation to fisheries resources during 
the Vietnamese occupation of the 1980s. What has since been 
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researched and written about this period (1975–1990) tends to 
focus on the Khmer Rouge genocide or the Vietnamese occu-
pation (Slocomb 2002; Tyner 2008). For these reasons, I do 
my best at drawing together what is historically known about 
Cambodia’s fisheries sector, paying particular attention to what 
was written about local fishers and forms of local management. 
It may be that I have missed something within the French schol-
arly tradition, although I have read several works (cf. Chevey 
and Poulain 1940; Martin 1997).
The once-abundant aquatic resources found in the Tonle Sap 
flood-plain lake generated significant revenues for Cambodian 
royalty, the French Protectorate, and more recently the Fisheries 
Administration and high-level officials. Cambodian royalty 
fundraised revenue through issuing fisheries concession leases 
(Petillot 1911, as cited in Degen et al. 2000). At the same time, 
French colonizers (1863–1953) recognized the revenue potential 
of Cambodia’s rich inland fishery. A taxation system was, in 
part, modelled on Cambodia’s traditional practices: the French 
Protectorate formalized the fisheries concession arrangements 
to generate revenue for the colonial administration. By 1910, 
for example, taxes from the fishery made up one-ninth of the 
French Protectorate’s annual budget (Degen et al. 2000).
French colonial policy enabled local leaders to claim common 
land, land that was once available for all villagers. It appears 
that what may have been common property was gradually taken 
over by local or other elites, including land adjacent to critical 
fishing grounds. Moreover, prime fishing grounds in the Tonle 
Sap were parceled off for the exclusive use of elites and indus-
try. Fishing rights were auctioned to private bidders to raise 
revenues; the highest bidder then held exclusive fishing rights 
over a particular area, with Chinese merchants monopolizing 
the market. Exclusive concessions for larger-scale fisheries were 
thereby granted throughout the flood plain for two- to four-year 
periods. Medium- and small-scale fisheries were essentially 
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open access licences, allowing fishing gear of a certain size to 
be used in all areas except fishing lots (Bush 2008).
A significant amount of trade was already taking place within 
the region by this time (early 1900s). An estimated fifty thou-
sand tonnes per year of fish were exported in the form of dried, 
salted and fresh fish, along with fish oil and fish paste (Degen 
et al. 2000). A Fisheries Law was established in 1908. At this 
point only a few restrictions in terms of fisheries practices 
were set in place. Documents kept by colonial administrators 
indicate that stock declines in relation to specific species had 
already been noted during this period. Regardless, conservation 
measures were not put in place and fish continued to be a major 
source of revenue for the colony. This persisted into Cambodia’s 
independence era (i.e., post-1953). The Cambodian government 
continued the system of parceling off the Tonle Sap to the high-
est bidder for exploitation purposes, as written into the 1956 
Fisheries Law (Degen et al. 2000). It appears the auctioning of 
fishing lots in the Tonle Sap remained a major policy thrust of 
the government throughout the 1960s and into the early 1970s.
Coastal resources, in contrast to the Tonle Sap were never 
parceled off to generate revenues for the colonial adminis-
tration or for any post-independence government. This was 
partly because the majority of Cambodia’s population lived in 
the flood plains of the Tonle Sap and this was where the state 
could generate the most revenue. Archival documents mention 
the trading of marine products throughout the Gulf of Thailand 
and the South China Sea during colonial times. During post-
colonial times, oral histories relating to fisheries in the 1950s 
and 1960s suggest that those Cambodians fishing in the coastal 
areas were small-scale producers. During this period, villagers 
could sell their catches to buyers from Thailand, Vietnam and 
Singapore who came into the area to purchase local marine 
products (Marschke 1999). Unfortunately, little is written about 
coastal resources during the colonial or post-colonial periods.
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The Khmer Rouge era (1975–1979) is recent enough to piece 
together a few more aspects in relation to the fisheries sector. 
Trade, both in the coastal area and in the Tonle Sap floodplain, 
stopped for the most part by the mid-1970s. Fishing resources 
were neglected in favour of rice production under the Khmer 
Rouge. This was, after all, a socialist project gone horribly 
wrong, where the cities were emptied out and the population 
was forced into an agrarian existence (Tyner 2008). Fishing 
that did take place was to supply leading Khmer Rouge cadres 
in Phnom Penh (Degen et al. 2000) or was caught illegally to 
augment meagre household food supplies. A few aquatic resour-
ces were specifically targeted. For example, there was a high 
demand for the Irrawaddy dolphin, as the oil contained in the 
dolphin’s flesh could be used for engine lubricant.
In the early 1980s the Vietnamese-backed government issued 
a series of central directives, including organizing villagers 
into solidarity groups, known in Khmer as krom samaki, for 
farming and fishing villages. This type of collectivization 
was rather liberal by Vietnamese standards and adapted to 
suit the post-Khmer Rouge context (Frings 1997). It was the 
municipality or commune that “was responsible for the proper 
functioning of the solidarity teams for increasing the harvest, 
the core element of the agricultural-based revolutionary soci-
ety” (Slocomb 2004: 453). However, the state could not enforce 
compulsory returns, and it appears that solidarity groups also 
sold to local business people if this is where the advantage 
lay (Slocomb 2002). Although by the mid-1980s agricultural 
offices that covered fisheries were found at the provincial 
level, the Ministry of Agriculture never achieved firm control 
of resource exploitation in part because of the ongoing war and 
weak administration (Le Billon 2000; Slocomb 2002). That 
being said, fish was viewed as a resource that could be further 
developed for trade with Vietnam, Cambodia’s main trading 
partner throughout the 1980s (Slocomb 2002).
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By the late 1980s, the government had introduced pragmatic 
reforms, discarding socialist economic practices in favour of 
liberal market reforms (Slocomb 2006). At this point, solidarity 
groups were abandoned and villagers returned to fishing with 
other household members, or sometimes shared a boat with 
neighbours. Formerly parceled fishing areas in the Tonle Sap 
were redemarcated: the government re-established this conces-
sion system to raise revenues (this system had only been loosely 
used to generate state revenues during most of the 1980s). The 
1987 Fisheries Law recognized large-scale fishing operations—
initiated under French colonial rule—as a major state revenue 
source and tool to control the fishery. By 1992 the concessions 
were being auctioned at values ranging from US$ 2,000 to US$ 
20,000, depending on the area’s size and location (Bush 2008). 
Once again, fishing lots in the Tonle Sap were auctioned to the 
highest bidder, thereby excluding villagers from nearby fishing 
grounds; once again the coastal area was relatively ignored. As 
a result, a first-come-first-serve mentality ensued.
During this period of market liberalization, the fisheries 
represented a good that the state relied upon for export. Fishing 
lot owners, in particular, guarded their fishing grounds, and 
fishers were often unable to cross fishing lot boundaries to 
access their fishing grounds, or any open water area for that 
matter. That being said, local people relied on the fishery as 
a source of protein and, for those living in and around rivers, 
lakes or the ocean, as a source of income. By the late 1990s, a 
few fishing lot owners controlled much of the Tonle Sap fish-
ery. This resulted in an enclosure, limiting many people from 
entering the fishery. In the coastal area, fishers were facing 
their own challenges: an increasing presence of large, foreign 
trawls and ever-efficient fishing gear that was affecting aquatic 
stocks. Since aquatic stocks were decreasing throughout the 
Gulf of Thailand, it made sense to target Cambodia, with its 
relatively intact mangrove ecosystem. This was a time when 
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 conflicts between fishers using different gear began to increase 
dramatically (Marschke 1999; 2005).
As this narrative suggests, not much is known about the 
fisheries sector in general. Even less is known about if or how 
Cambodian communities managed their fish and flood forest 
resources prior to the devastating Khmer Rouge regime, or, for 
that matter, at any point leading up to the rise in community-
based management practices in the late 1990s (that coincides 
with the proliferation of NGOs and donor interest). Historians 
like David Chandler argue that little management took place at 
a local level in any sector (cf. Chandler 1996). This certainly 
seems consistent with a society that is hierarchical and authori-
tarian (Bit 1991). The counter-argument to this is to consider 
the speed at which villages rebuilt their temples post-Khmer 
Rouge; no doubt this effort took a significant amount of local 
initiative and control (Legerwood and Vijghen 2002), although 
some monetary support did come from overseas Khmer.
A few authors, specifically examining natural resources 
and local agency, found that local resource practices were 
likely led by village and higher-level government officials 
(cf. Martin 1997; Marschke 1999). In the coastal areas of south-
western Cambodia, for example, there appears to have been a 
system in place for charcoal production whereby charcoal was 
produced in designated spaces with a recovery period being 
recognized as necessary to ensure the longer-term sustainabil-
ity of the mangrove ecosystem (Marschke 1999). This effort 
was supervised by local government officials. Martin (1997) 
describes a state-controlled marketing system in the 1960s 
whereby villagers could do what they liked with their resour-
ces so long as they sold their product to a centrally appointed 
government official. In this system, household harvests were 
recorded and then money was distributed after the district chief 
sold the harvest on behalf of households. To draw from another 
example, monks recall villagers protesting as parts of the flood 
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forest near the village were cleared for watermelon cultivation in 
the 1940s. Such cutting affected aquatic habitat during the flood 
season, and after complaining to the district level, watermelon 
cultivation stopped and reforestation was encouraged. Since 
then, villagers follow an informal system of forest management, 
reporting to authorities any illegal cutting or hunting activities 
(cf. Evans et al. 2004; Marschke 2008).
As such, it may be fair to suggest that while forms of local 
resource management can be found in Cambodia, these cases may 
be far and few between. It does not appear that specific fisheries 
management activities took place in and around villages, in the 
sense of limiting gear types, protecting specific breeding habitats 
or limiting the number of people who could access these areas, 
with the exception of one case where monks protected fish spe-
cies in the river near their pagoda (CBNRM LI 2009). Thus, while 
it is possible that more examples of local fisheries management 
existed, it also may well have been that protecting forest areas 
for aquatic habitat was what happened most often. What all this 
suggests is that there has never been an active interest in fisheries 
management at the village level per se, rather a general interest 
in habitat protection and in ensuring access to the fishery.
CONCLUSION
Reflecting upon Cambodia’s history is useful for understand-
ing what a novel local resource governance approach has been 
recently introduced to the fisheries sector, one that is in many 
ways counter-intuitive to leadership structures (local and 
national). The emphasis on a form of fisheries management that 
included local people only came to fruition in the late 1990s. 
What this historical analysis suggests is that local fishers never 
took a particularly strong role in fisheries management, and 
that the state has consistently looked toward the fishery for 
revenue generation. Equipped with this information, it becomes 
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clear that shifting fisheries management to local levels is not 
necessarily just, given that there is not a strong precedent for 
local fisheries management and that multiple actors are vying 
for aquatic and coastal resources. This chapter, therefore, offers 
insights into why local resource governance programs may take 
time to be established, and how fisheries governance remains 
contested, as will be seen in the chapters that follow.
Even with significant reforms, fisheries are hard to manage 
in the best of circumstances; multiple drivers coalesce in and 
around fishing villages, producing highly complex, uncer-
tain consequences (Pitcher and Lam 2010; Underdal 2010). 
Governance arrangements need to respond to an ever-changing 
resource base and “roving bandit” traders (Berkes et al. 2006), in 
addition to adapting to both the common-pool nature of capture 
fisheries and the owner-operated nature of small-scale aqua-
culture (Chuenpagdee et al. 2008). High poverty rates, limited 
tenure rights for fisheries resources and the general economic 
growth derived from natural resources (including fish) pose 
additional challenges for fisheries governance in Cambodia (Cox 
2008; Un and So 2009). Finally, dealing with excess capacity and 
fisheries conflicts is proving to be particularly hard, even with 
major policy reforms and donor support on these issues.
There is limited analysis of Cambodian fisheries governance 
(Sneddon 2007; Bush 2008) and the concrete challenges that 
fishers are facing in part because of the slow pace of change 
within the fisheries sector and in Cambodia more generally. 
What does exist generally fails to account for the socio-political 
context in which policy experiments are designed (Clement 
2010) or to consider the longer-term sustainability of such 
policy experiments. The subsequent chapters explore fishers’ 
livelihoods and management and fisheries governance more 
broadly, drawing on my detailed research from one village and 
the local fishing grounds that a handful of villages depend upon 
in southwestern Cambodia.
I came to Koh Sralao in 1988 because I did not want to be a soldier any-
more. People told me about the opportunity to work for a businessperson 
who was growing marijuana. I came to the village thinking that I would 
be a worker but the plantation was shut down shortly after I arrived. So 
I had to learn to fish. I learned to fish from people nearby, asking them 
questions about their nets and about the water. I built a house on the 
water and used candles at night to catch crabs with my hands.
I decided to stay. I did not know anyone, so I had to find a middle-
person who could help me in harder times. After a year, I had saved 
enough money to buy a boat. I still caught crabs but I used a bamboo 
trap instead of candles. Even today I still catch crabs, but I now use 
nets and go deeper in the water since I know where to look.
Although my life is better now than it was, since my children can 
help me earn money for our family, I do worry about the future. There 
are now more people interested in our fishing grounds . . . bigger 
fishing boats and barges that carry sand . . . and sections of my nets 
are destroyed each year. It is harder to catch a consistent amount of 
fish, even when I fish further from home. My children need to do 
something else, but I do not know what else they can do here. I like 
this area, and would prefer to stay if possible.
—Excerpts from interviews with  
Mat Sok, Cambodia, 2002, 2003, 2008, 20108
III
life in a resourCe-
dePendenT village, 
1998–2010
8 Although I met with many individuals and groups throughout this field research, the 
most consistent, in-depth work took place with key informants in six households that 
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Multiple factors have affected Mat Sok’s livelihood situation: enforcing government policies such as the government 
crackdown on growing marijuana, declining fish stocks, limited 
educational opportunities in the village and a general lack of 
money. The above excerpts illustrate the ongoing challenges that 
this fishing household deals with. Sok considers his household 
to be economically poor, although he feels that it is tight-knit 
and well supported within the Muslim community (around 
ten percent of all households in Koh Sralao are Muslim; the rest 
are Buddhist) and within the village more generally. Several 
times when Sok’s fishing gear has been stolen, for instance, 
neighbours lent him old gill nets that enabled him to save 
enough money for new gill nets rather than having to borrow 
money. Sok is also involved in community activities, working 
within Koh Sralao’s Mosque Association and, at various points, 
working with the local resource management institution (which 
will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4).
Sok has been able to send his children to the village school 
(with classes until grade nine) by using gill nets, a fishing gear 
that he can handle by himself to catch crabs. Sok’s wife Narin 
extracts the meat from the crabs he catches and sells the crab 
meat to a local buyer. She sometimes peels extra crabs as a way 
to generate additional income for their household. Recently, 
Sok’s two oldest sons finished grade nine at the village. One 
son started to fish with him, which increases the amount of 
gill nets that Sok can set, and the other son found work in a 
factory near Phnom Penh. Unfortunately, sending either son to 
high school in the provincial town was out of the question for 
 I began carefully working with in 2002. For each of these households, I explained this 
book project and discussed the pros and cons of using names or pseudonyms. We agreed 
that I would quote people directly to give credit to local experts unless a topic was too 
sensitive (relating to politics or issues of power, for example). In these cases the name of 
the person and the year of the discussion is placed after the quote. For all other sources, 
information is presented in such a manner to ensure confidentiality.
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Sok, which is the case for most villagers. A concern for Sok’s 
household has been the continuous decline in fish catch over the 
past years, coupled with fishing gear getting consistently stolen 
or destroyed. Sok’s livelihood is enmeshed within a complex 
social-ecological system that is in continuous flux.
This chapter attempts better to understand such fluctuation. 
My goal in writing this chapter is to account for the social-
ecological changes that have taken place within this mangrove-
estuary village over a twelve-year period, 1998–2010, paying 
particular attention to the livelihood trajectories of a handful of 
households and the ongoing stresses endured by these villagers. 
I am curious to understand the local opportunities that may 
arise when living in an area where resource extraction is the 
norm and if this has enhanced or diminished general develop-
ment opportunities for villagers. This analysis sheds insights 
into why villagers started working toward resource governance 
and specific management activities, which are explored in the 
subsequent chapters.
INTRODUCING KOH SRALAO VILLAGE
Koh Sralao village, the village where much of the detailed 
field research has taken place, is located within the mangrove-
estuary forests that populate the shorelines of southwestern 
Cambodia, 25 km from the provincial capital of Koh Kong town 
(located in the province of the same name, Koh Kong province) 
(see Figure I in Prologue). Until 2009 the population was steady 
at around 1,900 people, with three hundred or so households. 
Only in the past year, or maybe two, has Koh Sralao experi-
enced a rapid out-migration (which will be discussed later in 
this chapter and again in Chapters 5 and 6). Koh Sralao village 
is accessible only by boat, which can take anywhere between 
forty-five minutes to three hours from the provincial capital. 
The village also lies within 30 km of the Thai border. People in 
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the area rely on trade with Thailand, although this has changed 
since the early 2000s when a road was reconstructed to connect 
the provincial capital with the rest of the country. Traders, from 
within the village and from outside, continue to buy local fish 
that is then either sold to Thai buyers or buyers from Phnom 
Penh. The main changes that have come with the reconstructed 
road—increased access of outsiders into the province, land-
grabbing, business opportunities—have recently been felt in 
the village. Nonetheless, Koh Sralao village continues to be 
considered as a remote (since it is boat-access only), relatively 
poor village by Cambodian standards. Koh Sralao is one of a 
handful of mangrove-estuary fishing villages in this area.
Basic services in Koh Sralao village were minimal for 
many years, although this started to change in the early 2000s. 
Schoolteachers were willing to stay in the area and a new 
primary school and a new junior high school were built in 
2005. That being said, children who want to go to high school 
need to leave the village for the provincial town of Koh Kong. 
Health services remain minimal, although a doctor now comes 
into the village once a month. Electricity vis-à-vis a gener-
ator is now offered in all parts of the village with half of Koh 
Sralao’s households being able to afford this service. Water 
can be pumped into richer people’s homes, for a monthly fee. 
Since 2007 cell phone coverage has reached the village, which 
has made communication far easier. Before then, only a few 
households owned a walkie-talkie radio system that connected 
to villages within a 20 km radius. Table II contrasts the differ-
ences in services between 1998 and 2010. Worth noting, poorer 
households cannot afford electricity or to have water piped into 
their homes; at the same time, most children now attend school, 
especially primary school.
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THE HOUSEHOLD PERSPECTIVE:  
SOVANNA, WAYNE, PREUN, MILORN, DOM AND SOK
Having briefly introduced the village, I now turn my attention 
to the lives of six key informants and their families. I began 
meeting formally with these key informants in 2002 as part 
of my dissertation research to gain further insights into daily 
life in Koh Sralao. Although most household information was 
shared through the eyes of my main contact, other household 
members frequently contributed to this picture mainly as time 
Table ii: Services in Koh Sralao, 1998–2010
Services Koh Sralao 1998 Koh Sralao 2010
Health No health centre; 2 midwives; 2 
traditional doctors.
Basic clinic, doctor comes  
once a month; 2 midwifes;  
2 traditional doctors.
Water Two wells, one that works in 
the dry season. Sell water to 
other villages. Households 
 collect rainwater.
Three wells—open for all to 
use. Four spring wells, 3 that 
are piped into households  
(for a fee), the fourth is sold 
to other villages. Households 
 collect rainwater.
School Old, wooden school  
(grades 1–4).
New concrete primary school 
built in 2001 (grades 1–5); new 
concrete junior school built 
in 2005 (grades 6–8).
Electricity Battery, oil lamps (poorest). Battery, oil lamps (poorest), 
generator (richest).
Phone No phone system; two-way 
radio.
Two-way radio; cell service in 
2007.
Trade Most villagers indebted to a 
village middleperson; most fish 
products sold to Thailand.
Debt to a village middleperson 
or bank (in 2004 villagers were 
able to get loans from a bank); 
most fish products sold to 
Thailand.
Travel Villagers rely on their own 
boats for travel, or join boats 
taking goods (fish) to town.
There are four taxi boats, each 
running daily.
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went on. Table III illustrates the diversity of situations found 
among households in Koh Sralao and highlights the variation in 
livelihood activities between their initial arrival, what they did 
in 2002 and what they did in 2010. As Table III illustrates, many 
people moved to the area to pursue nonfishing-related resource 
extraction activities (working at the marijuana plantation, then 
turning to other activities including logging and charcoal mak-
ing) and only came to depend on fishing at a later point.
When I first began working with these households in 2002, 
five out of the six households pursued some form of fishing 
as their main livelihood activity.9 Wealthy households special-
ized their fishing activities, setting large traps 5–6 m below 
the surface of the sea or using a large circle net to gather fish. 
Less wealthy households fished using gill nets or crab traps. 
Milorn, the only female-headed household in this sample, was 
not involved in fishing activities in part because of gender con-
straints and in part because of her history as a business woman. 
Although most households pursued fishing activities as their 
main livelihood activity, many took advantage of nonfishing 
activities when they arose. For example, one year households 
were able to sell freshly picked mushrooms found in the man-
grove back-swamps to a Korean buyer, but the mushrooms 
were over-harvested within one season. Another year a few 
9 There are two main places that people from Koh Sralao village fish: (a) in the mangrove-
estuary areas near the village and (b) in a productive shallow-water bay area known as 
Chrouy Pros Bay. The mangrove-estuary areas, surrounding the village, provide an excel-
lent habitat for a variety of aquatic species such as shrimp and mangrove mud crabs that 
use the muddy bottom for their home and feed on mangrove leaves. Koh Sralao fishers 
fish in the mangrove estuaries or may go further afield to join other fishers in Chrouy 
Pros Bay. Here fishers set their nets and traps for swimming crab and grouper species. 
These fishing grounds begin around 5 km from the village; as such, one requires a 
motor boat to access this area (about half of Koh Sralao’s fishers fish here). There are no 
exact numbers in terms of who is accessing either of these fishing grounds, although far 
more people in the area are dependent upon Chrouy Pros Bay, since it is a particularly 
productive ecosystem and several villages are located at the edge of this vast bay.
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households tried to cultivate green mussels, but this found-
ered because Thai buyers were not interested in buying from 
Cambodian fishers that year. These types of nonfishing activ-
ities tended to be one-off, short-term opportunities, although 
there are also cases of households being able to open and sustain 
small food shops in front of their homes.
By the mid-2000s, however, households began discussing 
livelihood strategies that would enable them to exit the fishery 
completely, either through migration or by developing a suite of 
livelihood activities that did not depend on the fishery. Milorn 
and Dom are examples of two households that left the village in 
the mid-2000s to pursue nonfishing livelihoods, whereas Wayne 
and Sovanna are examples of two households that abandoned 
their fishing activities but have been able to pursue other liveli-
hood activities within the village. This is particularly telling in 
Wayne’s case, since Wayne was born into a fishing household: 
Wayne’s grandparents, parents and Wayne himself were fish-
ers, and Wayne earned a significant portion of his income from 
specialized fishing activities. Yet by 2008, Wayne no longer 
used fish traps nor practiced any type of fishing:
I no longer fish since it is less predictable than in the past. Although 
I did not find large groupers in my fish traps for several years, I did 
catch some in 2007. So I could do this again if I had to, but it is risky 
and I would catch less than I used to since there are more trawls in 
the sea. Also, I want to protect my health and not work too hard, 
and I now have competition from several other fishers who recently 
learned to dive (2009).
Wayne’s reasons for diversifying beyond the fishery are linked 
with age, competition, risk and working with a resource that is 
becoming increasingly scarce. He has not encouraged his sons 
or daughter to enter fishing as a livelihood activity. Wayne’s 
household operates one of four taxi boats, controls much of the 
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household water supply business, and recently obtained two hec-
tares of farmland in the village (although this land is contested 
and it is unclear if he will be able to keep it). Meanwhile, 
his daughter married the local schoolteacher in 2007 and 
recently moved with her husband to the provincial town. She 
is the first family member to leave the village in at least three 
generations.
Sovanna, too, has chosen to pursue nonfishing-related liveli-
hood activities. In 2002, when I first met Sovanna, he talked 
about wanting to do farming. At that point, Sovanna was nego-
tiating a land claim in the village (for 10 ha of land that was 
contested by another villager) and had bought land in another 
province. Between 2003 and 2005 Sovanna divided his time 
between Koh Sralao and his new farm, around 500 km from 
Koh Sralao, where he planted mung beans. This, however, 
proved too difficult to manage and once his land claim was 
settled in Koh Sralao he decided to focus his farming effort in 
the village. Sovanna began planting fruit trees in the mid-2000s 
and now sells his fruit in the village. He plans to expand into 
rubber. Farming is a real switch for Sovanna and his household 
since for many years Sovanna was a middleperson10 (providing 
10 In the late 1990s and early 2000s, villagers borrowed money from a local moneylender/
fish buyer, and were then required to sell their catch to that particular moneylender/fish 
buyer at a reduced price. In exchange, fishers could delay loan payments, when necessary, 
and could sometimes get a cash advance. Such relationships, classified as patron-client 
relations, did play a role in village life, although there were limits to this relationship 
(the idea of a generous patron, à la James Scott, does not appear to obtain in Cambodia) 
(Legerwood and Vijghen 2002). By the mid-2000s, however, most moneylenders stopped 
buying fish products, rather switching to lending out money at high interest rates. This 
was at the same time that a few fishers began to access credit from the bank located in 
the provincial capital, Koh Kong town. Although interest payments are generally lower 
with the bank than through a moneylender, the bank offers no leniency for those that 
cannot meet their payments. This is problematic if the fishing season is poor, or if a fisher 
becomes ill and cannot fish. Even so, fishers are increasingly reliant on the banks since 
moneylenders are being more demanding in terms of repayments and are less willing to 
lend out money, often citing fisheries declines as the reason.
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fishing gear to households in exchange for them selling their 
aquatic products to them at a reduced price) and a specialized 
fisher (operating a circle net).
It is rather telling that in a coastal village, only two of the 
six households in my sample continued to be involved in fish-
eries in any significant way by 2010. In the short period of time 
between 2002 and 2010, many households’ main livelihood 
strategies had shifted. Sok and Preun were the two key inform-
ants whose households continued to rely on the crab fishery, 
mostly because they felt they had no other options available 
to them. As Preun explained, “There is no future in fishing 
here, since the fish are smaller and less abundant. I hope that 
my children can be creative and find a new opportunity for 
themselves, but I do worry. For poor people it is not so easy to 
improve one’s situation” (2008). There is the recognition that 
fishing is unlikely to deliver a sustainable livelihood, yet most 
households who remain in the village continue to fish because 
of a perceived lack of alternatives.
This is not to suggest that Preun and Sok’s households have 
not tried to diversify into nonfishing activities. Preun owns a 
small shop that sells fruits and vegetables, and runs a generator 
that supplies electricity for one-third of the village. He spent 
most of his savings on sending his son to college in Phnom Penh 
in the hopes that his son would then begin to send back remit-
tances once he started working. To Preun’s disappointment, this 
did not happen. In 2009 Preun’s household cleared 1 ha of land 
10 km from the village in the hope that someone would want to 
buy the land. This is highly unlikely, however, since business 
interests rarely recognize these types of small-scale land claims. 
By contrast, Sok and his household have struggled to diversify 
into nonfishing activities within the village. The good news, for 
this household, is that it is now in a phase of benefitting from 
two children having completed their schooling (grade nine in 
this case). Sok’s eldest son is working in a factory near Phnom 
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Penh and is able to send back some money each month; the 
other son now fishes with Sok.
The livelihood trajectories of the two households that no 
longer live in the village also warrant further discussion. 
Milorn’s livelihood took off during the resource exploitation 
phase of Koh Sralao: she owned several charcoal kilns and 
employed labourers to run these kilns. All her charcoal kilns 
were destroyed in 1999 as part of a government crackdown on 
illegal production. She tried to become a moneylender for those 
switching to crab fishing, but found that it was too difficult 
to ensure loan repayment once there were hints of fisheries 
declines. She then turned to making small sweets that she sold 
door-to-door, and other activities like raising pigs and renting 
out the basement of her house to gamblers. As she has lived in 
the area for a relatively long time, she is able to use her networks 
to access opportunities. For example, in 2004 a local business-
person sold her equipment for distilling rice wine. Milorn’s idea 
was to sell the rice wine and use the waste from this process as 
food for her pigs. This worked for several years until she decided 
that it was too much work for her to do this on her own. At that 
point she sold off the business to another villager.
Overall, Milorn’s livelihood activities became increasingly 
less lucrative over the years. This may have been one of the fac-
tors that pushed her toward finding options outside the village. 
In 2006 Milorn left Koh Sralao for the first time in pursuit of 
other opportunities. She initially went to Thailand, where her 
son was employed as a fish worker. She kept house for him, but 
found it hard to sell goods from his home. She returned to Koh 
Sralao in 2007 where she tried selling water. The well that she 
had access to, however, was the muddiest well in the village, 
so villagers did not want this water pumped into their homes. 
Thus, when she heard about a land distribution project that the 
government was supporting in another province, she seized 
the opportunity. According to her daughter, she was given a 
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piece of land that she farms with one of her grandchildren. Her 
daughter still lives in the village, using her mother’s home and 
continuing to rent out the basement for gamblers to play cards.
Milorn’s livelihood history is different from Dom’s, in the 
sense that she has been able continually to find new opportun-
ities and make some money whereas Dom has had more of a 
boom-bust livelihood history. In the 1990s Dom fished for the 
then abundant and valuable grouper fish, saving enough money 
to become a middleperson for both crab fishers in the village 
and for those harvesting and selling logs. Dom became involved 
in transporting logs in the late 1990s from the upland forest 
areas through the mangrove estuaries to Koh Kong provincial 
town. To do so, Dom estimates he was forced to bribe the police 
a total of US$ 1,800 over a five-year period. At a certain point, 
however, there was a crackdown on this type of activity and 
Dom’s logs were confiscated by the police. This confiscation, 
coupled with many villagers not repaying Dom the money that 
they had borrowed from him, sent his household into a down-
ward livelihood spiral starting in 1999.
Dom then turned to crab fishing as his main livelihood 
activity, but sought to supplement this with other activities; 
some of these initially appeared to be successful, although 
none were ever sustained. For example, Dom began operating 
a karaoke shop from his home and sold homemade dog-meat 
soup. Although dog meat is considered a delicacy, Khmer cul-
ture frowns upon the killing of dogs. After the novelty wore 
off and people stopped coming to sample his soup, the busi-
ness petered out and Dom was forced to reconsider his options. 
A few years later, Dom decided he was too old to fish. In 2005 
he left the village to help a businessperson secure a claim on 
a piece of land he was planning to develop near the provincial 
town. Dom and his wife pieced together a thatched hut with a 
small garden area. This semi-rural existence lasted for nearly 
two years until the owner began developing the land and Dom 
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was forced to move. In my last visit to Koh Sralao in 2010, vil-
lagers reported that Dom had obtained 2 ha of farmland in one 
of Cambodia’s border provinces, that his daughter had followed 
him there and that he had recently become the village chief. 
Dom’s house in Koh Sralao has long since been reclaimed, 
since he owed a significant amount of money to several 
moneylenders.
THE VILLAGE PERSPECTIVE
What the foregoing account suggests is that life for villagers 
is in constant f lux. Although household wealth does shape 
the choice of livelihood activities that are pursued, as is seen 
between Sovanna’s livelihood choices (moving between activ-
ities, settling on nonfishing activities) as compared with Sok’s 
choices (remaining reliant on fishing), and can serve as a buffer 
against everyday stresses, life nonetheless remains challenging 
for most villagers in Koh Sralao. The following section provides 
an analysis of general stresses endured by Koh Sralao villagers 
over the past twelve years, and then considers the livelihood 
activities that villagers have pursued, based on wealth category, 
during this period. This analysis demonstrates how most vil-
lagers have been switching between livelihood activities at a 
furious pace and how few villagers can really “make it” in a 
situation of ever-continuing resource declines.
Ongoing Stresses
Livelihood stress has been rather constant for Koh Sralao vil-
lagers. Table IV illustrates the continuous instabilities facing 
villagers throughout the twelve years from 1998 to 2010.
As Table IV illustrates, people have endured a lot over this 
period. Koh Sralao households have been impacted by over-
fishing and a lack of livelihood options for years. Resource 
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extraction opportunities for the local population ended, for the 
most part, by the late 1990s. As land-based livelihood activities 
such as forest exploitation were significantly curtailed, villa-
gers were forced to concentrate their livelihood activities in the 
fisheries sector.11 Meanwhile, the increase in foreign fleets has 
forced fishers using trawls to move into the inshore areas. It is 
Table iv: Stresses Experienced by Villagers, 1998–2010
Stress Explanation
Sand Mining, 2008– Significant sand is being mined from river 
mouths. Affects crab populations and people’s 
ability to fish in the area; by mid-2010 nearly 60 
(of 300) households had left the village.
Food Crisis/Economic 
Crisis, 2008–
Price of rice, fruit and vegetables doubled; price 
of gas increased.
Competition within Main 
Fishing Grounds, 2000s
Fishers squeezed into one area, meaning fishers 
using traps and nets are competing with fishers 
using trawls. Conflict ensues.
Loss of Fishing Gear, 
2000s
Stolen or destroyed fishing gear (traps and 
gill nets) presents a challenge for households. 
Authorities hesitant to get involved.
Declining Resources, 
2000s
Progressive decline in wildlife and fish 
populations, along with habitat degradation. 
Limited enforcement of existing laws.
Being at the Mercy of 
Markets, 2000s
Market demands and fluctuating commodity 
prices; boom-bust marketing cycles. No one to 
buy a product (sell-while-you-can mentality).
Charcoal Ban, 1999 Forced more people into crab fishing or to leave 
the area. This shifted pressure from one resource 
to another (mangroves to fish).
Open Access Regime 
for Resources, late 
1980s–1990s
Lawlessness pervades—fend for yourself 
and take advantage of resource extraction 
opportunities. In spite of major legislative 
reforms supporting community-based resource 
management, this attitude stemming from this 
era, to a large extent, remains.
11 Throughout the 2000s, over three-quarters of Koh Sralao’s three hundred or so households 
have practiced fishing or some form of fishing-related activity, catching mainly shrimp 
and two crab species (the swimming crab and the mangrove mud crab). Debt levels tend 
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no wonder that conflicts have escalated in recent years between 
those using different gear types in the same fishing grounds. 
Those that are able to combine fishing with nonfishing activities 
do so to ensure a suite of livelihood options. Compounding this 
situation is minimal access to land and the distance between vil-
lages: villages are between five to ten kilometres apart, meaning 
that boat travel is costly and not particularly time-efficient.
The most recent challenge facing fishers comes from sand 
mining activities that began in early 2008, when a few com-
panies began dredging operations near one of the main fishing 
grounds used by Koh Sralao villagers. Within weeks, villa-
gers noticed a decline in the main crab species caught in the 
area, the swimming crab. Fishers suspected a link between 
the rapid stock declines and the sand dredging. Although Koh 
Sralao’s resource management committee sent an official let-
ter of complaint to the provincial government and the Ministry 
of Environment, no government authority has been willing 
to address this. This is likely linked to who is pursuing sand 
mining: the two main operators are two of Cambodia’s richest 
business entrepreneurs, both of whom happen to hold seats in 
the National Assembly and are rumoured to have strong con-
nections with the prime minister (Global Witness 2009; 2010).
Sand mining is linked to regional markets, regulations and 
interests. Although Cambodia is developing its extractive indus-
tries sector, the recent interest in coastal sand from southwest-
ern Cambodia is linked with Singapore’s land reclamation and 
construction projects and the Indonesian ban on sand exporta-
tion in 2007. Following the Indonesian ban, Cambodia—with 
its loose regulatory framework and relatively pristine coastal 
environment—became an area of interest for foreign dredging
 to be high, which is the case in many fishing villages, since fishers often need to borrow 
money at the beginning of a fishing season to cover their start-up costs (replacing mesh, 
fixing nets, boat repairs). For example, in 2003, eighty-two percent of households said they 
held debt; in a 2008 follow-up survey, ninety percent of households said they held debt.
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companies (Sokha and Strangio 2009). Although it is difficult 
to assess the exact ecological impact of the sand mining, since 
there is no scientific baseline from which to measure, villagers 
believe that fishing has become even more difficult in the past 
two years. Empty homes are now seen throughout the village. 
This is the first time that I have seen this in the entire time 
that I have been working in this area. Villagers estimate that at 
least one-sixth of all households left the village between 2009 
and 2010. Considering that the total population of Koh Sralao 
remained stable for the past decade at around three hundred 
households, this out-migration is significant. It appears that 
some households left to pursue farming opportunities elsewhere, 
while others fled particularly high debt loads and were unable to 
handle the shock of considerable crab declines. Sand extraction 
is not the only activity to place a strain on local livelihoods; it 
may just have been the tipping point for some households.
To survive in Koh Sralao, households need continuously 
to take advantage of the livelihood opportunities that present 
themselves. That being said, not all households can take advan-
tage of the same opportunities, especially poorer households. 
How, then, do livelihood opportunities break down over the past 
decade vis-à-vis wealth categories in a place like Koh Sralao? 
Wealth, of course, is a relative concept in a village such as 
Koh Sralao, with few households being able to save much 
money and few households being able to move between wealth 
categories. The broad categories of rich, medium and poor did 
not look particularly different between 1998 and 2010, with 
most Koh Sralao households continuing to identify them-
selves in the medium category.12 What did differ, however, 
was the type of livelihood activities that people could pursue.
12 According to local perceptions, poor families have limited fishing gear or are forced 
to sell their labour, medium families have a boat, several types of fishing gear and can 
access credit (a range of debt occurs in this category) and rich villagers appear to have 
specialized business opportunities.
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Table V breaks down livelihood activities by wealth category. 
Livelihood activities that are stroked out no longer exist, activ-
ities written in normal font have been continuous throughout 
the years and activities that have emerged in the past few years 
are italicized.
Table V draws attention to just how dynamic life is in Koh 
Sralao, and the multiple livelihood activities that households 
have pursued, continue to pursue or may try to pursue over 
time. At first glance it appears that poorer households, or those 
at the bottom end of the medium scale, are really struggling. 
This is likely true. They definitely have less livelihood options 
available to them. However, when thinking about fishing activ-
ities and livelihood security, another interesting point emerges. 
Poorer households tend to fish in the mangrove-estuary areas in 
and around the village, whereas medium households fish further
Table v: Suite of Livelihood Activities, 1998–2010
Rich HH Activities Medium HH Activities Poor HH Activities
Specialized fishing 
activities
Access land (in village; 
in other areas)
Large HH shops
Control services  
(water, electricity)
Farm intensively
Control a service (water 
supply, electricity, water 
taxi)
Lend money actively







Fish in Chrous Pros Bay 
(gill nets)







Have a share in a 
key service (water, 
electricity, water taxi)
Claim small amount of 
land far from village
Collect mangrove wood




Sell labour ( fishing, 
nonfishing)
Collect molluscs
Italics: 2007–2010 activities; stroked out: activities that no longer exist; regular font: 
activities that have been constant.
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away from the village (accumulating debt to do so). Sand min-
ing appears to be impacting fishers fishing in open waters to a 
greater extent than those fishing in and around the mangrove 
estuaries. Thus, given the significant debt loads that medium 
fishers carry, they are quite stressed and stretched. I do not want 
to suggest that poorer households are not struggling, for they 
are, but merely to point out that life for medium households 
is not easy either. Whereas middle-income earners are facing 
unanticipated risks and struggles in relation to intensifying 
their fishing effort, rich households have been able to switch 
their livelihood activities with relatively little risk. They have 
been able to diversify into nonfishing-related activities, and 
for many years did a mix of fishing and nonfishing activities. 
The difference is that in 2010 they are relatively uninvolved in 
fishing activities.
LIVELIHOOD PATHWAYS AND RESOURCE DECLINE
In spite of wealth differences, a striking feature of this study is 
how marginalization and immiseration is the norm for villagers 
in Koh Sralao. Only a few villagers have really “made it”: those 
that switched to nonfishing activities prior to the beginning of 
sand dredging activities. Villagers have constantly struggled to 
improve their situation and to find ways to sustain their liveli-
hood. Yet sustaining local livelihoods has become a near impos-
sible task since villagers have been increasingly marginalized 
in terms of access to the most productive resources in the area. 
Outside interests in local resources serves to further enhance 
people’s marginalization. Villagers are no longer involved 
in the small-scale extraction of the more lucrative resources: 
logging, charcoal production, sand mining or catching larger 
fish. If all these natural resources were truly protected (the 
village lies in one of Cambodia’s twenty-three protected areas) 
and outside entrepreneurs were not coming into the area, then 
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 villagers might have had the benefit of an increased supply of 
fish, wildlife and non-timber forest products. This, however, 
has not been the case.
Moreover, this mangrove-estuary area does not have the 
means of production that would provide villagers with a more 
stable livelihood such as access to farmland, a well-regulated 
fishery or reliable wage labour opportunities in the area. 
The lack of road access combined with high gas prices and a 
declining fishery may prove to be a serious issue in the future. 
Although a few wealthy households can invest in their children’s 
education, this is not an option available for most households. 
Extra household labour enables a household to increase their 
fishing effort; this also means that children are faced with dif-
ficult decisions in terms of continuing their education, looking 
for work outside the village or helping their parents with fish-
ing activities. By all accounts, those households that left in the 
past year did so because they could not sustain their lives in the 
area. Migration may in fact become the exit strategy for many 
fishing households. The question is where do people go and 
are they able to “make it,” whether in Cambodia or elsewhere? 
Meanwhile, those that stay are the wealthy few, those uninter-
ested in moving and those who do not see any other options 
available to them. This is a village that seems to be reaching a 
breaking point.
CONCLUSION
Business entrepreneurs have always found ways to exploit the 
natural resources found in southwestern Cambodia—through 
growing marijuana, logging, charcoal production or dyna-
mite fishing. However, the relative isolation and access chal-
lenges to this region meant that for many years local people 
were employed as labourers in such extraction activities or 
sometimes owned small businesses themselves. Even though 
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resource extraction did affect the ecosystem in a negative way, 
particularly the significant amounts of deforestation that took 
place, there were a range of livelihood options for local people 
to consider. As resource extraction opportunities began to 
diminish and as the government began enforcing certain rules 
and regulations, villagers who stayed in this area recognized 
that forms of resource governance were likely necessary if they 
were to sustain their livelihoods, and the livelihoods of their 
children (Marschke 2005). In a sense, the chaos and resource 
declines experienced in the 1990s are part of why people bought 
into the idea of pursuing forms of resource governance. In the 
late 1990s, fish stocks were already in decline, but there was 
a belief that aquatic stocks could be better managed at a local 
level along with implementing an active reforestation program 
(PMCR 2008). Large-scale resource extraction that excluded all 
villagers and seriously affected aquatic stocks was not fathom-
able back then. Perhaps this was a good thing.
Hindsight might lead one to question the benefits of put-
ting a large amount of effort into local resource governance, 
particularly since villagers and technical departments have not 
been able to halt sand mining practices. In spite of this setback, 
Chapter 4 will illustrate how Koh Sralao villagers have not 
been passive actors in this story. Resource governance work 
in Koh Sralao began at a particular point in time, one where 
people thought that their work could make a difference—and 
for certain issues it has. Villagers were interested in “doing 
something,” particularly when it came to protecting mangrove 
forests, wildlife and aquatic habitats, and preventing illegal 
trawling or blast fishing. This willingness, combined with a 
donor agenda that promoted the idea of involving local people 
in all types of governance issues, created a platform for experi-
mentation. Chapter 4 explores the results of such experimenta-
tion, examining the ebbs and flows of the work of Koh Sralao’s 
resource management committee between 1998 and 2010.
 
IV 
villagers Pursuing loCal 
resourCe governanCe, 
1998–2010
Cambodia’s emphasis on local governance can be seen as a timely embodiment of the global trend encouraging decen-
tralized resource governance, as a donor and government 
response to the poverty and marginalization found in many 
rural areas, or as a foolhardy idea with little chance of success 
given the reality of rural livelihoods in resource-dependent 
villages. Nonetheless, hopes became somehow pinned on novel 
governance arrangements that involve local people living closest 
to a given resource. When resource governance experiments 
first began in Cambodia in the 1990s, the focus was on the most 
pressing resource issues (i.e., land encroachment, logging, aqua-
tic stock declines, poaching of wildlife) facing a given village 
or commune. Villagers were encouraged to create a resource 
management plan and elect a resource management committee. 
Much of this initial effort was financed by the international 
community and supported by NGO or government-led project 
teams (Un and So 2009). Prior to the establishment of formal 
policy, it was only through the support of a provincial governor 
that forms of local resource governance were likely to be sus-
tained or be successful (Marschke 2005).
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While a dozen or so community-based management experi-
ments took place during the late 1990s (Marschke 2005; Un and 
So 2009), a serious effort went into creating a policy environ-
ment to ensure such involvement was legal, particularly among 
donors and activists who wanted citizens to gain sufficient 
rights. Policy mechanisms to enable local resource governance 
now exist in Cambodia. These policies were mostly designed 
in a sectoral manner, following the vertical lines of a technical 
department. For example, the Fisheries Administration, the 
Forestry Administration and the Ministry of Environment each 
have legislation that endorses local-level resource management 
(for fisheries, forestry and natural resources, respectively). Once 
formal policy was approved, the official endorsement by a prov-
incial governor was no longer required, although a significant 
amount of “soft” power still exists in this office. There are now 
over three hundred communities working on forestry issues, 
468 on fisheries issues and over fifty on issues within protected 
areas (CBNRM LI 2009; NSDP 2010). Multiple donors, national 
NGOs, academics and government departments have supported 
aspects of this effort.
The purpose of this chapter is to explore what resource 
governance can mean at a local level. In a sense, creating a 
management plan or having a locally elected committee does 
not say much in terms of how resource governance is being 
addressed “on the ground,” particularly in a context of general 
natural resource decline. For these reasons, the experiences 
found in Koh Sralao are worth paying attention to. Koh Sralao’s 
resource management committee has been working on resource 
governance since the late 1990s; this is an area where resource 
extraction has been rife and where governance reforms are not 
easy to pursue. This chapter examines the specific activities 
undertaken by Koh Sralao’s resource management commit-
tee and explores if and how these activities are sustained over 
time. Equally telling are the issues that one might imagine a 
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local resource management committee could handle but does 
not chose to pursue, such as gear theft and excess capacity. The 
chapter illustrates how resource governance has been successful 
in dealing with activities that easily demonstrate success and 
provides an analysis of why other issues remain a challenge.
RESOURCE GOVERNANCE IN THE VILLAGE
Koh Sralao’s resource management committee was established 
partially in response to the rapid deforestation that took place 
near Koh Sralao during the 1998 election period (Marschke and 
Nong 2003) and partially because there was a donor-funded, 
government-led research team13 interested and willing to work 
with villagers on resource management issues and a national 
policy framework that supported this type of approach. This 
was a logical fit, given that there were no other projects working 
in the area and people relied on the forest and fish resources for 
their livelihood (PMCR 2008; Marschke and Sinclair 2009). As 
discussed in Chapter 3, villagers draw on the natural  resources
13 This research team, which has consisted of staff from Cambodia’s Ministry of 
Environment, along with staff from other national and provincial departments (includ-
ing fisheries, women’s affairs and rural development) was supported by Canada’s IDRC 
between 1997 and 2010. Over time, the project team and project funds diminished, 
from CA$ 345,000 for the first phase of the project, then known as the Participatory 
Management of Mangrove Resources (PMMR, 1997–2001), to CA$ 100,000 between 
2007 and 2010 for the last phase of the project, known as the Participatory Management 
of Coastal Resources (PMCR). In the early years, the team focused on capacity-building 
and supporting community organizing for resource management initiatives, while in 
later years the team focused on finding additional sources of funding for village groups, 
producing research reports and sharing lessons learned from the work of several resource 
management committees in the area. The team has done a serious amount of backstopping 
over the years to support village-level initiatives and convince national policy-makers 
of the relevance of local work. This is closely linked to the leadership shown by PMMR/
PMCR’s project team leader, who has consistently supported and worked on resource 
management issues over the years. For more details on the PMMR/PMCR team and their 
work, see PMCR 2008.
82  Life, Fish and Mangroves
found in this mangrove-estuary community in multiple ways. 
The Cambodian government, for the most part, has had lim-
ited “hands-on” involvement in this area with the exception 
of enforcing a ban on logging activities (e.g., cutting logs, 
exporting logs or making charcoal) in the late 1990s and then 
supporting commune planning processes in the mid-2000s. As 
such, if villagers wanted to see the governance of their resour-
ces improved, they needed to engage in this issue and decide 
on activities that they could implement.
Koh Sralao’s resource management committee, first elected 
in 2000, consists of seven “movers and shakers.” Strong leader-
ship and local support for this leadership are definitely enabling 
factors contributing to the committee’s success (Marschke 
and Sinclair 2009), something that is found in other studies 
examining when community-based or co-management of fish-
eries resources may be successful (Gutierrez et al. 2011). This 
is an important aspect, since there is a growing critique that 
many resource committees exist on paper but not in practice 
(Resurreccion 2006). The head of the committee is Sovanna 
(whom I introduced in Chapter 3), a well-respected business-
person in Koh Sralao who sits on a series of village committees 
and has been elected to sit on the commune council in both sets 
of elections (2002 and 2007, respectively, although he has since 
resigned from this role). Moreover, many of the committee were 
re-elected (five of the seven members in the 2004 re-election; 
with four original members re-elected in the 2009 election) 
and have been working on resource management issues for a 
relatively long period of time. Another important aspect may 
be the relationships committee members have built over time 
with technical staff at the provincial and national levels; these 
are often drawn upon when more serious resource management 
problems arise in the area.
This committee serves as an example of what is possible in 
the arena of local resource governance, even in areas where 
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 persistent resource declines exist and daily life can be a chal-
lenge. This committee is not likely to be reflective of most 
resource management committees in Cambodia (Blunt and 
Turner 2005; Ratner 2006), given the long-term technical 
support, strong local leadership and decent village-commune 
relations. The ecological system also may contribute to aspects 
of the committee’s success; compared with upland areas where 
trees may take decades to grow, the benefits of mangrove 
replanting are demonstrated relatively quickly. The main man-
grove species, Rizophora spp., mature relatively quickly (in less 
than a decade) and provide habitat for many different aquatic 
species within its roots. Ownership at the committee level, and 
to a certain degree the village level, of the resource governance 
activities is strong. Over seventy percent of villagers said that 
they were aware of the work of the resource management com-
mittee in a 2008 village survey.
SPECIFIC RESOURCE MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES
We have done a lot over the years. We have done mangrove replanting, 
formed internal regulations and shared these with villagers, solved 
some problems in the village, patrolled to catch and fine illegal 
fishers, forest cutters and hunters, held monthly meetings, provided 
environmental education in the primary and junior schools and held 
village garbage clean-up days.
We are less busy now than we were in the past, although we do 
meet regularly to discuss any resource-related problems and meet 
with other villages when there is a big problem in the area. We have 
re-planted over 500 ha of mangrove trees and continue to re-plant 
mangroves and work on waste management. We have now transferred 
some of our other work to the commune council, since we can access 
a small amount of funds for commune-related resource activities.
In the past two years [2008–2010] I have facilitated several meet-
ings between our three local resource management committees, since 
we have a problem with sand mining near our fishing grounds. Each 
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committee organized for villagers to thumb-print a petition that we 
sent to the local authorities asking them to investigate this situation.
—Excerpts from interviews with Sovanna, head of Koh Sralao’s 
resource management committee, in 2004, 2006 and 2010
Sovanna is reflecting on what he feels the main activities of 
the committee have been. His comments illustrate how Koh 
Sralao’s resource management committee has been involved in 
various types of activities since the committee was elected in 
2000. Such activities include mangrove replanting, dealing with 
fishing conflicts, patrolling the village area to prevent illegal 
hunting or fishing practices, setting up a waste management 
system in the village, working with schoolteachers to develop 
curriculum related to local ecology and thinking about how to 
handle sand mining activities. These activities are illustrative 
of the issues that villagers may be able handle at a local level. 
Some activities have been more successful than others; certain 
activities have continued consistently, whereas other activities 
only took place for a short period of time. Table VI illustrates 
the range of resource-related activities that committee members 
have been engaged in between 1998 and 2010. This table also 
provides an explanation of what an activity actually entails and 
notes if the activity is still happening.
As Table VI illustrates, Koh Sralao’s resource management 
committee has been involved in a series of activities since 
it began including creating a management plan, signposting 
protected areas, inputting into policy and being filmed while 
replanting mangroves to promote Environment Day within 
Cambodia. Mangrove replanting is at the core of Koh Sralao’s 
annual resource management work, along with waste manage-
ment and, at various times, patrolling. This committee has been 
able to sustain its work over the years, albeit intensifying its 
activities at certain times and scaling back its activities at other 
times. There is significant buy-in for resource management in 
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this area; moreover, the committee has been able to modify 
and integrate a few of its activities into emerging governance 
mechanisms such as Commune Development Plans, which all 
communes are required to do annually.
After a series of workshops in the late 1990s facilitated 
by the government-led research team interested in garnering 
support for local resource management, a number of villagers 
ran for election with seven villagers being elected (Marschke 
2000). This committee only began their work in earnest after 
participating in a series of study tours looking at what resource 
management meant, particularly in other villages dealing with 
fishing and flood forest issues (Marschke 2000).14 Once the 
committee bought into the idea of “doing something” at a local 
level, they began with an extensive environmental education 
campaign and with patrolling activities to prevent hunting, 
trawling and dynamite fishing (all illegal activities). With time, 
the committee expanded its activities to include conservation-
type activities, livelihood activities and other village develop-
ment activities (Marschke and Berkes 2005).
Over time, committee members have also become more 
confident and vocal. On several occasions committee members 
have had a chance to explain their challenges to Koh Kong’s 
provincial governor and the Minister of Environment, such as 
discussing the illegal trawling activities that take place in the 
mangrove estuaries (Marschke and Kim 2003) or by drawing 
attention to the implications of sand mining on the fishery. In 
late 2006 members from Koh Sralao’s committee were asked
14 Through such study tours and local knowledge exchanges, relationships are built between 
villages. Koh Sralao’s response to the devastating 2005 fire that burned one-third of all 
homes in another community working on resource management issues 900 km away is 
illustrative of this. When news of the fire reached Koh Sralao, they, along with two other 
resource management committees in the area, raised CA$ 100 to donate to the resource 
management committee of the fire-ravaged community. This type of village-to-village 
help in the resource management sector, which has often been donor-driven, is generally 
unheard of.
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to debate with university students about the pros and cons 
of shrimp farming. This debate was televised nationally, and 
committee members shared their experiences with unsustain-
able shrimp aquaculture and argued in favour of developing 
small-scale aquaculture as one of a series of fishing strategies 
that would ensure longer-term survival of the fishery and local 
livelihoods (N. Kim Dec. 2006 pers. communication).
This committee now acts in a kind of advisory role for other 
resource management committees in the area. For example, 
when a nearby village started its ecotourism activities a few 
years back, the head of Koh Sralao’s committee was asked 
to act as an advisor to its resource management committee. 
Since 2005 this committee has been working with two other 
resource management committees in the area to facilitate a “bay 
wide” approach to fisheries management (three villages in this 
area rely on the same fishing grounds known as Chrouy Pros 
Bay, further discussed in Chapter 5). The committee has been 
instrumental in leading the drive toward a fisheries federation. 
In this role, the committee has led the group toward agreeing 
upon common regulations and approaches to fisheries man-
agement for this fishing ground, and to take similar stances 
when it comes to petitioning against sand mining or large-
scale trawling sometimes found in and around local fishing 
grounds (PMCR 2008). Although enforcement of community-
based regulations can be problematic because of the size of 
the fishing grounds and the general lack of patrolling support 
from technical departments, this federation still serves as a 
useful platform for discussing pertinent resource issues in the 
area.
To get a better sense of what it means to be working on a 
specific activity, the following section examines a few of the 
activities the Koh Sralao committee has been involved with 
in greater depth. Patrolling, waste management and  mangrove 
replanting are each examined in turn. Careful attention  illustrates 
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how these activities have had ebbs and flows in terms of interest 
and effectiveness. The most sustained activity, by far, appears to 
be the mangrove replanting campaign.
Patrolling
Patrolling for illegal resource extraction activities is one area in 
which Koh Sralao’s committee has been relatively active, par-
ticularly in the early years near the village. During peak times, 
the committee patrolled the waters surrounding the village eight 
times per month. These patrols were done to monitor forest-
cutting, wildlife-harvesting, fishing with dynamite and trawling 
in the shallow mangrove estuary waters. When the committee 
was able to stop offenders, they would issue a fine and, in some 
cases, confiscate fishing gear or illegally extracted resources 
such as logs or charcoal.
The resource management committee can only carry out 
patrols with a member of a technical department or with the 
local police. This “forced marriage” can be problematic since 
technical staff, local police and a management committee may 
have differing interests in resource management. For example, 
technical staff either follow the law to the letter or they ignore 
it, police often ignore the law since money can be made from 
resource exploitation and a committee is often trying to find 
solutions to resource challenges through enforcing its own 
rules, albeit with a certain degree of flexibility. Koh Sralao’s 
advantage, in terms of patrolling at least, is that it lies within 
a protected area since the Ministry of Environment supports 
local park rangers and considers them to be technical staff of 
the Ministry of Environment within all protected areas. Thus, 
the committee can patrol with either of the two park rangers that 
live in Koh Sralao, rather than needing to involve the local police 
or ask for technical support from the provincial Department of 
Environment. This is an example of where  protection-related 
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interests align, which serves the resource management commit-
tee and the park rangers well. With time, the local police also 
overcame their resistance to patrolling efforts.
Even with the advantages that committee members have in 
Koh Sralao, patrolling is not that easy to implement. It requires 
some serious thought and decision-making. Fishers themselves 
are constantly monitoring the waterways, reporting on illegal 
activities to the committee. Illegal activities may not necessar-
ily fall within a patrolling schedule; the committee then needs 
to decide if they should investigate the claim and mobilize 
themselves. To do so, committee members need to be available, 
a boat needs to be found, the police need to be informed and 
park rangers need to be gathered. More than this, committee 
members must brace themselves for potential conflicts with 
those they are trying to stop and apprehend.
For patrolling to work, repercussions have been established 
for those that fish illegally. There is a system of fines in place, 
depending on the gravity of the act. However, imposing a fine 
is not always that easy since not all situations are predictable. 
Consider the following quote:
A fisher lost traps on the other side of the estuary [across from the vil-
lage]. We tried to solve this with the police. The person who stole the 
traps lived outside the community. We wanted to fine this person but 
they did not have any money. So, we went to their home and brought 
back some luggage and some cups since he is a thief. Everyone agreed 
that this was fair (Dom 2003).
When poor fishers are caught, extracting a monetary fine can be 
harsh and unrealistic. As such, creative solutions may be found 
to ensure that a fine is imposed but in a way that is deemed 
fair to the situation. Fairness, in such cases, is subjective to the 
whims of the committee.
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Sometimes it is simply too risky to patrol. It makes little 
sense (and is nearly impossible) to try to stop someone doing 
dynamite fishing in a high-powered boat. The committee 
itself does not have a speedboat to patrol with (initially they 
used the boat donated to the park rangers, which lasted a 
few years, and they then turned to using each other’s boats). 
Gasoline prices also affect the number of patrols that can 
take place in any given month. As in other places, gasoline 
prices have been steadily rising. While fines do supplement 
gasoline prices, there is no guarantee that someone will be 
apprehended on a patrol and, even if someone is apprehended, 
that they can necessarily pay the fine. Thus, it has proven 
difficult to self-finance this system continuously over the 
years. Although the committee has relied on random inputs 
from various projects (NGO- and IO-funded/or -supported), 
collected fees from villagers and chipped in committee mem-
bers’ own money, this is one activity that has been difficult to 
sustain.
Securing funding is one reason the committee stopped 
actively patrolling, although several other factors are also at 
play. As will be discussed in the following chapter, concrete 
artificial reefs were placed in the fishing grounds used by 
many Koh Sralao fishers in 2006, which led to a significant 
reduction of illegal trawling in the area. Another factor is 
that a conservation NGO began actively patrolling the area 
for wildlife poaching. This, combined with the belief that the 
committee has a reputation for having strict resource man-
agement practices, is part of the justification for stopping 
consistent patrols. Perhaps, too, committee members were 
tired of patrolling and felt that this really should be the work 
of the government rather than themselves. This may be a step 
toward demanding resource governance from elected commune 
officials, or perhaps it is a signal that local people have had 
enough.
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Waste Management
Island-estuary communities do face a significant challenge when 
it comes to waste management, as there is little land in which 
to burn or bury waste and these areas are far from government 
services. Until recently, the “norm” was to throw waste into the 
water for those houses built over the sea. This is no different 
than in freshwater fishing communities, where over ninety-five 
percent of villagers dispose their waste into the river or lake 
(Isreal et al. 2005). The committee in Koh Sralao has been work-
ing to change this. A series of waste management trainings and 
workshops—initially facilitated by the government-led research 
team working in the area, then continued by Koh Sralao com-
mittee members—have been held since 2000. Both committee 
members and project staff working in the area have struggled 
with how to approach this issue. For the first several years, 
linked into a general environmental education campaign, work-
shops introduced the importance of waste management for the 
committee and selected community members. However, people 
were not dealing with their waste in a consistent manner.
Only in late 2004 was the committee ready to implement a 
system of waste management for Koh Sralao, and an NGO was 
willing to pay for individual garbage bins for each household.15 
At this point, committee members had spent enough time 
educating villagers about the cause and effect of poor waste 
management. Operationalizing a waste management system 
involved small user fees, distributing waste bins, widening 
several bridges over the waterways so that the cart used to col-
lect waste could go over them, agreeing on an area of land by
15 The Mangrove Action Project (MAP), based in Thailand, has provided CA$ 8,000 per 
year since 2005 to the Ministry of Environment to support waste management activities 
in several coastal villages in Koh Kong province. Although this was tried in several 
villages, Koh Sralao appears to have been most successful (for more details, see PMCR 
2008). This is an example of the fundraising the PMCR team was able to do in its later 
years.
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which common waste could be buried and a weekly system of 
garbage collection. As Sovanna notes:
We have had to learn how to encourage and push community mem-
bers to pay their monthly waste collection fee. I’ve also noticed that 
when some households start keeping their household area clean, other 
households who live around them begin to do so too (Sovanna 2007).
As a means of encouraging greater participation of community 
members, quarterly waste management awards are given out for 
those households that have the cleanest area surrounding their 
house. Although the system is not perfect (sometimes waste is 
not collected on time as the waste collector is busy with other 
livelihood activities), committee members felt that this practice 
was contributing to a cleaner, healthier village environment. 
Over time, the committee has helped to create new “norms” 
in relation to acceptable levels of waste in Koh Sralao. In 2008 
the committee was in the process of reviewing the monthly fees 
that households paid as they planned to increase the fees that 
small businesses pay for garbage collection and planned to hire 
another person to collect the waste. By 2010 the committee had 
a system in place by which businesses paid a different rate than 
households for waste collection.
Mangrove Replanting
Mangrove replanting is the most consistent activity that the 
committee in Koh Sralao supervises: mangrove replanting was 
done on an annual basis between 2000 and 2008. In the late 
1990s, this area experienced a significant decline in mangrove 
forest cover, fuelled by the growing market for mangrove wood 
and mangrove charcoal in neighbouring Thailand and lax 
enforcement by government officials (Marschke 1999). This 
was curbed when the national Forest Administration clamped 
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down on illegal logging activities, which halted the extensive 
trade of logs and charcoal with Thailand. Perhaps as a result 
of this experience (serious tree-cutting and an enforced ban 
on logging), the committee decided that forest protection and 
enhancement was an important aspect of their resource manage-
ment work. This is also an activity that is doable, in the sense 
that collecting mangrove propagules for replanting can be done 
in the areas surrounding the village, propagules do not cost 
anything and the results of this activity can be seen within a 
year or so (i.e., young mangroves can be seen growing in former 
shrimp ponds or filling in areas that had been overharvested). 
In recent years this has been undertaken as a food-for-work 
project, with an outside individual or organization donating the 
rice to ensure that everyone in the village immediately benefits 
from their labour.
Although there was a low survival rate of mangrove prop-
agules in the first year, in subsequent years better plant-
ing techniques and monitoring of seedlings took place. The 
committee coordinates this annual replanting event and is 
supported by several long-time residents holding significant 
local environmental knowledge. This process has fostered an 
enhanced understanding of the value of mangroves for villagers 
in Koh Sralao. As one villager commented, “people know not 
to cut the mangroves as this will destroy our life. Now there are 
more mangroves, and we can find more snails and crabs” (Koh 
Sralao villager 2007). Moreover, replanted mangroves provide 
a buffer against storms and an increased nursery ground for 
crabs and other aquatic species. As of mid-2008, over 500 ha of 
mangroves were replanted in the area surrounding Koh Sralao.
Preliminary analysis of Radarstat satellite imagery suggests 
that the prevalent decline in mangrove resources that the area 
faced in the 1990s has been halted with significant regrowth 
taking place. Most likely this regrowth can be attributed to 
an active environmental education campaign at the village 
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level, patrolling efforts to ensure natural regeneration and the 
mangrove replanting effort. It helps that villagers have been 
recognized provincially and nationally for their work, being 
televised several times for replanting mangroves on National 
Environment Day. It is a big deal for a remote mangrove- estuary 
community to make it onto national television! There is a 
general sense of pride in mangrove replanting activities, and 
a significant amount of buy-in to continue this from a social 
and ecological perspective. For the first time in over a decade, 
mangrove trees surround the village and mangrove replanting 
no longer needs to take place on an annual basis.
WHAT IS MISSING?
As the cases of patrolling near the village, mangrove replanting 
and designing a waste management system illustrate, certain 
resource governance issues can be handled at a local level 
even with limited, patchy funds. Koh Sralao’s committee and 
community members are involved in specific resource manage-
ment activities, having taken steps to enhance community life. 
In many other contexts, municipal governments would take 
on these issues (i.e., dealing with waste or policing efforts). 
Koh Sralao’s committee also demonstrates the ability to come 
together on issues, including being able to discuss challenges 
with other committees and being able to organize petitions to 
bring awareness to issues such as illegal trawling or the impacts 
of sand mining.
Activities that are cost-effective, demonstrate results and are 
nonpolitical in nature are easiest to pursue, as demonstrated 
by the mangrove replanting effort. Mangrove propagules, as 
an example, can be easily collected and replanted so long as 
people draw on local knowledge to ensure appropriate siting 
for the replanted propagules. This activity can be relatively 
easily organized at a local level. Less cost-effective, more 
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contentious activities will ebb and flow more. While the patrol-
ling committee has had success in apprehending illegal fish-
ing boats near the village, it has proven far riskier to take on 
larger boats, particularly those from outside the village. There 
is also a fiscal sustainability issue. Gasoline costs are high: if 
no one is apprehended, people are out of pocket for patrolling 
since there is no consistent budget to ensure this activity can 
take place on a regular basis. Koh Sralao is unique in that it 
sits within a protected area that grants the committee access to 
park rangers to help in patrolling. This has spurred things on 
and patrolling works decently in comparison to other villages 
(Chapter 5 touches on this). Even so, mechanisms for resolving 
serious conflicts that arise with patrolling remain weak and 
financing remains an issue.
Certainly what has been accomplished by this committee 
is impressive and well worth applauding. Examples of sus-
tained resource management efforts are few and far between 
(CBNRM LI 2009) and much can be learned from this experi-
ence. However, one also senses the challenges of sustaining 
this effort and realizes that the governance structures that 
have been put in place are fragile at best. Conflict resolution 
mechanisms are weak, linked to a culture that traditionally 
strives for social harmony (disrupting such harmony is seen 
as a transgression), a weak judiciary and a system that favours 
flexible rules to solve conflicts (Un and So 2009; Gellman 
2010). While flexibility can sometimes be a good thing, in 
the sense of encouraging creative problem-solving, it is very 
problematic in a context whereby those solving the conflict 
will often favour the actor with the biggest connections and 
resources. It is tough to encourage conservation and small-
scale, managed, resource extraction activities in a context 
with multiple people vying for natural resources as a means 
to earn their living and where power dynamics come into 
play.
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Further, if I reflect upon the stresses affecting villages as 
were outlined in Chapter 3, I see that there are serious issues 
that are not addressed by this committee. Some of these issues 
are simply too big—deals made in the capital city that permit 
the extraction of significant amounts of sea sand, for example. 
Yet there are other issues that the committee is not interested 
to touch or not successful in dealing with. Examples of such 
challenges include gear theft and dealing with excess capacity, 
as will be further explored in this chapter.
Gear Theft
My crab traps were stolen two nights ago and I am really upset. 
I asked the Resource Management Committee and the local police 
to help me but they refuse to get involved since I have no idea who 
stole my traps. Now what am I supposed to do? I already owe the 
middleperson a lot of money and do not want to go further into debt 
(Preun 2006).
Gear loss was mentioned not only by Preun but by many other 
households as a major issue. While fishers have always antici-
pated that their nets may be ruined by larger fishing boats and 
that smaller gear such as crab traps may get lost, the theft of 
fishing gear appears to be increasing. In a 2003 livelihood 
survey that I conducted (n = 61), only a few households in Koh 
Sralao (twelve percent) discussed stolen fishing gear as a liveli-
hood problem, although individual discussions suggested that 
stolen fishing gear might be more significant than the survey 
numbers suggested (Marschke 2005). Three years later, in 
December 2006, after thinking more about what Preun had 
said and in talking with more fishers, I conducted a random 
survey of ten percent of Koh Sralao households (n = 32). Here, 
I asked about stolen or destroyed crab traps in the 2004–2005, 
2005–2006 and the beginning of the 2006–2007 fishing  seasons 
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(in 2003, seventy-four percent of fishers used crab traps, and 
this number is likely similar today). What surprised me was 
the number of stolen or destroyed traps that were reported. In 
2004–2005 the average number of stolen or destroyed traps was 
120, in 2005–2006 this number increased to 187 and in the first 
two months of the 2006–2007 crab season this number was a 
staggering 231 traps per household. Even if gear theft is over-
reported, these numbers suggest a striking amount of gear theft 
does take place.
Many fishers are affected by gear theft and it is likely that 
some households are involved in gear theft themselves. Once 
the cycle of gear theft has begun in a village it is tough for 
households to not become involved, especially if one’s own gear 
has been stolen. Having access to fishing gear, after all, is the 
difference between making money in a given fishing season or 
ending the season further in debt. Some police officers likely 
have a vested interest in gear theft continuing since it is alleged 
that they can extract an informal profit from such an illegal 
activity, which, in turn, helps to supplement their own liveli-
hood. Even when a village-elected resource management com-
mittee can intervene, gear loss is only resolved in a few cases.
Several factors may be impacting the increase in gear theft 
in the past few years. An overall decrease in aquatic resources 
means that fishers are struggling to earn a living from the 
fishery. As resources decrease, a middleperson is less willing 
to lend money, especially to those already in debt. In 2004 
the ACLEDA bank opened a provincial branch and began 
giving loans to fishing families.16 Unlike a middleperson, the 
bank’s repayment schedule is strict. Some fishers hinted that 
they needed to steal from each other to ensure that they make 
their payments. Credit markets in Cambodia are harsh: credit 
16 ACLEDA began in 1993 as an NGO for micro-credit and small enterprise development, 
and was transformed into a commercial bank in 2003 with most loans going to entrepre-
neurs selling basic commodities.
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rationing, high interest rates and strict debt collection are the 
norm (Kenjiro 2005).
Fishing gear may be stolen or destroyed in fishing grounds in 
and around the village, or at fishing grounds further away (see 
Figure I in Prologue, which illustrates the mangrove-estuary 
areas where people fish and Chrouy Pros Bay where people also 
fish). The resource management committee in Koh Sralao has 
initiated various responses to gear theft over the years, focus-
ing on theft in and around the village. Table VII documents the 
various attempts in Koh Sralao to deal with gear theft.
As Table VII illustrates, the resource management committee 
has attempted to deal with gear theft over the years, although 
these attempts have not been particularly successful. Perhaps 
the most innovative idea was in relation to stolen crab traps in 
and around the village. The idea was to use village subgroups 
as a way to organize fishing households. Each subgroup was 
Table vii: Trying to Handle Gear Theft
Year Koh Sralao Committee Initiative
2002 Divided village into eight sections, each section was allocated a 
paint colour by which to mark crab traps.
2003 Realized that they needed to switch to a paint that does not easily 
wash off.
2004 Issued a fining system for stolen crab traps.
2005 Ignored the crab-trap issue, focused on other issues (i.e., waste 
management, mangrove replanting, working with other 
committees in the area).
2006 Suggested to increase community patrolling, but idea was 
opposed by the village leader (who was newly appointed).
2007 Relied on park rangers and an NGO that does active patrolling 
in the area. This prevented some gear loss, along with artificial 
seagrass reefs.
2008–2010 Sand mining and crab decline was now the most pressing issue 
for the committee to address. Villagers reported that crab traps 
continued to be stolen and that sand barges also destroyed gill 
nets. Committee members appeared resigned to this practice.
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given a specific paint colour that households could then use to 
etch markings onto their crab traps. At first, fishers responded 
enthusiastically to this idea. The committee even fine-tuned 
the system by introducing water-resistant paints and ensuring 
that each subgroup knew their designated colour. Although this 
system was useful for identifying stolen traps when they were 
found, it proved far harder to verify who had been responsible 
for stealing the recovered crab traps. Such discussions were 
tense, and the committee never did find a suitable way to 
resolve these tensions. After a few years, the committee con-
cluded that unless they caught someone red-handed, crab-trap 
theft was too contentious an issue to handle. As such, the paint-
ing and marking of crab traps has long since stopped.
In 2006 the committee proposed that fishers could pay a 
nominal monthly fee to the committee so they could begin daily 
patrolling in areas where fishers set traps and nets. Although 
many villagers bought into this idea, the idea somehow became 
political and was squashed by several households that belong to 
the opposition party and by the newly appointed village chief 
(who is rumoured not to like the resource management com-
mittee because donors often bypass him to talk directly to the 
committee). Opponents accused the committee of wanting to 
pocket the money and suggested that they would not really use it 
for patrolling. Unfortunately, the idea of collecting fees became 
too controversial and had to be dropped. Committee members 
were now (2010) resigned to stolen fishing gear being part of 
the transaction costs facing fishers. Stolen and destroyed gear 
continues to be an issue, perhaps even more so as crab stocks 
are in decline and as barges and other larger boats run over 
sections of gill nets.
Given the context of gear theft, one can see why the com-
mittee has struggled with this issue and has not yet found a 
solution to it. At least the committee has tried to address this, 
since other levels of government are not interested in touching 
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this “hot” issue. For example, elected commune officials are 
aware of stolen gear but refuse to get involved. They argue that 
fisheries officials should be dealing with issues surrounding 
gear theft. Certainly Fisheries Administration staff are spe-
cifically mandated to deal with fisheries conflicts; however, 
several fisheries officials suggested that this issue was being 
exaggerated by local people and that there are more pressing 
issues for the Fisheries Administration to deal with. Only one 
Fisheries Administration staff member admitted that stolen 
fishing gear is a major issue that no one really talked about or 
knew how to handle.
Even NGOs working within these areas were unaware of the 
significant increase in gear loss and felt a bit helpless in terms 
of how to support this issue. One NGO member suggested that 
gear theft is a normal cycle, with people stealing consistently 
from each other. This may have been a defence mechanism 
on behalf of the NGO member, as taking on gear theft would 
require significant effort at multiple levels. There is no doubt 
that gear theft is a vicious cycle that needs to be stopped, yet 
this issue does not appear to be on anyone’s agenda. It is amaz-
ing that this has slipped through the cracks in a country that has 
undertaken a significant fisheries reform and created policy that 
emphasizes local decision-making processes (Marschke 2008). 
If this really is happening to the extent that informal probing 
suggests, how is it that this has become an acceptable risk for 
those working in the fishery?
Fisheries Management Strategies
A careful examination of what Koh Sralao’s resource committee 
focuses on illustrates that they do not work on an active fish-
eries management program per se. There are two noteworthy 
exceptions to this: patrolling efforts and attempting to enlarge 
the mesh size used in crab traps and nets. Patrolling efforts have 
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already been extensively discussed, so I now turn to examining 
the latter.
Using a larger mesh size for individual traps or nets can be 
done whenever fishers replace their nets, which often takes 
place on an annual or bi-annual basis. In 2002 the committee 
asked all fishers who were preparing their nets for the next 
fishing season to use the next size up (going from a 2 cm to a 
3 cm mesh size). Many fishers in Koh Sralao agreed to do so, 
although they soon became quite frustrated when they realized 
that other fishers also using the same fishing grounds had not 
followed suit. Those fishers who had agreed to change their 
mesh size found themselves catching less fish than those who 
had not (Marschke and Berkes 2005). Understandably, Koh 
Sralao fishers returned to using a smaller mesh size for their 
fishing gear in the following fishing season. This is an example 
of a collective action challenge, since only with compliance 
from multiple villages is it worth everyone’s effort to comply 
(Ostrom 1990). It is possible that Koh Sralao’s committee would 
now have the moral authority to mandate a change of mesh size 
in the main fishing grounds of this area, asking other villages 
also to comply. However, it is also less likely that they would 
have the energy, ten years in, to monitor and ensure compliance 
for this action and would only do so with significant support 
from other actors (i.e., technical departments or NGOs). To date, 
they have not tried to enlarge mesh size again.
In a sense, Koh Sralao’s committee tried to tackle tougher 
fisheries management issues in its early days: patrolling and 
encouraging the changing of mesh size are part of this. With 
time, the committee has chosen to partake in more manageable, 
durable activities such as habitat restoration, implementing a 
system of waste management and attempting to share their 
resource governance experiences with other villages and higher-
level authorities. The committee, in a sense, has skirted the 
most difficult fisheries management issues. In particular, 
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the committee has not found a way to limit excess capacity 
(in simple terms, overfishing), either by switching the mesh 
size used in gear, limiting the number of fish caught or limit-
ing who may enter into a fishing ground. With current stock 
declines, small-scale fishers, such as those in Koh Sralao, are 
forced to increase the number of nets or traps that they set and 
the number of hours that they fish, or to diversify into nonfish-
ing livelihood activities.
In the Cambodian context, catch limitation and limiting the 
number of fishers in an area tend not to be implemented (Salayo 
et al. 2008). Koh Sralao’s committee, in fact, appears to be a 
unique example of a committee attempting to limit catch in one 
fishing season (Van Acker 2010). Wayne (2009) best explains 
the views of the committee: “The bigger ships can take as much 
fish as they like, but we only take a little fish and fisheries staff 
expect us to take even less. This situation is not right, and we 
[the committee] cannot insist on making people take less when 
this type of local management would not be enough to improve 
the overall health of the fishery.” Catch limitation is not seen 
as a fair expectation when larger boats are not following suit. 
This is also true of exclusion, although for different reasons. 
Although it is ideal to create a zone where only community 
members can fish, the reality of doing so can be problematic. 
Fish species migrate, and much depends on climate variability, 
stock numbers and market prices in terms of where and what 
is desirable to fish in any given month. Some stocks and some 
fishers are highly migratory (Berkes 2010c). Creating tightly 
controlled zones of access might lead to greater conflicts than 
already exist, and serve as a mechanism to marginalize the 
poor further. Careful thought needs to be given to any strategy 
promoting effort reduction in the Cambodian context.
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CONCLUSION
People are living in a context that is turbulent and dynamic, 
where livelihood stability is not the norm. Nevertheless, people 
recognize that forms of resource governance may be helpful. 
Although the resource committee has not been able to control 
the decline of fisheries resources or the theft of fishing gear, 
it has been successful in other areas. Habitat restoration is 
one example of an action that has been particularly effective: 
over 500 ha have been replanted since 2000. As mangrove 
habit at near the village is restored, poorer households have an 
opportunity again to glean for cockles during the rainy season 
and, more generally, report seeing a greater number of aquatic 
species such as mangrove mud crabs in these replanted areas. 
Moreover, these mangroves serve as a buffer for the village 
against wind and storms.
Koh Sralao’s committee has been willing to take on many 
challenges over the years and has found ways to sustain certain 
activities, including integrating activities such as mangrove 
replanting into commune planning processes (the next chapter 
explores this in greater detail) and to continue other activities 
at a village level, such as waste management. Even patrolling, 
an activity that ebbs and flows, has been consistent enough for 
other villagers and fishers to know that this is an area where 
it may take place and where one needs to be careful. From a 
longevity perspective, committee members themselves suggest 
that one key to their success is recognizing how to fight certain 
battles and when to accept those that will not be won. Having 
modest goals is one way to ensure a longer-term approach to 
resource management, for certain types of activities at least.
Undoubtedly, local governance of any form is tough to imple-
ment in a context where resources are declining, there is limited 
financial or technical support and larger-scale entrepreneurs are 
also interested in the area. A committee will need the  support 
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of neighbouring villages and local government officials to 
patrol joint fishing grounds and to ensure consistent policies. 
Other actors, perhaps from the national level, will need to 
monitor and help foster solutions for issues such as overfishing, 
international fleets in local waters and larger-scale resource 
extraction activities. Resource governance beyond the village 
does get more complicated, since more actors are involved. 
Chapter 5 explores how resource governance is working across 
administrative units, exploring the management of a common 
fishing ground used by Koh Sralao villagers and others. The 
main fishing grounds are known as Chrouy Pros Bay; this is 






Last night a trawler destroyed my gill nets. I was quite upset but he 
told me that I did not have a light on my boat so it was my fault that 
he could not see me. I reminded him that trawling in the bay is against 
the law and that I cannot afford a light for my boat. He was sympa-
thetic but did not offer to do anything. I need to find money to get a 
light for when I fish, although I am not sure this will help in all situa-
tions. Trawlers pay no attention to us, the poor fishers (Sok 2004).
Six years later . . .
I now have a light on my boat, so that helps although boats still run 
over my nets. This is because there is more boating activity in this 
area now—trawls, sand barges and bigger ships. I have to think care-
fully about where to set my nets. I try to pick areas that trawls avoid 
but are too shallow for bigger ships. I usually guess correctly, but not 
always (Sok 2010).
This type of governance challenge, where one fisher or boat driver inadvertently ruins the fishing gear of a fisher, is not 
easy to solve. Initially (in 2004) Sok thought that a light would 
be helpful for night fishing, even though orange-red buoys did 
indicate where Sok had set his nets. In the initial case, Sok 
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had set his nets at dusk and then proceeded to sleep on his 
boat as a way to save on fuel costs and to scare off potential 
thieves. Sok was asleep when he heard a boat driving close to 
his. According to Sok, the trawl fisher had not been paying 
attention but quickly blamed him for not having a light on his 
boat as a way to indicate to him that he had set his nets in that 
particular area. As such, Sok was out of luck and needed to 
replace his gill nets and, eventually, also to buy a light for his 
boat (which he had bought in 2006). Having a light has helped 
somewhat but still does not prevent boats from running over 
his gill nets. This is because in the last six years the situation 
in these fishing grounds has changed: these fishing grounds 
are now also used as a transportation route for barges and 
ships.
While Sok sometimes fishes in and around Koh Sralao vil-
lage, he also fishes in the popular Chrouy Pros fishing grounds 
about 10 km away from Koh Sralao village.17 Fishers from a 
handful of villages (including Koh Sralao fishers) along with 
migrant fishers use this sheltered, shallow-water, nutrient-rich 
bay since it is particularly rich in aquatic life. With so many 
people drawing on these natural resources, conflicts are bound 
to be rife. Two issues are particularly contentious: conflicts 
17 Enclosed on three sides by mangrove estuaries (dominated by Rhizophora spp.), Chrouy 
Pros Bay is bordered on its seaward side by Koh Kong Island. Two relatively narrow 
channels on either side of the island provide access to the open sea. Aquatic species 
include grouper fish (Epinephelus tauvina and Epinephelus awoara), crabs (Portunidae 
callinectes, Portinidae syllca, commonly known as swimming crab and mangrove mud 
crab) and shrimp (Penaeidae penaeus, Penaeidae metapenaeus and Penaeus monodon, 
commonly known as giant tiger prawn or black tiger shrimp). Seagrass species are par-
ticularly abundant in this area (Halodule uninervis is the dominant species; Halophila 
decipiens and Halophila beccarii are also found) (Bock 2006). This ecosystem is import-
ant from a livelihood perspective; moreover it provides a critical nutrient source and is 
an important migration channel for many aquatic species. Part of these fishing grounds 
lie within two protected areas (Peam Krasaop Wildlife Sanctuary; Botom Sakor National 
Park) and within a Ramsar site (Ramsar sites are wetlands of ecological significance).
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between resource users using different fishing gear and sand 
mining in and around local fishing grounds. These two issues 
cannot be solved by a single resource management committee 
since the activities occur throughout the shallow-water bay. 
Even though Chrouy Pros Bay falls under the jurisdiction of 
three resource management committees, villagers cannot handle 
these larger-scale conflicts nor can they confront businesses 
that are granted permits in the capital, Phnom Penh. As such, 
controversial issues occurring in de facto open-access spaces 
used by many fishers and other resource users are not easily 
solved.
Chapter 5 considers resource governance within local fishing 
grounds, moving beyond the village as a unit of analysis. I care-
fully examine how two decentralization processes designed to 
support local governance are used to solve specific fishing-
related conflicts. Both the Sub-decree on Community Fisheries 
and the Law on Commune Administration are examples of poli-
cies whose uptake in southwestern Cambodia are partial at best. 
Although these two policies are not always used as imagined, 
or at all, this can have both positive and negative implications 
in terms of resource governance. I then turn to an examination 
of sand mining, a case in which no policy process appears to 
be working on behalf of local people. These examples illustrate 
how formal policies may be used or avoided, and how informal 
policies often guide everyday practice.
DEALING WITH FISHERIES CONFLICTS
Let me carefully examine the issue of conflicts between fish-
ers using different gear types. Chrouy Pros Bay is a highly 
productive, shallow-water, brackish ecosystem that fishers and 
other resource users rely upon. A major source of tension is 
between fishers using trawls, which are illegal in shallow-water 
areas according to the Fisheries Law, and fishers using fishing 
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gear such as gill nets or crab traps. Trawls are nonselective in 
terms of what they catch and can wreak havoc upon the sea 
bottom, but, more than this, they also run over traps and nets. 
The destruction of fishing gear creates a real stress for those 
setting nets or traps in these fishing grounds. This tension is 
also illustrative of a power dynamic: fishers who use trawls 
rely on larger boats than fishers using traps or nets. It tends to 
be richer villagers who can afford trawls. These tensions are 
relatively recent since fishers operating trawls only moved into 
this shallow bay area with the recent increase in foreign vessels 
found in Cambodia’s offshore waters. As more fishers began 
accessing the same fishing grounds, significant fisheries-related 
conflicts have emerged.
How, then, have fishers, village management committees, and 
other concerned actors attempted to deal with specific fisheries 
conflicts? To explore this question I examine how actors have 
turned to formal policy processes in an attempt to solve such 
conflicts, and how certain conflicts were only solved when Koh 
Kong’s provincial governor signalled for the creative adaption 
of existing policies.
Through Fishing Policy
Within the Community Fisheries Sub-decree (which applies 
to a handful of villages living around Chrouy Pros Bay) and 
the Protected Areas Sub-decree (which applies to Koh Sralao), 
illegal activities such as wildlife hunting, poaching and dyna-
mite fishing are listed along with an explanation of which fish-
ing gear is allowed where. Trawling in shallow waters (less than 
20 m), for example, is illegal. For committee-related patrolling 
activities it is mandated that committee members carry out 
patrols with a police officer, a technical officer (i.e., a repre-
sentative from any given technical department) or a park ranger 
(for patrols taking place within protected areas). Guidelines for 
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the procedure involved in apprehending someone are also found 
within such policies.
Patrolling is something that potentially prevents conflicts or 
deals with existing conflicts in a relatively swift, timely manner. 
This being said, it is not easy to do in Chrouy Pros Bay. This is 
a 30 km2 expanse, attracting a range of fishing boats including 
larger boats that sometimes tuck into the bay area when the 
seas are rough. It is too large to manage by village patrolling 
efforts alone, and even joint village patrols (between resource 
management committees) are not easy to coordinate or carry 
out. Things are further complicated by jurisdictional  boundaries 
since several of the villages in and around Chrouy Pros Bay 
fall under the jurisdiction of the Fisheries Administration, 
which does not provide “fish rangers,” unlike the Ministry of 
Environment with its park rangers. In addition to support from 
a technical department, patrolling success requires the sup-
port of local police and strong local leadership. Somehow this 
is not happening in a very consistent manner within Chrouy 
Pros Bay.
All three villages with management committees in this 
area agree that there is a need for patrolling in the bay area, 
and rules pertaining to trawls fishing in shallow-water areas 
need to be enforced. The challenge is getting support from 
technical departments—the tip of Chrouy Pros Bay falls under 
Ministry of Environment jurisdiction and the rest of Chrouy 
Pros Bay falls within the Fisheries Administration. As such, 
Koh Sralao villagers, along with the park rangers, tend to patrol 
near their village and the tip of Chrouy Pros Bay (see Figure 
I in Prologue), whereas the two other villages (Koh Kapik 
and Chrouy Pros) are expected to cover other parts of the bay. 
These two villages require the support of either local police or 
Fisheries Administration staff to do their patrols; unfortunately 
they face a serious challenge in getting these stakeholders to 
approve of, or engage in, their patrolling efforts. And, as was 
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described in Chapter 4, even Koh Sralao’s patrolling efforts ebb 
and flow, and they are a relatively well-functioning committee 
with decent technical support.
The following excerpts are taken from a discussion with a 
provincial fisheries officer about how to better manage Chrouy 
Pros Bay. The fisheries officer is explaining what the rules are, 
in terms of local fisheries management, and what has been hap-
pening in Chrouy Pros village (one of the two other villages 
with a resource management committee in the area, besides 
Koh Sralao), where fishers are struggling to get support for 
their patrolling efforts.
The provincial Fisheries Administration carries out patrolling activ-
ities, although we have a significant area to cover and a limited 
budget. If a local fisheries committee wants to patrol their fish-
ing area then a member of the Commune Police needs to join. For 
example, in Chrouy Pros village, the Commune Chief of Police issued 
an order stating that only when a commune police officer accompan-
ies the committee on a patrol will the police take any responsibility 
should a conflict occur. Local police officers need to tell their Chief 
of Police whenever they go out to patrol with the committee.
I have had many complaints from the committee in Chrouy Pros 
village about the Chief of Police in their area. In their case, the com-
mittee needs the approval of this local chief. A few months ago vil-
lagers reported to the committee that there were trawl fishers fishing 
in their fishing grounds. The committee wanted to initiate a patrol 
and went to the police to ask them to join in. The Chief of Police was 
away from the village that day, although several other police offers 
were around. They invited these officers to join in and one officer 
agreed. The patrol itself was uneventful and three push nets were 
caught and fined according to community bi-laws.
When the Chief of Police returned to the area and heard about the 
patrol he was very angry. He introduced an administrative penalty by 
taking the police officer’s gun and criticizing him publicly. Although 
committee members were upset because this officer had sacrificed his 
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time to join in the fisheries patrol, they could not challenge the Chief 
of Police. The officer himself was quite upset and resigned from the 
police force, deciding to do police work in another province instead.
The committee then came to see me here in the provincial office 
as they felt that this action was unfair. Also, the committee told me 
that they felt that the Chief of Police was supporting illegal activities. 
Apparently whenever the committee caught illegal fishers these fish-
ers claimed that they pay 50 B [US$ 1.50] per boat to a money col-
lector which is meant to enable them to continue their illegal fishing. 
The committee wants us, the provincial Fisheries Administration, to 
do something.
However when the committee does not follow the approved regu-
lations, it makes it hard for me to help them. They are supposed to 
patrol with a police officer, who can carry a gun, and then inform me 
about any confiscated gear. There are now many push nets and trawls 
since the committee generally patrols without the cooperation of the 
police. This leads to bigger problems since many trawl fishers know 
that the police are not joining in with the patrols and, because of this, 
the Fisheries Administration cannot do anything once people are  
caught.
—Excerpts from an interview with a provincial fisheries officer,  
Koh Kong province, 2006
Chrouy Pros’s resource management committee faces a 
Catch-22. The police in their area are not interested in work-
ing with them, and the provincial Department of Fisheries 
insists that the committee follow the regulations outlined in 
the Community Fisheries Sub-decree, which requires a police 
officer or a technical officer to patrol with a committee. 
The Department of Fisheries claims to be chronically under-
resourced (they make a point here) and cannot consistently send 
a technical officer out to this area, over 30 km from the prov-
incial town. When the village committee takes matters into its 
own hands, no government authority appears willing to support 
them if they have deviated slightly from official procedures. 
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The irony of all this is that trawling in the shallow waters of 
Chrouy Pros Bay—the main activity that the committee is try-
ing to stop—is illegal according to the 1987 and 2006 Fisheries 
Law. This example is illustrative of how policy can either be 
ignored or be followed so carefully so as to make it difficult for 
fishers to get the support they need to enact specific resource 
management activities.
Members of resource management committees (focusing 
on fisheries, forestry or protected areas) cannot carry guns, 
which is why they need the support of local police officers to 
patrol their waters. It is risky to patrol without a gun. However, 
as this example illustrates, getting such support may not be 
so easy. When committee members do try to cooperate with 
police officers, there is no guarantee that a police officer will 
be able to join in a patrol. Some of this foot-dragging (Scott 
1985) may be happening because the police are benefitting from 
their own rent-seeking activities and are reluctant to see this 
form of income stop. When this is the case, setting up a weekly 
patrolling roster is unlikely to work since then it would be too 
easy for police officers to tip off fishers as to when patrols will 
take place. It may also be that there is limited room for a police 
officer to support this type of work if someone higher up the 
chain of command is unsupportive of such initiatives.
A fisheries committee can also patrol with a fisheries officer: 
this is one way to avoid patrolling with the police. In reality, 
funds are limited for Fisheries Administration officers to travel 
to remote villages to help with such patrols, and this is why 
fisheries officers encourage fisheries committees to cooper-
ate with local police, to confiscate fishing gear and then call 
a technical officer to support this process. Fisheries officers 
are insistent that committees follow the regulations set out for 
fisheries management. Given that rule-making generally takes 
place at a provincial or national level, not all rules and regula-
tions are always easy for local people to implement. Certainly, 
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as with the police, some fisheries officers support the idea of 
local management more than others.
A final option is for a committee to patrol with a park ran-
ger, as is the case in Koh Sralao. However, of all the villages 
surrounding Chrouy Pros Bay, only Koh Sralao village falls 
within a protected area, so this is not a viable option for other 
villages. Park rangers tend to be local people, so they are based 
in a village, a practice the Ministry of Environment has been 
promoting since the early 2000s. The Fisheries Administration, 
on the other hand, does hire technical staff who are meant to 
work at a village level. However, given that these officers are 
not from the villages and generally have families in the prov-
incial or district town, there is little incentive for them to stay 
in the villages for long periods of time. Encouraging local “fish 
rangers” may be one option for the Fisheries Administration; 
another is diverting more funds toward coastal patrols.
For this combination of reasons, one can understand why a 
resource committee may eventually decide to patrol on its own. 
This is where conflicts can escalate and a type of frontier vio-
lence can occur. Between 1999 and 2002 there were twenty-two 
deaths as a result of fisheries conflicts (Evans 2002). Although 
this number has now lessened, conflicts continue to lead to 
violence and injury (Un and So 2009). A serious effort has been 
made in Chrouy Pros Bay, not only by Koh Sralao’s resource 
management committee but also by the other two committees 
responsible for Chrouy Pros Bay. However, these patrols have 
not always been that successful and have caused a significant 
amount of tension between different actors. As fisheries con-
flicts escalate and continue to remain unsolved, a resource 
management committee may decide that it is not worth the 
headache to initiate patrols. Or, when committees do continue 
to patrol, they may decide to focus on illegal wildlife hunting 
or protecting mangrove forests and seagrass sanctuaries, which 
are less conflict-ridden tasks.
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Through Commune Planning Policy
Therefore, even with the establishment of natural resource 
management committees in the early 2000s, fishers continued 
to trawl in Chrouy Pros Bay. Committee members were not 
able adequately to address these tensions through fisheries 
policy, in large part because of a lack of policy uptake within 
the provincial fisheries department (although other factors also 
contributed toward this). Yet resource committees are not the 
only local institutions responsible for resource management 
issues and community fisheries is not the only policy designed 
to enhance local governance (as shown in Table I of Chapter 1). 
Commune development planning is an example of another 
policy that is meant to empower local actors via the elected 
commune councils. Elected commune councils are responsible 
for most things that take place within their administrative 
units and are involved in a planning process that is designed to 
enable communes to identify their specific needs, with NGOs 
and technical departments then drawing on commune plans to 
deliver aid. Each commune is granted a small annual budget to 
be spent on infrastructure projects, or if relevant, other projects 
that would benefit a commune. The general experience with 
commune planning has been that over time resource-dependent 
communities have begun to incorporate more environmental 
and livelihood concerns within their commune development 
plans (CBNRM LI 2009).
How, then, has this planning process worked for the two com-
munes surrounding Chrouy Pros Bay (which is where the three 
village-level resource management committees reside)? An 
analysis of the 2001–2007 plans for these two fishing-focused 
communes revealed that commune plans tend to be infrastruc-
ture-oriented, prioritizing roads, schools and wells. Mangrove 
replanting is also listed. Somewhat surprisingly, given the inten-
sity of fishing conflicts found in the area,  strategies to address 
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fisheries conflicts are not overtly found within the commune 
plans. Perhaps this makes sense, given that commune planning 
is new in Cambodia and that it takes time for government actors 
and local commune councils to learn how to use this type of 
process in a way that addresses local needs.
To expand further, one commune requested that the main 
boating channel in one of the villages be dredged to allow larger 
boats a direct route between the open sea and Chrouy Pros Bay. 
The other infrastructure request within this commune was for 
Koh Sralao village to build a bridge that connected one part 
of the village with another. In the second commune, a road 
that spanned the length of the village was requested. In both 
 communes no contractors bid on these projects, mainly because 
of the challenges involved in transporting heavy equipment 
via boat to these areas. Hence, in spite of commune requests, 
in 2003 and 2004 no infrastructure development projects were 
funded in this area. In other words, the communes of Chrouy 
Pros Bay had not spent the money that had been allocated to 
them by the national government.
Around this time, perhaps in response to the chaotic situa-
tion that the Fisheries Administration was not able to regulate 
combined with ever increasing trawls in the area, Koh Kong’s 
provincial governor became interested in finding a solution to 
fisheries conflicts. Having grown up in a fishing village him-
self, the provincial governor visited Thailand in early 2004 to 
learn how artificial reefs could protect seagrass areas and attract 
fish habitat. After this study tour, the governor recommended 
that the unspent commune funds be used to build concrete arti-
ficial reefs that could serve as fish attractors throughout Chrouy 
Pros Bay. This was argued to be a strategy that could help poor 
fishers in the area and increase fish habitat and productivity. 
The provincial Department of Planning, which is responsible for 
facilitating commune planning processes, agreed that this would 
be a good use of unspent commune funds for these communes.
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Yet neither of the two communes actually requested artificial 
reefs in their commune plans prior to 2007. Before 2007 any 
requests related to natural resources were mostly in terms of 
environmental education or mangrove replanting. Little was 
found in terms of the fishery, even though this was the very per-
iod when conflicts were escalating. It is worth repeating that the 
specific infrastructure requests were to dredge a channel, build 
a bridge and build a road through one village. As one commune 
councillor noted: “[W]e did not think of the concrete reefs by 
ourselves. Actually we were not asked about how else we might 
spend the funds. We were told that our money would be spent on 
artificial reefs. We were not in a position to refuse” (Dec 2006).
Hence, with serious encouragement from the governor, the 
provincial administrators responsible for commune planning 
decided to spend the money allocated for infrastructure develop-
ment to build concrete artificial reefs, combined with cement 
poles used to demarcate seagrass conservation areas. In 2005 
the construction of artificial reefs and cement poles began; 
in early 2006, 414 concrete artificial reefs and one thousand 
cement poles were placed throughout Chrouy Pros Bay. The 
estimated expense of the job was CA$ 80,000.
Why, then, did Koh Kong’s provincial governor encourage 
this? According to one government official,
I think he [the provincial governor] was really clever to push for the 
artificial reefs. Although he said it was to protect the sea grass, it 
was actually a good way to limit trawls coming into Chrouy Pros 
Bay. There has been a lot of conflict in that area and this has been a 
difficult issue to solve. This way he could get around those technical 
staff who were not that active in finding solutions for resource prob-
lems, and the trawls could not blame the poor fishers (Member of the 
Department of Environment, Koh Kong, 2008).
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Once the provincial governor had encouraged the commune 
funds to be spent on artificial reefs, few people appeared to 
object. There was a general feeling among technical experts and 
fishers that the seagrasses found in this area were in decline 
because of the use of trawls in the area (Bock 2006). Thus, the 
NGOs working on environmental issues applauded the move 
and lent further support to build additional poles to demarcate 
seagrass conservation areas (PMCR 2008). Moreover, this 
deployment of artificial reefs appealed to technical depart-
ments. The local Department of Environment had been hoping 
to address seagrass decline for a while, so they were in strong 
support of this move. The Department of Planning saw this as 
a way to spend the commune funds allocated to this area. The 
Department of Fisheries recognized that this would alleviate 
some pressures on local fisheries conflicts and were also in 
support of seagrass conservation.
The commune council, while somewhat frustrated that they 
had no say in how to spend their commune funds, were pleased 
with this project when they noticed a decline in trawls and saw 
that the reefs served as fish attractors. Anecdotal evidence 
from local fishers suggested that there was an increase in fish 
and crab near the reefs. When asked in 2007, one year later, 
about how artificial reefs had impacted upon their livelihood, 
seventy-seven percent of Chrouy Pros fishers felt that the 
impact was positive (fourteen percent negative, nine percent 
no opinion). The only people that were upset were the trawl 
fishers, who found it risky to use such gear in areas where the 
concrete reefs were not demarcated. Many trawl and push-net 
fishers were forced to change their fishing grounds and argued 
that they were now catching smaller yields (although still more 
than most crab fishers). Even so, a few trawl fishers have been 
creative. Several placed two long wooden poles holding a net 
on the front of their boats. When this device touches a cement 
pole, the trawl then seeks a new direction that avoids the cement 
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poles and reefs. This is one way to avoid the artificial reefs and 
still trawl in the area, although it does take more work (which 
is why not that many fishers are doing this).
By early 2008 there was a general sense that conflicts had 
decreased in the area, including the destruction of nets from 
trawls that Sok described in the beginning of this chapter 
(granted this still happened, but to a somewhat lesser extent). 
Poorer fishers talked about being able to set their traps in the 
areas surrounding the artificial reefs; village leaders were con-
tent that a major conflict had significantly lessened. Moreover, 
the resource management committees were relieved that an 
ingenious solution had been found to an issue that they had, 
thus far, not been able to address adequately, and technical 
departments were pleased with the results of the deployment of 
the artificial reefs and the demarcation of seagrass sanctuaries. 
It appeared that things were looking up for fishers in this area, 
for the first time in a while.
DEALING WITH SAND MINING
This is why taking a longitudinal approach to research is so 
interesting. Had I stopped my research for this book in 2007 
or 2008, as I had originally intended, I would likely have sug-
gested that modest gains had been made in the area of resource 
governance in spite of stock declines and the general challenges 
facing communities in this area (granted resource governance 
was fragile, but nonetheless, something important had been 
attempted). However, this story does not end with the deploy-
ment of artificial reefs and communities demarking seagrass 
conservation areas to ensure the gradual increase in fish stocks. 
It is no exaggeration to suggest that the entire resource govern-
ance effort in this area has been side-swiped since the advent 
of sand mining.
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Business entrepreneurs turned to Cambodia’s coasts in late 
2007, looking to mine sand for export within the region. This 
was likely linked to Indonesia’s ban on sand exports in 2007 
and the construction boom occurring throughout Southeast Asia 
and China. Several national ministries (initially the Ministry of 
Industry, Energy and Mining and then the Ministry of Water 
Resources and Meteorology, which houses the Committee for 
Sand Resources Management established in 2009) issued a 
series of permits that enabled sand mining in southwestern 
Cambodia. Sand mining activities are found in and around 
the provincial town and in the rivers f lowing through the 
mangrove-estuary areas toward Koh Kong Island at the edge of 
Chrouy Pros Bay. This is the same area that fishers rely upon to 
earn their livelihood. Although these dredging operations began 
in a handful of sites in late 2007 and early 2008, by 2010 there 
were an estimated twenty-seven dredging sites within this area 
(Global Witness 2010). Figure II identifies the multiple sand 
dredging sites in and around local fishing grounds.
How did this situation emerge so rapidly? In early 2008, 
within a few weeks of the sand mining operations beginning, 
villagers in Koh Sralao and elsewhere noticed a decline in the 
swimming crab population; after several months of sand extrac-
tion, the swimming crab population was particularly low. At this 
point, fishers began to suspect a connection between sand min-
ing and the rapid disappearance of this species in their fishing 
grounds (as was mentioned in Chapter 3). Koh Sralao’s resource 
management committee initiated a campaign, working with 
the other resource committees in Chrouy Pros Bay. The goal 
was to have the Ministry of Environment investigate this issue. 
Villagers from the three communities thumbprinted a petition 
asking for the sand mining to be stopped since it appeared to be 
negatively affecting fish stocks. This petition was sent through 
official channels. Meanwhile, committee members contacted 
those whom they knew in government departments to see if 
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Source: Ministry of Environment, Cambodia, August 2010; location of sand mining adapted from 
Global Witness 2010 and Marschke 2010 field observations.
figure ii: Sand Dredging Sites (Black Triangles)
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someone could help them address this issue. The Ministry 
of Environment sent a delegation of government officials to 
investigate the issue in April 2008. The delegation examined 
the situation, talking with local fishers and those controlling 
the sand mining operations. Water quality samples were also 
taken; these tests, however, did not come up with anything 
unusual. Sources who observed the mission suggested that the 
sand mining operations were suspended the week prior to this 
delegation visiting and that the delegation was put up in a five-
star hotel, owned by one of the main business entrepreneurs 
controlling the sand mining operations. It appears that nothing 
came out of this mission.
In the two years since the committees thumbprinted the 
petition, sand mining activities steadily increased. Koh Kong 
fishers, including members of the resource management com-
mittees discussed in this chapter, have resorted to taking part 
in protests in the provincial town (such as in October of 2009) 
and to filing complaints with provincial authorities (Sokheng 
and Strangio 2010). This has all been to no avail. There has been 
no environmental impact assessment conducted by the Ministry 
of Environment to assess the impact of the sand dredging upon 
the ecosystem, unless the water quality samples count, nor have 
any scientific studies been undertaken by fisheries or other 
scientists to assess the health of the crab population or other 
fish stocks. Considering the seriousness of this activity, little 
mention is made of sand mining in any written documents (with 
the exception of Global Witness reports, which I will discuss 
shortly). Moreover, I have not been able to discuss this issue 
with any government officials at the provincial or national 
levels, although it is rumoured that the old provincial governor 
(who had supported the artificial reefs but was not re-elected 
in 2008) is using informal channels to try to lessen the amount 
of sand being mined and removed from this area.
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In my last visit to Cambodia (May 2010), Sovanna further 
explained the sand mining activities to me:
For the past year we have seen many boats and barges pass in front 
of our village, and we can hear the equipment being operated all day 
and all night. It is very noisy. Have you gone out to Koh Kong Island 
to see the piles of sand and the big ships? These ships have flags from 
other countries, including Singapore and Malaysia. This is one place 
where they load the sand to ship somewhere else. At first we tried to 
stop the sand mining since this activity really affects the crabs but it 
seems that there is nothing we can do. If we are lucky the companies 
will soon stop working in this area (May 2010).
I followed Sovanna’s advice and took a boat to the area that he 
described. Since I am not a mining expert, it is hard for me to 
assess precisely what I saw. Nevertheless, I observed a large 
sand depot near Koh Kong Island at the edge of Chrouy Pros 
Bay, saw six sites where sand dredging was taking place and 
saw at least ten barges and five large ships all in the span of 
several hours (in May 2010). While the Cambodian government 
does allow for smallish amounts of sand to be dredged each 
month—between forty to sixty thousand tonnes—from what 
I saw and from what villagers suggested, it is probable that more 
sand than this is being dredged on a monthly basis.
Even with knowing that sand mining activities are taking 
place in full force, it is difficult to assess the exact impact of 
these activities. This is because there are few visible signs of 
serious degradation (as compared to clear-cutting, charcoal 
production or aquaculture ponds) unless you are a fisher in 
the area, and there have been no scientific studies undertaken 
to verify villager claims of stock declines (meaning that such 
claims are easily dismissed as exaggerated). Moreover, journal-
ists do not appear to be able to access the sand mining compan-
ies, and the little written documentation that exists is based 
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on a series of investigative-journalism-type reports (cf. Global 
Witness 2009, 2010; Sokha and Strangio 2009). Regardless 
of the details, it appears that sand is dredged and loaded onto 
three-hundred-ton barges for transport to a sand depot area 
where the sand is then cleaned and stored prior to loading onto a 
larger ship (capable of holding fifteen thousand tonnes of sand) 
(Global Witness 2009; Sokha and Strangio 2009). Reporters also 
viewed shipping documents that listed the transfer of 77,236 
tonnes of sand from Cambodia to Singapore ports within one 
week in 2009 (Global Witness 2010).
Perhaps in frustration from the lack of uptake on this issue, 
Global Witness produced a report in May 2010 suggesting that 
Singapore needed to explore options for sustainable sourcing 
of raw materials and to consider carefully how problematic 
Cambodia’s sand mining sector is. (Singapore appears to be 
the primary destination of Cambodia’s export-oriented sand 
sector.) The report included controversial statements such as 
“millions of dollars are changing hands, but there is no way of 
tracking whether royalties, taxes and other revenues generated 
from the sand dredging and export industries are reaching the 
national treasury” and “[c]ompanies operating in the sand sec-
tor as well as Cambodia’s regulatory agencies are ignoring its 
national environmental and social safeguards, and international 
industry best practices” (3). Global Witness also released the 
following press release:
Cambodia’s international donors must tackle head on the gross mis-
management of the country’s natural resources at tomorrow’s gov-
ernment-donor meeting . . . . Donors gave Cambodia $1bn in aid last 
year, despite evidence of widespread corruption and mismanagement 
of public funds and repeated failures to implement promised reform 
(“International donors must act on entrenched natural resource-related 
corruption in Cambodia” 31 May 2010).
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The Cambodian embassy responded as follows:
The Royal Embassy of Cambodia to the United Kingdom is not 
surprised to read the press release by Global Witness . . . as always 
mentally disturbed and exaggerated with a hidden agenda of pursuing 
in hugely-damaging smear campaigns to discredit the Government of 
Cambodia (“Global Witness to fall into its ‘own trap’” 1 June 2010).
Both positions suggest a level of frustration with how things 
are represented. While there may be a middle ground to this 
story, there is no doubt that larger macro-economic develop-
ment forces are affecting villagers in southwestern Cambodia. 
A few business entrepreneurs are gaining from this activity, 
with local people not benefitting in the least. If you remember 
the details of Chapter 3, around a sixth of all households left 
Koh Sralao village in 2009, citing serious fish decline related to 
sand mining as a reason (these fishers were carrying high debt 
loads). It is likely the tipping point that has forced households 
to consider relocation to other areas. This might be acceptable 
if there were broader economic gains being made that could 
be funnelled into education, health or basic infrastructure 
development. Sand mining would be far more understandable, 
if this were to be the case, as this would then allow for a real 
discussion about development trade-offs (economic growth, 
environmental sustainability, etc.). Unfortunately, the benefits 
of sand mining remain unclear since tracking the royalty fees 
that businesses are expected to pay on each tonne of sand is 
difficult at this point (Global Witness 2010).
This issue illuminates how the governance of certain types of 
coastal resources is not always easy, and how sometimes policy 
frameworks may be avoided or ignored. For example, these sand 
mining concessions were granted within a protected area and 
a Ramsar site, an area where villagers had worked on resource 
governance issues, in connection with the provincial governor, 
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the Ministry of Environment and the Fisheries Administration. 
People in relatively high positions know about the work of these 
communities. Sand mining is not meant to take place within a 
protected area, and mining outside of protected areas is subject 
to an environmental impact assessment. The permits granted to 
business entrepreneurs, for small amounts of sand extraction, 
appear to be ignored. It is no wonder that villagers resorted to 
protest and, with time, became resigned to this situation. Those 
that stay in the area hope it ends soon; those that left felt they 
had no other choice.
Most of the sand mining in Koh Kong province is done in 
the southwestern part of the province, which has been the focus 
of this research. Two of Cambodia’s richest business entrepre-
neurs control these operations: they are each national senators 
and are likely making a lot of money. The export of sand from 
Koh Kong province is estimated to be worth US$ 28.7 mil-
lion annually (Global Witness 2010). Even if numbers and the 
importance of connections are exaggerated, this analysis gives 
a sense of the magnitude of this business. It is no wonder that 
fishers’ complaints are not taken seriously or that the Ministry 
of Environment and the Fisheries Administration are not in 
a position overtly to protest the sand mining. This is likely 
another case of Cambodia’s elite benefitting from resource 
extraction activities, as seen in other sectors (Le Billon 2002; 
Un and So 2009; Cock 2010). This operation also demonstrates 
how broader political economy issues can have a devastating 
impact upon an area. Although a significant effort has been 
made to support resource governance, in cases like this where 
business entrepreneurs have high-level connections and can 
make a significant profit, it appears that power does trump 
rationality.
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CONCLUSION
As this chapter has shown, resource governance policies do not 
necessarily unfold according to what is written nor are they 
always followed. Community fisheries policies and programs, 
designed to support fishers in managing their fishing grounds, 
have not been implemented as envisioned. For example, the 
Fisheries Administration has a limited budget to support patrol-
ling efforts, and in some cases staff may not be interested to 
do so; moreover, certain polices such as the banning of trawls 
in shallow waters are not enforced (to be fair, most govern-
ment departments are not enforcing all of their policies). Local 
governance processes, vis-à-vis commune development plan-
ning, have also not followed the prescribed ideal. As employing 
artificial reefs exemplifies, commune planning, the pinnacle of 
Cambodia’s decentralization agenda, may not be steered from 
the local level as is envisioned. This may not be a bad thing, 
however, if a provincial governor is creatively using policy to 
deal with issues that have proven difficult to solve such as fish-
eries conflicts. Finding a way to limit trawls—an illegal activity 
that no one could prevent—in the name of seagrass conserva-
tion was a brilliant move since all direct conflicts were avoided 
and no government department lost face in the process. This 
example illustrates the hybrid nature of resource governance 
in Cambodia, and why adapting governance processes to suit a 
cultural context may not be an inappropriate move.
Nonetheless, “steering hands” can be problematic and this 
type of informal, adaptive approach to policy will not always 
work. Sand mining speaks to this. In this case there is no cham-
pion willing to stop sand mining, normal policies designed to 
halt such levels of extraction are not followed and it appears 
that business entrepreneurs are very well connected. Given the 
serious amounts of money being made from sand mining, it is 
hard to imagine anyone is interested in stopping this type of 
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activity. Mineral development continues to be promoted as a 
way potentially to alleviate poverty, although this appears to be 
a rather rhetorical statement. Sand mining is an example of a 
missed development opportunity for both local citizens and the 
state in general. As is seen in the mangrove-estuary villages, 
development benefits do not stream down to local fishers or, 
from what my informal discussions suggest, to local govern-
ment officials either. Furthermore, there has been no talk of 
compensation for fishers’ livelihoods as former fishing grounds 
are no longer accessible resources. The poorest of the poor were 
forced to flee this area as a way of escaping their debts.
This chapter demonstrates, from another perspective, just 
how difficult it is to support ongoing resource management 
activities and resource governance more generally within 
Cambodia’s social-political context. It also illustrates that it 
requires more than a committee’s initiative to engage in active 
resource management practices. Even with decent policy and 
strong local will, efforts may be blocked by multiple actors. 
Higher-level political support is necessary in some cases. Yet 
the plight of smaller-scale fishers is not the most pressing issue 
for many government agencies, particularly those fishers liv-
ing in remote, frontier-like areas of the country. This suggests 
a rather real failure in governance at many levels, particularly 
the national level.
 
International mining firms see Cambodia as a new frontier that has 
yet to be explored. Unlike many other parts of the world, there has 
been little geological exploration of Cambodia since France ended 
its almost century-long colonisation in 1953. For this reason, and the 
fact that Cambodia is the only country in South East Asia that allows 
100 per cent foreign ownership, overseas mining companies have been 
keen to invest.18
As this quote illustrates, Cambodia continues to be promoted as a frontier to be explored for its potential development. 
Resource extraction has now been happening for over twenty 
years, leading to the depletion of Cambodia’s forests, serious 
overfishing, a surge in land prices and, most recently, an inter-
est in oil, gas and mining (Cox 2010). Extraction activities have 
shifted from one natural resource to another. For example, with 
the moratorium on logging in the late 1990s, entrepreneurs 
began to engage in land speculation, spurred on by road access, 
economic growth and general political stability. Between 2000 
and 2007, Cambodia’s economy grew by 9.5 percent per year, 
VI
Probing The failures
18 Invest in Cambodia, http://www.investincambodia.com/minerals.htm (accessed March 19, 
2010).
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second only to China (Moore 2010). Land prices rose signifi-
cantly during this same period, as did land concentration. In 
2008 the bottom 40 percent of the strata owned 5.4 percent 
of Cambodia’s arable land, whereas the top 20 percent owned 
70 percent of the land (Un and So 2009). Given Cambodia’s 
history with resource development thus far, it may be that oil, 
gas and mineral development will follow a similar pattern of 
extraction with business entrepreneurs benefitting far more than 
rural dwellers (Cock 2010).
The development of Cambodia’s natural resources can be 
seen as a blessing, in terms of contributing to the growth in 
GDP and for potentially lifting the country out of poverty, 
or as a curse, in terms of depleting Cambodia’s once strong 
natural resource base and thereby deeply impacting rural live-
lihoods (Auty 2007; Cock 2010). Regardless of one’s perspec-
tive, resource extraction activities do appear to be the norm. 
In this regard, headlines in the Cambodian English language 
newspapers are significant: “Mekong Could be in Danger” or 
“Fishermen Air Fresh Dredge Fears” or “Fishing Community 
in Kampot Protests” (Hirsch 2010; Sokheng and Strangio 2010; 
Vong 2009). International headlines are also telling: “Making 
a Killing in Cambodia; While most Cambodians spend their 
lives struggling against poverty, a spoilt, young elite enjoy 
all the privileges of vast wealth—and they aren’t ashamed to 
flaunt it” (Marshall 2010). A resource bonanza is happening in 
Cambodia. Considering that over eighty percent of Cambodia’s 
population remains in the rural areas, this is definitely a cause 
for concern. After all, landlessness, small land holdings and 
limited access to natural resources are primary factors that 
affect rural poverty (Diepart 2010).
It is, therefore, a real paradox that during this same period 
of extensive resource extraction, government bureaucrats have 
also been drafting and approving various pieces of resource 
governance legislation. Moreover, there has been, and continues 
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to be, a massive donor effort working toward enhancing local 
involvement in resource governance (Godfrey et al. 2000; Un 
and So 2009; Cock 2010; Gellman 2010). Cambodia continues 
to transform itself, meaning that actors may be working on a 
range of activities that are sometimes at odds with each other. 
This is a context whereby mineral development can take place 
in protected areas, in spite of regulations prohibiting this, and 
agricultural concessions can be granted to foreign businesses 
while local villagers struggle to get access to enough farmland 
to feed their families (Diepart 2010). The previous chapters have 
illustrated how people respond to this situation by often mov-
ing from one resource extraction opportunity to the next, until 
there are few options left by which to earn a livelihood. This is 
where local resource governance may come in, with the starting 
point being far from fair or just, or when people consider exiting 
rural areas altogether. There is, unfortunately, no guarantee of 
work in urban areas (Chandler 2010). This chapter provides a 
further reflection upon this resource governance situation by 
considering if and when resource policies work, and by further 
probing several resource governance failures discussed in the 
previous chapters.
PROBING RESOURCE GOVERNANCE FAILURES
This research case illustrates how the drafting and passing of 
new policy has not erased the underlying dynamics of resource 
competition nor has it shifted the distribution of economic 
benefits from natural resources to rural communities in any 
significant manner. Rural livelihoods continue to be affected by 
ongoing struggles for rights to access, manage and secure bene-
fits from natural resources—principally land, water, fisheries 
and forests—in the face of intensifying competition (CBNRM 
LI 2009; Van Acker 2010). A major issue, at this point, is not 
enshrining local rights into policies and laws, for this has been 
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actively pursued throughout the past decade, but rather people’s 
capacity to enact these rights in their particular situation. There 
is an almost normative assumption that once polices are passed, 
the particular management of a given issue and governing more 
generally can emerge. This is not proving to be the case.
Perhaps it is naive even to assume that creating decent 
policy will lead to policy uptake on the ground. Departmental 
cultures are not swayed simply because new policies are cre-
ated, particularly if no one is insisting that these new policies 
are consistently followed. Moreover, if nepotism and crony-
ism exists to the degree that is suggested (i.e., Gellman 2010; 
Un and So 2009; Hughes 2009), it will take serious shifts in 
worldview, particularly in terms of accountability, before these 
new policies are consistently taken up. After all, actors have 
embraced resource governance polices for a plethora of reasons. 
For instance, conservation organizations may be advocating 
for local involvement in resource management from a com-
mons management perspective (cf. Ostrom 1990) while donors 
focusing on interactions between humans and their environment 
may promote a social welfare perspective (cf. Béné et al. 2010). 
Others may buy into roll-out neo-liberal policies, having faith 
that market failures can be addressed by volunteer organizations 
in civil society (cf. McCarthy 2005). Government bureaucrats 
may support decentralized resource management initiatives 
as a way to penetrate rural areas and therefore work toward 
political consolidation (Hughes 2009). In other words, multiple 
logics may be used when promoting local resource governance 
(Mansfield 2007), which helps to explain why such policies are 
passed and why it then becomes challenging to get such policies 
to work in practice.
Given that such competing logics exist when legislation is 
drafted and then passed in support of local resource governance, 
one can appreciate why it may become a real challenge actually 
to enact such policies. Local resource governance would not 
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appear to be an obvious choice for government bureaucrats, 
until one considers the perspectives of roll-out neo-liberalism 
and political consolidation that government departments may 
adhere to. This also helps explain why government bureaucrats 
may not be particularly interested in actively supporting these 
mechanisms or in working toward resolving particular resource 
conflicts. At the same time, not all community members buy 
into the idea of local governance, and some committee members 
may be more interested in building their alliances and networks 
than in carrying out resource governance activities. In the 
particular part of Cambodia where this field investigation took 
place, the area is close to the Thai border, is a former Khmer 
Rouge stronghold and, until relatively recently, was isolated 
from the Cambodian capital, Phnom Penh. It is no wonder that 
resource governance is hard to enact in this situation.
Southwestern Cambodia has served as a resource frontier 
for the past twenty years, which helps to explain the ongoing 
interest from various local, national and regional actors in the 
natural resources in this area. Establishing forms of resource 
governance is nearly impossible in this type of context since 
it requires certain actors to give up revenue-generating oppor-
tunities. For these reasons, the resource governance successes 
explored must be well celebrated. This is not a context that eas-
ily supports this type of initiative: the leadership found within 
villages and within certain sectors of government are particu-
larly noteworthy. Indeed, it demonstrates how people are not 
passive actors in challenging situations, and how they do have 
agency. Moreover, it demonstrates that even in contexts where 
policies are not enacted as imagined, small gains can be made 
in terms of resource governance.
Throughout this book the potential for resource governance 
is highlighted; the success stories exist in stark contrast to the 
resource governance failures. Failures occur for a multitude of 
reasons and are not always that easy to tease apart. For example, 
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some issues that ought to be addressed at a local level are not; 
other issues that require collaboration between various actors 
somehow slip through the cracks and other issues can still 
only be handled by higher levels of government with a vision-
ary outlook for resource governance. More concretely, stolen 
fishing gear may demonstrate a failure in village governance, 
the challenge of getting support for community patrols may be 
a failure of co-management processes, and sand mining may 
illustrate a failure in national governance. It is noteworthy that 
resource governance failures are not scale-specific, contrary 
to what advocates of decentralization or centralization might 
theorize would happen (i.e., promoting either the state or local 
involvement as the solution to governance failures). As such, 
the following section carefully probes the nature of resource 
governance failures at different scales.
Failures at the Village Level
Chapter 4 demonstrates mixed success in the resource gov-
ernance efforts carried out in and around Koh Sralao village. 
Resource governance works to a certain extent: there is an 
active mangrove replanting campaign, a system for waste 
management and a committee that has ebbed and flowed in 
its activities over the past decade. These ongoing activities 
do demonstrate a sustained interest in resource management, 
even as funds wax and wane (PMCR 2008). What villagers and 
resource management committees chose to ignore or not work 
on may also be instructive.
Aspects of the open-access nature of the fisheries resources 
in southwestern Cambodia make a lot of sense. For instance, 
effort reduction is something that committee members see 
as unfair. They argue that fishers are poor to begin with and 
prefer to allow outside fishers into their fishing grounds rather 
than limiting access. It may very well be that there are some 
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unintended benefits from this approach (sure, fish are declining, 
but given how things currently work in Cambodia it is not clear 
to me that focusing on effort reduction or controlling resource 
access would actually lead to poverty reduction). As Béné et al. 
(2010: 32) note: “The main contribution of small-scale fisheries 
to poverty alleviation may lie, paradoxically in their semi-open 
or common access nature. Resource-poor people often rely more 
heavily on common resources than their better-off households.” 
This gives good pause for thought: perhaps the fishers of Koh 
Sralao are correct in not wanting to limit access, for this does 
speak to the welfare function of the fishery.
Other issues that are not solved at a local level are more puz-
zling. The continuation of gear theft, as an example, may be a 
resource governance failure or there may be other explanations. 
Many respondents whom I interviewed over the years faced 
severe debt levels as a result of fishing gear theft. As much as 
I tried to engage local institutions and donor organizations into 
a discussion around this issue, I consistently failed to generate 
serious interest. Gear theft is likely more than a cyclical process 
of people stealing from each other in response to individual 
gear being stolen, although this happens too, as someone or a 
group of people are likely benefitting from this trade. How is 
it that gear theft remains such a persistent issue, persistent to 
the point that it has become a norm?
When explaining this situation to others, particularly academ-
ics, an immediate reaction has been that Koh Sralao must lack 
in social capital, for why else would gear theft be occurring? 
Although pointing to a lack of social capital is in many ways 
an obvious explanation, it strikes me as somehow too simplistic 
to be helpful in understanding this situation. Putnam (1995: 67) 
defines social capital as the “features of social organization, 
such as networks, norms, and trust that facilitate coordina-
tion and cooperation for mutual benefit.” He further argues 
that those societies rich in social capital have a sense of “civic 
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 virtue” embedded in a network of reciprocal relations. This 
differs from societies that have good individuals who are work-
ing in isolation (Putnam 2000). As such, it is theorized that in 
places that are low in social capital it is hard to build trust, col-
lective action and commons governance (Pretty and Ward 2001).
Yet there is another dimension of social capital that is worth 
thinking about, particularly in the context of Koh Sralao village. 
Access to social capital in terms of resources depends greatly 
on the power, position and location of villagers (Bourdieu 1980). 
Certain members within any village, due to their power and 
societal position, may sustain privileges that, in turn, underpin 
and disadvantage other groups. In other words, powerful people 
can undermine the social capital of less powerful groups. Such 
insights do help to explain why gear theft may be something 
no one can tackle, particularly if a powerful subsection in the 
village or someone with connections outside the village is sup-
porting this practice.
Of course, there are several other possible explanations for 
this situation. A contributing factor may be that gear theft is a 
particularly contentious issue that is not easily observable. It 
may also be that gear theft is seen as part of the risk of doing 
business as a fisher. In other words, it is the social transaction 
cost necessary in pursuing this type of livelihood. Although 
the prevalence of gear theft in Koh Sralao suggests a failure 
in local resource governance, it may just be that this is not a 
realistic issue for a resource management committee to address. 
After all, Koh Sralao committee members are working to instil 
resource governance in a frontier context within a seriously 
declining fishery. Many people came to the area to pursue a 
host of resource extraction opportunities. Now that most local 
residents no longer have opportunities in other resource sectors, 
the focus is on the fishery where a certain level of lawlessness 
continues to pervade. If Cambodia, in general, suffers from 
corruption and accountability issues (TI 2009), gear theft is 
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an example of how this is found throughout society to varying 
degrees. Gear theft serves as a proxy of the challenges of get-
ting resource governance to work on complex issues. It would 
take a serious effort, over many years, to tackle such an issue, 
and the incentive structures currently in place for local resource 
governance do not provide enough support to make such an 
effort worthwhile.
My own work in other Asian fishing communities suggests to 
me that stolen fishing gear is not unique to the Cambodian con-
text. This is a resource governance issue that is under-explored, 
under-reported and under-addressed, not just in Cambodia but 
elsewhere, too. For example, ten scholarly articles discussing 
gear theft within the fisheries sector were found in Scholar’s 
Portal (a main database for social sciences research) between 
2000 and 2010. What this scarce literature suggests is that fish-
ers may travel further distances to avoid traps getting stolen 
(Daw 2008) and require extensive support in monitoring and 
surveillance if this problem is to be solved (Al-Masroori et al. 
2009). This does not help me better to analyze the situation in 
Koh Sralao; nothing is written about how local institutions may 
be involved in solving this type of issue. I somehow sense that 
the committee in Koh Sralao could tackle this problem, since 
they themselves suggested a more active monitoring campaign 
at one point and have tried a series of things over the years. This, 
therefore, begs the question of whether this is seen as a reality 
that comes with life working in a sector such as the fishery.
Failed Partnerships
Based on the work in southwestern Cambodia, it would seem 
that village-government partnerships are not always working 
very well, particularly on more contentious issues. Village-
focused policies were designed to provide a platform for 
 stakeholder  collaboration. Although the nature of these arrange
140  Life, Fish and Mangroves
ments varies, their main thrust is to enable dialogue between 
stakeholders to ensure better resource management outcomes 
at a local level (Armitage et al. 2009). Accordingly, government 
bureaucrats are meant to take a role in either supporting or in 
working with village members to manage local resources. In 
reality, however, few government departments are able to sup-
port local work in an ongoing manner. Technical departments, 
whether fisheries, forestry or an environment department, do 
not have significant operating budgets since decentralization 
reforms have not, yet, resulted in any serious administrative 
decentralization (Turner 2006). A lack of finances is the first 
reason that any government official will cite when explaining 
why co-management approaches are not always working.
But more than this is going on. There is little incentive 
for a bureaucrat to help a community to patrol or to engage 
in conflict management. The departmental culture does not 
encourage this, and it may even be discouraged since a certain 
amount of illegal activity can benefit departments from the 
informal collection of fees. This is never easy to “prove,” but 
the practice of rent-seeking is thought to be rife in Cambodia 
(Un and So 2009; Global Witness 2009). Although some 
bureaucrats at a central level may buy into the idea of village-
government collaboration on resource management, this prac-
tice has not penetrated throughout the governance system. 
It would take a serious effort at the central level to ensure 
these practices were adopted in reality. Departments within 
a ministry hold different perspectives toward local resource 
governance, such as the Community Fisheries Office whose 
mandate is to support community fisheries and the Inspection 
Office whose job is to inspect production and police fishing 
activities. Thus, bureaucrats who sanction co-management are 
facing internal struggles to promote the adoption of this type of 
approach.
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Many authors studying local resource governance processes 
argue that a well-defined resource system, small-scale resource 
contexts, a clear and identifiable set of social entities with 
shared interests and reasonably clear property rights are con-
ditions that will enable village-government partnerships to be 
successful (Ostrom 1990; Berkes 2006; Armitage et al. 2009). 
If one thinks about this list in the context of the mangrove-
estuary villages described in this book, one begins to realize 
how unlikely such conditions may be in reality. To be frank, 
I doubt that the villages of southwestern Cambodia are par-
ticularly unique. After all, when are social-ecological systems 
well-defined with only a few users being interested in them? 
The experience of Koh Sralao villagers, and those surrounding 
Chrouy Pros Bay, may not be so different from many social-
ecological contexts where multiple actors are interested in the 
same natural resources. In our globalized world, entrepreneurs 
are continuously searching for opportunities to exploit natural 
resources, and Cambodia, with its relatively rich natural resour-
ces (although there has been a significant depletion of forests 
and fish stocks, some do remain, and mineral exploitation is 
only just beginning) and weakly enforced laws, is an attractive 
place. Against all odds, there have been moments when local 
resource governance has worked, particularly in and around 
villages.
Failures in National Leadership
Sand mining is an issue that exhibits how national ministries are 
not following their own policies. The Ministry of Environment 
holds jurisdiction over protected areas and sites of ecological 
significance (i.e., Ramsar sites, biodiversity reserves) and the 
Fisheries Administration is responsible for the conservation 
and management of aquatic resources throughout Cambodia. 
Meanwhile, the Ministry of Industry Mines and Energy is 
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responsible for mineral exploration, with the Ministry of Water 
Resources and Meteorology focusing on both water resources 
and minerals. If each ministry were to follow its mandate, the 
scale of sand mining would be far smaller, the impacts carefully 
monitored. This is because an environmental impact assess-
ment would be conducted by the Ministry of Environment, 
the Ministry of Fisheries would undertake an aquatic survey 
to assess the impact of sand mining on fish stocks and the 
concessions granted by the Ministry of Industry, Mines and 
Energy and the Ministry of Water Resources and Meteorology 
would be small in nature and cause minimum ecological harm. 
Yet, in the popular narrative, there has been an emphasis on 
how mineral, oil and gas exploration may be one way to bring 
Cambodia’s population out of poverty (Cox 2010), and it appears 
that existing policies are not applied to sand mining in coastal 
areas. Why is no one encouraging the Cambodian government 
to take a longer-term view on sustainability or questioning the 
justice of a few elite actors making an extraordinary profit from 
a commons resource to the detriment of the local ecology and 
population?
Just as frustrating is that village protests do not appear to 
be taken seriously, official complaints launched through gov-
ernment channels are pending and no international donor has 
championed this issue. It has been well publicized that there are 
serious accountability issues with the Cambodian government 
when it comes to extractive industries (Global Witness 2009). 
Many organizations have not wanted to touch this issue, since 
it relates to contracts given out to the highest members of the 
Cambodian government (i.e., national senators). It is an issue 
that can only be addressed at the highest levels, such as with the 
prime minister. Although in May 2009 the Cambodian prime 
minster did call for a halt to sand mining activities, the focus 
of this ban was inland sand mining, not coastal activities. As 
such, mining activities increased in southwestern Cambodia 
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throughout 2009 and 2010 (Global Witness 2010). This is a case 
where no checks and balances are in place, making it impos-
sible to find a solution. Such an activity makes a mockery of the 
work of villagers, of policy-makers supporting local resource 
governance and of many in the donor community.
CONCLUSION
Between powerful actors angling to exploit natural resources 
and resource policy processes that, in many ways, are designed 
to be counter-intuitive to how things function in practice, it is no 
wonder that results are mixed. Perhaps the situation in Chrouy 
Pros Bay is far more the norm than the work of the committee 
in Koh Sralao, which demonstrates leadership, risk-taking and 
a willingness to do something for the “greater good” of the 
area. Not all communities in Cambodia are willing to invest so 
much effort into this, particularly since people are not paid to 
be involved in this type of work. What is done in Koh Sralao is 
arguably more than many North Americans ever do in terms of 
getting involved in local governance issues. Actors are capable, 
even within severely restricted social spaces, of formulating 
decisions, acting upon them and innovating or experimenting 
(Long and Long 1992), as well as interpreting policies and even 
resisting them (Scott 1985). Unfortunately, strong leadership at a 
local level will only go so far if other actors higher in the chain 
of command are not also supporting resource governance prac-
tices. In this current context, it is no surprise that actors will hit 
stumbling blocks and, in spite of a decent policy environment 
that suggests otherwise, business interests often win. There 
is a Khmer saying that “corrupt officials know how to share 
corruption money” (Un and So 2009: 133), suggesting that 
enough people are seeing the benefits from resource exploita-
tion activities; as usual, these benefits are not “bottom friendly.”
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Decentralized resource governance processes seem “to pro-
vide an answer to the rigidity of centralized structures and a 
response to past failings, but they can also be a smokescreen 
for things we do when we are not sure what it is we are doing” 
(Arthur et al. 2011: 15). For both the policy and develop-
ment communities it can become a justification for further 
experimentation in contexts that are poorly understood, and 
where outcomes of practice are uncertain, unpredictable and 
sometimes undesirable. The resource governance failures of 
southwestern Cambodia serve as a reality check for understand-
ing how resource governance processes may be implemented. 
A major stumbling block for local resource governance pro-
cesses is power relations and policy uptake; this is what needs 
to be targeted. Moreover, a supportive environment that enables 
policy to be reflexive and pertinent to ever-changing local con-
texts needs to be fostered.
Policy reforms promoting local resource governance are not working out as envisioned.19 Although people do engage in 
resource governance in creative ways, there are many failures 
along the road. The broad appeal of local resource governance 
may, in part, explain why it is so difficult to enact. Government 
actors, as an example, support resource governance for mul-
tiple reasons including to promote roll-out, neo-liberal policies 
(McCarthy 2005), to work toward greater political consolida-
tion (Hughes 2009) or to support community involvement in 
resource management (Ostrom 2009). Since these actors are 
likely to advance diverse aspects of any particular resource 
governance policy, it can hardly be surprising that imple-
mentation will be chaotic and confusing. Even if government 
departments wanted to support the processes necessary for 
genuine decentralization, it would be difficult since specific 
departments dealing with natural resource conservation do 
ConClusion:  
resourCe governanCe  
aT The margins
19 Resource governance reforms are not working out as envisioned in Cambodia or and at 
a regional level. For example, decentralization processes in post-Suharto Indonesia have 
not halted deforestation practices and the Philippines struggles to manage its fishery in 
spite of excellent policies that support local governance (McCarthy 2006; Salayo et al. 
2008). Cambodia’s experience, too, is far from ideal.
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not have large budgets and may also face capacity challenges. 
Moreover, it really takes time before policy processes are sys-
tematically taken up and people begin to buy into notions of 
local resource governance and “co” models as ways to govern 
natural resources.
It is no wonder that resource governance results are patchy 
at best and that this is a difficult agenda to pursue. In some 
ways, pursuing this type of governance experiment in a place 
like Cambodia seems almost unrealistic, given its historical 
roots and emerging reality. After all, this is a place where 
business entrepreneurs boast about Cambodia’s frontier status, 
while others argue that Cambodia’s natural resources, particu-
larly future oil revenues, are its development curse (Le Billon 
2002; Un and So 2009). Moreover, the notion of locally driven 
resource governance does not have particularly strong roots 
in Cambodia, particularly in rural, lowland villages.20 Yet 
donors, policy-makers and village members alike have seized 
upon an opportunity to create policy that does give more voice 
to citizens and allows them a role in contributing to village 
governance, even if only in a few cases. After all, few policies 
existed in the 1980s and early 1990s, post-Khmer Rouge, and 
the past fifteen years have been a chance to reconstruct and to 
get things “right,” or at least “better.” This is an appealing idea, 
which helps to explain why such a novel resource governance 
experiment is underway in a context like Cambodia’s.
20 Specific resource management initiatives appear to have been driven by local government 
officials who were often responding to directives from higher authorities (Marschke 
1999; Frings 1997). This may be linked to the relatively low population pressure found 
in Cambodia’s countryside, thereby avoiding a tragedy of the commons situation (à la 
Hardin) (Diepart 2010). This is not to suggest that people did not have a say in local 
resources, and certain forms of resource management do appear particularly around for-
est protection and charcoal production (cf. Marschke 1999; Evans et al. 2004). In terms 
of specific fisheries management activities, however, this appears limited to mangrove 
or flood forest protection rather than active no-take zones or gear restriction, from what 
I can tell.
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Considering the landscape where this research took place, 
a Wild West-type of area that held, until quite recently, lush 
forests and healthy fisheries, and continues to hold other valu-
able coastal resources like sand, seagrass, corals and oil, the 
successes are rather impressive. In many ways, communities 
have beaten the odds with their successes, for they have done 
so in the absence of much external support. As Sovanna (2008), 
the head of Koh Sralao’s resource management committee, 
notes, “[W]e have learned a lot by working on these issues. 
We are now better organized, can deal with certain conflicts 
ourselves and know what the law says. We can deal with many 
small issues just not the big issues.” Undoubtedly, communities 
participating actively in resource governance have gotten some-
thing out of the process; if nothing else, confidence has been 
enhanced (Marschke and Sinclair 2009). To do nothing was not 
an option for members of these communities. Nonetheless, the 
protection of natural resources in and around these villages is 
not particularly easy and is not always proving to be fruitful, 
particularly in cases where there are large amounts of money to 
be made (large-scale fishing, sand mining). With every success 
that can be celebrated emerges another issue that is cause for 
serious frustration. It will be worth following up on the com-
mittee’s work in the years to come, to see if sand mining has 
indeed proved to be the tipping point for resource-dependent 
villagers, or if those that remain are able to recover and har-
ness their leadership and community organizing skills toward 
other forms of resource governance (i.e., certification schemes, 
avoided deforestation, payment for ecosystem services or find-
ing ways to halt fisheries declines). Perhaps an even bigger 
question is if villagers will see this as worthwhile.
Let me end this story with a few final thoughts.
First, local resource governance does not always make sense, 
even in resource-dependent villages. This is because declining 
resources are only one contributing factor in shaping people’s 
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lives. People are further marginalized by their location, their 
limited access to education and a lack of productive resour-
ces available to them. This is not to suggest that resources in 
and around villages should not be protected, conserved and, 
where appropriate, governed. Rather, the burden of this effort 
should not always be shouldered by poorer, rural residents. 
Governments and other organizations need to recognize and 
plan for the buffering role that natural resources play, in the 
sense of providing a fallback strategy for households. Fish and 
forest spaces absorb unskilled surplus labour and provide a 
safety net, along with risk mitigation mechanisms for poorer 
households facing real livelihood insecurities (Béné et al. 2010). 
What is also needed is investment in solving resource-related 
conflicts, including patrolling efforts, a commitment to regional 
forms of resource governance, investments in health and edu-
cation and working toward livelihood security, in addition to 
ensuring that common spaces exist for fishers and other local 
dwellers to access. When resource governance is pursued, there 
must be local leaders willing to pursue this agenda, particularly 
in cases where resource governance processes are designed and 
parachuted in by outside actors, along with appropriate insti-
tutional support that includes troubleshooting or backstopping. 
How this can work in an era of greater livelihood mobility, 
where people have not been rooted longer in just one place, is 
another pressing question.
Second, decentralized resource governance as it is currently 
enacted will not work in Cambodia. Even with donor policies 
(and the resource governance literature) being strongly oriented 
toward decentralized resource governance, Cambodia’s prob-
lems of deforestation, aquatic stock declines and other forms 
of resource exploitation do not show any signs of abating. 
Many decentralized resource policies, which were designed 
with good intentions, do not support rural livelihoods as some 
policies are manipulated and others are ignored. Policy changes 
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can be rather meaningless, particularly if the entrepreneurial 
elites do not themselves adhere to them or if such changes 
harm patronage networks (Burgos and Ear 2010). Cambodian 
elites do earn significant money from Cambodia’s natural 
resource base, channelling some of this money, in turn, back 
into their traditional patrimonial power bases (Un and So 2009; 
Chandler 2010). This ensures the continuation of some forms of 
resource exploitation, so long as it pays off for those involved 
(Cock 2010). Moreover, since resource exploitation often gets 
handled in the informal realm, it is hard to make sense of what 
has been negotiated and agreed upon, and it is even harder 
to know who is in a position or is interested to change this 
system. Even in cases where major protests have occurred, it 
is only small-scale resource problems that tend to get solved. 
This situation needs to change, with solutions being found 
for the most pressing natural resource issues, if the decline of 
Cambodia’s natural resource base is to be abated. Sustainable 
forms of resource extraction need to be given far greater con-
sideration, to ensure that villagers will see greater benefits than 
they currently do and to work toward some form of ecosystem 
sustainability.
This leads me to my third point: decentralized resource gov-
ernance should not be the entry point to resource governance 
in Cambodia. Rather, a serious resource governance effort is 
needed at higher levels of the governance system. As Andersson 
and Ostrom (2008: 88) note, “[a] sophisticated governance 
system recognizes the multi-scale aspects of natural resource 
governance as well as the presence of countervailing incentives, 
and seeks to correct them.” There is a certain amount of artifici-
ality in strongly promoting decentralization or co-management 
processes in a context like Cambodia, for this negates both 
how Khmer society functions and existing hierarchies (Hughes 
2009; Gellman 2010). Shifting power relations and control 
toward subnational levels is not easy. This is not to take away 
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from local governance mechanisms, since this case shows how 
part of the solution lies with local actors and those supporting 
them. Rather, it suggests that centralizing certain aspects of 
local resource governance may be more important in this type 
of context than what is currently promoted in many donor poli-
cies. For example, even with Cambodia’s recent policy reforms, 
people continue to manage the expectations and needs of their 
superiors (Hughes 2009). For these reasons, certain changes can 
only really begin with central technical agencies. Leadership is 
needed from these national agencies; only with such leadership 
will appropriate support be given to subnational levels within 
the system. Since there is respect for hierarchy and for informal 
networks, why not work with these norms to find solutions to 
the most pressing issues? As such, it may be that some contexts 
require centralized leadership, with elements of a top-down 
approach, if other forms of resource governance are to exist, 
potentially to flourish. This is an important point to consider.
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